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
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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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The Future of Force

and American Strategy

Eliot A. Cohen

WHAT DIRECTION should American strategy take? Indeed, does it have a future at all, or has the end of the Cold War and the apparent triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe rendered it obsolete? If the need for strategy—defined as the preparation and use of military power for the ends of policy—does persist, how should Americans prepare themselves to meet the challenges of the last decade of this century?

The Strategic Revolution

THE REVOLUTIONS of 1989 have by no means ended, but surely enough has occurred to make it obvious that international politics has undergone an epochal change. The Soviet empire has collapsed. The Kremlin has allowed its Eastern European glacis to crumble away even as the forces of dissent and hatred undermine the USSR itself. The multiple crises of the Soviet Union reinforce each other. Although by a combination of statecraft and luck the Soviet Union may survive, it is equally likely that it will fragment into a loose federation of independent republics or even collapse altogether.

For over forty years American strategy and defense planning has focused on the Soviet threat. That threat is disintegrating, and Soviet military power is undergoing a long-term and irreversible reduction. If so, one must ask where American defense planning should concentrate its attention henceforth, and how it should adapt to new challenges. Such a mammoth practical and conceptual task would be complex enough in any circumstances. It is made more difficult, however, by a variety of arguments to the effect that military force is no longer an important factor in world politics, that traditional considerations of *Machtpolitik* will lose or have lost their primacy; that force, in other words, is finished.

A lively debate has already occurred in these pages on this latter point, focusing on Francis Fukuyama's audacious argument that history has come to, or is coming to, an end. Others have advanced similar arguments for the obsolescence of force. Even an analyst of such impeccably hawkish credentials as Edward Luttwak has put forth the proposition that the "methods of commerce are displacing military methods," and that the "decay of the military grammar of geopolitics" is a central fact of contemporary international politics.[1] On the whole, those who argue that military force is becoming less important appeared to

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be gaining the day, at least until the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. This debate, however, transcends the jolt delivered by Saddam Hussein, and merits examination on its own terms. In the unlikely event of a peaceful solution in the Persian Gulf, it will re-emerge; in the case of war, many will choose to see the Kuwaiti episode as a staggering error made by a dictator at odds with the deeper forces of his time.

THERE ARE three core arguments for the dwindling importance of force in international politics. First, it is maintained that the development of the techniques of warfare have made military power increasingly unappealing as a tool of international politics; or, more extreme, that modern weapons have made military power *unusable* for purposes of foreign policy. Nuclear weapons create the kind of stalemate that perversely but blessedly created the long peace of the Cold War; chemical weapons serve as the poor man's atomic bomb; conventional weaponry including such modern refinements as cluster bombs, fuel-air explosives, and multiple rocket launchers make even that form of conflict too difficult to control. Not man's virtue, but his diabolical ingenuity in creating engines of destruction, has brought peace. Or has it?

Nuclear weapons probably—one cannot be certain about events that did not happen—prevented an all-out U.S.-Soviet war. But nuclear weapons have most assuredly not prevented the launching of wars, some quite large, against nuclear-armed states. The North Koreans and Chinese in the Korean War, the Vietnamese Communists in the Indochina War, the Arabs in the Yom Kippur War, and the Argentines in the Falklands War did not let their opponents' nuclear weapons stop them from using a great deal of force to secure their political objectives. Vast disproportions in firepower attributable to nuclear weapons did not prevent the Vietnamese from fighting a bitter frontier war with China, Afghan mountaineers from harassing Soviet invaders, or Palestinian and Shiite terrorists from raiding Israeli border settlements. And the real or potential existence of nuclear weapons has come very close to *inducing* warfare, as indicated by Soviet feelers about preventive war against China in the Nixon administration and the Israeli raid on the Iraqi Osirak reactor. Nuclear weapons exercise certain kinds of inhibiting effects on conflict, but in other cases they may provoke it—would the United States, indeed *should* the United States stand idly by if Muammar Qaddafi were to acquire an atomic bomb?

In other cases, nuclear weapons clearly do not prevent warfare, although they may set certain limits to it. It would be a terrible mistake to think that the elaborate and arid logic of nuclear deterrence that operated between the superpowers will continue to hold elsewhere. The U.S.-Soviet confrontation took place between a stable, pacific, and contented democracy and a highly rational, cautious dictatorship that found nothing inherently shameful about retreating in the face of superior force. It was, in many ways, an ideal opposition, and one highly unlikely to be repeated.

Are chemical weapons the equivalent of nuclear weapons in their deterrent effects? One should not overdo the comparison, either in terms of destructiveness (bad weather can drastically reduce the impact of a chemical attack) or psychology. After Hiroshima

[1]Fukuyama's essay, "The End of History?" appeared in *The National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989). Responses to it in that issue and the next, most notably Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism" in the Fall 1989 issue, cover some of the same ground that are dealt with here, but with a rather different focus. See also John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Fred C. Iklé, "The Ghost in the Pentagon," *The National Interest*, no. 19 (Spring 1990), also deals with some of the issues covered in this essay. Edward Luttwak's "From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics" appeared in *The National Interest*, no. 20 (Summer 1990).

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and Nagasaki there was an altogether healthy taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, which we should attempt to preserve. Chemical weapons, in contrast, were used repeatedly during World War I and on many occasions since, including, it appears, in Southeast Asia. The Iraqi use of chemicals in the war with Iran was particularly chilling: chemical weapons were used openly and successfully (in both the tactical and strategic senses). No international sanctions followed their use. (Indeed, in that conflict the United States tilted toward the side that had used them.) Probably the day will come when the civilized nations will regret their failure to punish those who used such weapons. For we may be entering an age in which chemical weapons are used by more parties rather than fewer.

Has conventional conflict become so terrible that man cannot wage it? The view has been pressed so many times in the past—from Ivan Bloch's dire predictions before 1914 of the slaughter that would ensue, to the terrifying predictions of annihilation through aerial bombardment in the interwar period—that a certain skepticism is warranted. Some modern weapons—highly precise long-range cruise missiles for example—appear to make violence more controllable. And other modern weapons contribute to the persistence of war, because they give the underdog a fighting chance. The Soviets discovered this unpleasant fact in battles with Afghan tribesmen who, despite their poverty and rudimentary educations, managed to master the use of Stinger missiles in a few weeks. Certain kinds of conventional weapons are now much easier to acquire than ever before, since Chilean, Chinese, and South African suppliers, among many others, ask few embarrassing questions about the uses of their cluster bombs, ballistic missiles, and long-range artillery.

What is almost certain is that we are entering a period of technological change in warfare so dramatic that it justifies the Soviet description: "the revolution in military affairs," a term they have applied to the invention of nuclear weapons, and before that, the advent of the tank and the airplane. It is a revolution brought about by a host of technologies, particularly those involving information processing. Although the Soviets have thought through some of its implications, neither they nor we can claim fully to understand it. What this means, however, is that war will take very different forms than it did in the past, not that it will cease to exist.

In the past, changes in technology and in politics drastically altered the destructiveness of war (compare the wars of religion in the seventeenth century with those of kings in the eighteenth and those of nations in the nineteenth). Similar changes may be expected in the future, but the essence of war—armed conflict between political entities—will not become impossible. In his *Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflections*, Raymond Aron observes that "our century, in fact, presents simultaneously the most varied forms of combat, from the terrorist act to carpet bombing—war has never been so polymorphous, it has never been so omnipresent." The ambush in a Kashmiri village, the terrorist outrage in a London office building, the stone-throwing of masked youths in a West Bank village—these are battles in larger campaigns every bit as much as the set piece engagements of the battle for the Faw Peninsula in Iraq or the siege of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL arguments for the obsolescence of war are thus either flimsy or partial. A more persuasive case is made by those who point to the spread of free enterprise and liberal democracy, and the death of communism. They rightly scoff at those who contend that in principle the United States and Canada, newly-united Germany, and France will be potential military opponents once the overarching fear of the USSR has vanished. Small-scale fighting may go on in obscure corners of the world, they argue, but the advanced, secure, and liberal democracies of North America, Europe, and Australia will never contemplate armed conflict with each other.

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As liberal regimes spread, so too will the zone of peace. Meanwhile, the overwhelming preponderance of military power residing in the free world, and its irrelevance to political and economic disputes within that world, will debase traditional strategy to only marginal importance.

But the argument for peace through democracy needs to be qualified in many ways. It was, after all, the democratization of conflict in the nineteenth century that restored a ferocity to warfare unknown since the seventeenth century; the bloodiest war in American history remains the one fought between two (by today's standards flawed) democracies—the Civil War. Concentration camps appeared during another conflict between two limited democracies, the Boer War. World War I was launched by two regimes—Wilhelmine Germany and Austria-Hungary—that had greater representation and more equitable legal systems than those of many important states today. And even when modern liberal democracies go to war they do not necessarily moderate the scope of the violence they apply; indeed, sensitivity to their own casualties sometimes leads to profligate uses of firepower or violent efforts to end wars quickly. Shaky democracies fight each other all the time. This past spring India and Pakistan came close, once again, to open warfare. We must remind ourselves just how peculiar the wealthy and secure democracies of the West are, how painful their evolution to stability and the horror of war with each other has been. Perhaps other countries will find short-cuts to those conditions, but it would be foolish to assume they will.

Moreover, although at the moment Western-style liberal democracy appears to be the most appealing form of government, we should not be complacent about its durability, especially where it is newly established. Will its global popularity withstand major economic setbacks, or even a prolonged failure to deliver the goods to developing nations eager to reach European, Japanese, and American standards of living? George Orwell observed in 1940:

> Nearly all Western thought since the last war, certainly all "progressive" thought, has assumed tacitly that human beings desire nothing beyond ease, security and avoidance of pain. . . . Hitler, because in his own joyless mind he feels it with exceptional strength, knows that human beings *don't* only want comfort, safety, short working-hours, hygiene, birth-control, and, in general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to mention drums, flags and loyalty parades. . . . Whereas socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people "I offer you a good time," Hitler has said to them "I offer you struggle, danger and death," and as a result, a whole nation flings itself at his feet.[2]

Can we disregard this entirely as a relic of far off times? Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait initially made him more popular at home, not less. The "end of history" argument, intriguing though it is, has many flaws. One may sum up one critique of it by noting how much of its plausibility hinges on one's view of Auschwitz. If one believes that the mad slaughter of the Holocaust was merely a horrible blip in man's general progress to consumerism, one may accept the argument. If, however, one sees in Hitler's war proof that anything is possible, that history is not linear, and that evil, including the evil that breeds civilization-shattering wars, is a permanent part of man's makeup, one cannot think that history is at an end or ending.

Liberal democracy gained victory in the

[2]George Orwell, "Review of *Mein Kampf* by Adolf Hitler," in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, ed., *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. II, My Country Right or Left, 1940–1943* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), p. 14. Orwell noted that "Perhaps later on they will get sick of it and change their minds, as at the end of the last war. After a few years of slaughter and starvation 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' is a good slogan, but at this moment 'better an end with horror than a horror without end' is a winner."

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Cold War by showing a persistence and a courage that many did not expect, and by delivering a prosperity that few could have imagined a half century ago. But the collapse of the Soviet empire owes as much, and perhaps more, to the fundamental hollowness and self-destructive nature of Marxism-Leninism. But other ideologies, as yet dimly foreseen, may pose threats equivalent to those of communism in its heyday, as may organized religions. Secular Western intellectuals, themselves immune to religious passion, may underestimate the power such beliefs exert not only on backward cobblers and peasant farmers, but on computer programmers, engineers, professors, and generals.

Furthermore, democracy may come under assault from wholly novel angles of attack. Are we certain, for instance, that the biological bases of liberal democracy, which assume equality and free will, will remain secure? If it becomes possible, as it well might, to breed men and women as easily as cattle are now bred, can we be quite certain that no one will exploit such awful possibilities for political purposes? "The present nature of man is tough and resilient. It casts up its sparks of genius in the darkest and most unexpected places." Thus wrote Churchill as he wondered about this very question in a prescient essay entitled "Fifty Years Hence" (in *Amid These Storms*). But suppose, he asked, a political elite could alter that nature in the laboratory? How will democracies adapt to the possibility that, despite Jefferson's famous dictum, some men may indeed be born with spurs on their feet, and others with saddles on their backs?

A third and final argument for the obsolescence of force comes from the rise of global economic interdependence, and the general (or rather purported) decline in the autonomy and importance of the nation-state. Here again, an awareness of history inclines one to skepticism: Norman Angell traced this kind of interdependence before World War I and proclaimed that it made war impossible. In the 1970s a band of academic theorists put forward the same arguments, which crumbled in the face of wars in the Middle East and Soviet-supported conflicts in Africa and Asia. Of course, the case should not be overstated: "geo-economics," as Edward Luttwak terms it, *is* of rising importance, and so too are such novel problems as those of environmental pollution.

BUT JUST as it would be foolish to ignore the emergence of new transnational forces and agencies on the one hand, and difficult global problems on the other, it would be wrong to succumb to the fallacy of interpreting all international developments as portents of global peace. Political entities fight wars; indeed, it is the political character of warfare that distinguishes it from the violence of organized crime. War can do quite well in the absence of nation-states: empires, city-states, confederations, and aspiring subnational groups have all used warfare to preserve or aggrandize themselves. And as the Crown Prince of Jordan recently warned, we may see greater conflict because of the attempt to break up nation-states. Certainly, the crack-up of empires is rarely peaceful, and we stand on the verge of the dissolution of the world's greatest continental empire, the Soviet Union. The fissiparous tendencies of modern ethnic strife—in the USSR, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, South Asia, and Lebanon—carry an implicit threat of violence. International institutions such as the European Community may breed peace, although the rise of the EC is surely as much a consequence of peace as a cause of it. In any case, the EC is the exception, not the rule: other organizations such as ASEAN, the OAU, and the OAS have not had anything like the vigor of the European Community.

It is unlikely that new collective security arrangements—directed not against a potential enemy but against any and all potential aggressors—can replace the traditional forms of armament and alliances. The history of such pacts, and most notably of the League of Nations, is that they simply do not work. When the crunch comes, states either cannot agree on the definition of aggression, do not

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find it in their interests to oppose the aggressor, or simply do not have the stomach to use force. Collective security pacts therefore become marginal talking shops (which is all the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, for example, can ever be) or they scare off potential members. If the U.S. Senate, for instance, thought that by ratifying a treaty it would commit the country to military intervention in a border war between Hungary and Romania, say, would it ever go along with such a notion?

All three arguments for an era of peace—the horrific quality of modern military technology, the spread of democracy, and the rise of transnational issues and actors—contain important truths. But neither separately nor together do they warrant a general conclusion that military power is becoming obsolete, or that war will not be used by states and other political groups. The causes of war remain as they were described by Thucydides, namely fear, ambition, and the desire for gain. It is only appropriate to celebrate the spread of freedom in and the waning of the threat from the East. But it would be well to temper our optimism with Alexander Hamilton's unsparing assessment of human affairs. In the *Federalist Papers* No. 6, he warned those who would believe in the "paradox of perpetual peace" that men are "ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious." "Momentary passions, and immediate interests," he argued, "have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice." And democratic governments are not immune from such drives. They too are "subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and other irregular and violent propensities."

Senator Alan Simpson likes to tell a story of Senator Robert Dole's June 1990 trip to Iraq. Dole, who had been wounded in World War II, told the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein:

> "I've never spoken personally like this, but do you see this arm?" and he gestured with his withered right arm. "I have this daily reminder of the futility of war," he said. "That's why we're here." Even the Iraqi leader sat in stunned silence, Simpson said.[3]

Dole had expressed a profoundly untrue piety of contemporary politics. Perhaps Saddam's "stunned silence" reflected an awareness that Dole had, in fact, fought in the *least* futile war of the twentieth century. But it is more likely that a victorious warlord who routinely (and on occasion, it is said, personally) executes political opponents found it impossible to take seriously a senior statesman in the world's most powerful nation who thus dismissed the uses of force. And less than two months later, Saddam demonstrated his view of the utility of force (and opinion of American statesmanship) by one of the most blatant acts of aggression since the Munich crisis of 1938.

War, and potential war, will remain a feature of international politics. Its sources will be many and changing, from ethnic animosity to irredentism, from competition for power to religious fanaticism. Its stakes will include territory (including valuable offshore properties), water rights, and control of populations. It will result from traditional kinds of animosities, but also from the second and third order consequences of developments that are intrinsically unforeseeable. Economic depression, for instance, need not breed violence directly, but it may, as in the 1930s, abet the development of new forms of tyranny, or increase the likelihood of the resort to violence by desperate countries.

The state system is undergoing its most dramatic changes since decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. Entirely new states will probably break off the hulk of the Soviet empire, creating the potential for a civil war as widespread and disruptive as any the world has known. In other parts of the world—even in Canada—there is more splitting, and Balkanization characterizes world

[3] "Dole Puts Bitterness of '88 Race Aside to Carry Out Bush Agenda," *Washington Post*, June 11, 1990, p. A8.

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politics as much as unification. No one can foresee the consequences of this kind of fragmentation, but it is hard to believe that it will necessarily be peaceful. Just the reverse, in fact: border disputes, the flight of ethnic refugees, and desperate efforts to build or maintain large political aggregations do not look to have entirely peaceful consequences. Neither, for that matter, do such structural problems as massive demographic pressures in North Africa, or competition for water in the Middle East.

The strategic revolution represents a far narrower set of changes than is commonly supposed. But these changes, though narrow, are deep; strategic calculations may be less salient in American domestic and foreign policy than they were in the past four decades. During that time the United States maintained armed forces and a network of alliances unparalleled in its history for one overriding reason: to contain the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat is now changed beyond recognition. As of 1990, that regime lacks the desire to conquer other parts of the world in the name of its ideology, the internal solidity and self-confidence required to fight a major war, and the economic base to sustain its vast military apparatus. Only with respect to nuclear weapons does it remain a superpower, and those have rather little value in the current context.

Given all that, and given the favorable geographical location of the United States, it is entirely reasonable to suppose that American defense strategy should change, that in the future we will be able to make do with considerably smaller forces. What would be wrong, however, would be to see in these changes a change in the nature of international politics itself. What we have witnessed, rather, is a reversion to an historically more normal situation for the United States, one in which it traditionally maintained very different kinds of armed forces from those required by the Cold War. The world was a dangerous place well before 1940, and the history of American military policy did not begin then. The challenges that we face are new, but not unprecedented; the dangers we face are far less (in all likelihood), but not negligible. Our security has increased substantially in the last two years, but it is not now, nor will it ever be, inviolable.

The Future of American Strategy

THE BUSH administration has begun, painfully, to come to terms with these changes, presenting proposals for a 25 percent cut in defense spending. Others, particularly Senator Sam Nunn, have put forth more detailed proposals for change, and scarcely a day passes without the announcement of the closing of ROTC programs or cutbacks in one weapon system or another. Every day editorialists and congressional representatives offer suggestions for saving money in the defense budget by slicing this or that program, while they berate the administration for lacking "a strategy." This charge is unfair, since it is far easier to call for a new defense blueprint than to create one; far easier to applaud the crack-up of one's opponent than to discern the precise nature of future challenges. But it *is* fair to say that the United States needs a strategic perspective, and that it lacks one. We need to debate—and if possible reach agreement—on first principles, and thereby to lay the foundations of a new national security policy. Instead, our current debate consists of undifferentiated calls for caution in budget cutting on the one hand, and accusations of unwillingness to confront reality on the other.

One reason for the incoherence of the defense debate is that Americans have forgotten how to think about strategy in the absence of an enemy. In countless ways, including many that are far from obvious, the Cold War has been hard-wired into our strategic mentality. It took decades for us to focus on the peculiarities of our Soviet opponent, calling him by name (instead of the anonymous "Threat" of 1970s-vintage field manuals). Eventually, the United States developed ingenious methods to prepare for war with the Soviets. The National Training Center at

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Fort Irwin, where American soldiers trained and organized as a Soviet motorized rifle regiment fought mock battles against regular and National Guard battalions, is a superb example of this. But ironically, just as the United States through this and other measures—the Competitive Strategy Initiative, for example—has come properly to grips with the Soviets, it finds them crumbling as a threat. This poses a bureaucratic problem, for the military has justified its budgets with reference to the requirements of global war against the Soviet Union, and now finds itself rhetorically paralyzed when dealing with those eager to slash the budget. This condition poses an equally serious conceptual problem, because the American defense establishment is at a loss for intellectual constructs with which to begin rethinking national security. Our current circumstances, however, are not unprecedented. During the 1920s, for example, the United States had respectable armed forces—as advanced as any in the world, sensibly organized and structured. The same might be said of other periods, and these are worthy of study for what they might teach us about how to think about strategy in a period of rapid political and technological change.

OUR RETHINKING of strategy must begin with the most important strategic question of all: "Why do we need armed forces?" There are, broadly speaking, five answers.

First, we want to preserve our *core security*. In the narrow sense, this requires that we retain control of our air space and our borders. Although this is a job, by and large, for the Coast Guard, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and various police organizations, it requires surveillance and interception capabilities that only the armed forces can provide. In the event of major instability in Mexico, of course, this job could turn out to be a very considerable one indeed. It bears remembering that, until 1940, the largest peacetime mobilization of the U.S. armed forces occurred in 1916 along the Mexican border.

Included within core security is the ability to rescue Americans held hostage or in danger overseas, for which current kinds of amphibious and special forces are more than adequate. Far more costly is the ability to shield the United States from direct attack, particularly direct nuclear attack. This requires a large nuclear deterrent force, particularly so long as the Soviets retain a large nuclear force, which they are likely to do. We will also want a defensive element, which would be particularly valuable when other nations develop long-range ballistic missiles. And we may have to think more seriously about the capabilities required to preemptively disarm the kinds of marginal opponents who might appear twenty years hence.

Second, the United States will want *regional leverage*, the ability to support local allies who might require our aid against their enemies. This mission is most evident in the European case. Conceivably a resurgent Russia—aggrieved by the loss of its empire and determined to reestablish itself in Europe—might threaten the liberties of the European states. In either case, and unless the Soviet Union becomes a stable liberal democracy, we shall need the wherewithal to deter it. Our commitments to Israel and various Asian countries will make similar demands.

These requirements, however, are very different from those we have known during the Cold War, particularly in Europe. Instead of preparing forces to fight enormous and costly battles in a global conventional war, we should seek to have a varied menu of overt and covert support for our allies—intelligence sharing, ammunition and weapons resupply, and specialized applications of military power. In particular, we should capitalize on our abilities to project firepower—not troops—deeply and with unprecedented precision. If, for example, we wish to protect Saudi Arabia against Iraq, it makes little sense to prepare heavy expeditionary forces that could only arrive too late to do any good, and which the American people would be reluctant in any case to send off to war. Instead, it would be better to develop capa-

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bilities to deny the Iraqis use of their air force, to sever their air, sea, and ground communications with the outside world, and to destroy particularly valuable industrial facilities. We will need, in other words, an extensive conventional strategic bombardment capability. This is a far from trivial task, but it is not an impossible one, and it has the merit of being politically as well as tactically plausible.

Third and fourth, we shall want our armed forces to perform two closely related tasks. The *firebreak mission* will require that they be able to prevent conflicts between other parties from affecting us or our close allies. The perfect example of this mission was operation EARNEST WILL, the largely (though not exclusively) naval Persian Gulf deployment of 1987–1988. Had the Iran-Iraq war occurred in the 1950s it would have been a nasty border conflict confined to the frontiers of those two countries. In the 1980s it ranged throughout the Persian Gulf and even, to some extent, beyond, because both countries now had the operational and technical capabilities to wage war at great distances. Although no one quite realized it at the time, EARNEST WILL had served to prevent a war from spreading in ways that would have disrupted international commerce. In the future, the firebreak mission might include a variety of measures to prevent the use of particularly nasty weapons—atomic bombs most notably—whose use would have repercussions far beyond the region in which they were deployed. The *freedom of movement mission*, closely related to this, requires that we retain the naval (and now the space) capabilities needed to overawe or control nations or non-state actors that seek to disrupt the free international movement of goods and information. This may mean such mundane tasks as minesweeping, or the far trickier problem of operations against anonymous pirate submarines (for which there is a precedent in Anglo-French operations against Italian submarines during the Spanish Civil War). This is, of course, a traditional task of the world's predominant maritime power.

"WE INSURE against loss of life, against loss of money, against destruction by fire or storm, and, in fact, against the loss of any possession or attribute which we deem of value. . . . The country or state is the highest form of insurance policy, and it is underwritten by a policy of national defense."[4] So wrote John W. Weeks, secretary of war, in 1923. The fifth and last task—the *insurance mission*—is at once the vaguest and yet the most important that the armed forces have; it is the responsibility to provide for eventualities that cannot be foreseen with clarity, and for threats whose nature we may only guess. How should the Department of Defense deal with this mission? One reaction to pervasive uncertainty might be to hold off making any decisions as long as possible, clinging to as much of the apparatus of the Cold War as political expedience permits. But even as, in the end, this will prove an impossible tactic domestically, it denies the larger strategic requirement externally. We cannot expect a world driven by the neat bipolar logic of the last forty years, no matter how much some may desire it. And we will only worsen our muddle if we refuse to confront head on the task of planning for uncertainty.

Uncertainty need not be the same thing as bewilderment. We can bound it in many ways: we know, for instance, that almost all of the states of Western Europe will be well-disposed to us. We know as well that old-style Marxist-Leninists will not be our chief opponents. We can expect a greater diffusion of military technology, including chemical and nuclear weapons, throughout the rest of the world. We can anticipate some of the likely hot spots of the future, such as the Persian Gulf and North African littoral. Above all, we can sketch out the organizational requirements of dealing with an uncertain security environment—the creation of organizations that can learn and adapt

[4] *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1923* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 5.

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quickly rather than organizations that can execute elaborately preplanned operations against a predictable foe, the need for rapid reaction rather than ponderous deployment, the premium on intelligence collection against a range of new targets rather than a single adversary.

AS THE United States contemplates potential new opponents, it will face a number of peculiar difficulties. For example, it will find itself in the position of quietly sizing and training forces to deal with countries that, if not friendly, are still not openly our enemies. Even when a Saddam Hussein warns his neighbors, as he recently did, that "cutting necks is better than cutting means of living," an American president will find it impolitic to tell Congress in so many words that he needs the ability to fight a war against Iraq. Absent the comfortable dualism of the Cold War, the United States may find itself tilting now against one power, now against another: a fixed enemy is probably a thing of the past.

Another unusual challenge, already alluded to, will be that of thinking through the second and third order security consequences of economic and military events in the Third World. Suppose, for example, that India and Pakistan go to war against each other, and that nuclear weapons are used. Directly, the United States is hardly likely to intervene, much though it will regret any such occurrence. But in the wake of such an event, it would find itself coping with waves of repercussions—accelerated nuclear programs in other countries, perhaps, or the formations of extended coalitions participating in a larger war. A generalized policy of preparedness on our part will require an agility in conceptualizing remote dangers, while avoiding the perils of an overactive imagination.

One useful measure in supporting the strategic objective of insurance or preparedness would be an attempt to build a floor, as it were, under defense spending. During the Cold War the United States spent between 5.5 and 10 percent of its gross national product on the military. A figure of 4 percent—a considerable reduction from today's low of 5 percent—would enable the United States to retain a military capable of operation on a global scale. It would be comparable to the load born by major European countries over the last two decades, and would provide some predictability for Pentagon planners, who otherwise confront the prospect of a budgetary free-fall.

Thus far we have discussed the chief missions of the armed forces. We may continue with a platitude: choices must be made. But how to make them, and where the tradeoffs lie, is by no means clear. The Defense Department, for example, recently completed a Major Aircraft Review that sought to balance cuts among a number of programs. It examined the B–2 "stealth" bomber, the navy A–12 attack bomber, the C–17 transport, and the Advanced Tactical Fighter. The logic of this review (which has been followed by a similar effort with respect to warships) is unclear. The missions of these aircraft are different; while it might make sense to look at tradeoffs between air and sea lift, or between power projection forces and what is required to move them overseas, this sort of effort has no obvious rationale. It might conceivably make sense as an approach to doing business in the automobile industry, where one looks at major product lines separately. Defense, however, is not the automobile business, nor is it clear that the American automobile industry should provide a model for the Pentagon. Similarly, calls to cut anything rather than personnel do not represent serious thinking about strategy; they represent, rather, a laudable if misplaced sympathy for the service men and women about to be released and an instinctive desire to keep large forces around "just in case."

There are two fundamental kinds of choices that need to be made, and both are acutely unpleasant. The first involves a choice between numbers of personnel and technology, and that choice should go in favor of technology. Personnel accounts, not counting retired pay, cost almost as much as

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operations *and* maintenance *and* procurement accounts in the budget. Our comparative advantage vis-à-vis the rest of the world lies in the sophistication of our technology, not the numbers of our soldiers. And a way of hedging against a large scale military challenge from a major country will be the creation of a formidable lead in a wide array of technologies. This is, therefore, the time to *increase* the amounts of money that we spend on research and development where, it should be noted, budgets have shrunk for several years, and where basic research expenditure has stagnated for decades.

A second kind of choice involves a willingness to reshape national defense organization, and to do so in painful and unpopular ways. Currently, a rough trilateral division of budget, general officer slots, and influence exists between the navy/marine corps, the air force, and the army. Almost all current plans, those of the administration as well as those suggested by congressional staffs, will reduce the army more than the other services. But what is needed is not simply the willingness to make disproportionate cuts, but to think through their implications, and to make sure that the remnant is not merely smaller, but better adapted to a new environment.

For example, it is fair to suggest that the army's loss of force structure should be matched by loss of organizational influence as well. In the interwar period the navy and marine corps had roughly half the budget, the army and the nascent air force (then the air corps) had the other half. These percentages are not valid today, but the fundamental fact is that the United States will be an air and naval power, not a land power. Our scarce dollars should go to the kinds of forces we might use, not those that we imagine to be useful in deterring opponents. The army will have three critical tasks: the preservation of fundamental expertise in intense ground warfare, the preparation of a mobilization base in the event of unexpected emergency, and the development of specialized and relatively small light forces for counterinsurgency and special operations. It should not be in the business of preparing expeditionary forces that will never sail, and it should not be allowed to maintain an inflated number of divisions which must be filled out with reserve units to be effective.

The other services face organizational challenges almost as wrenching as those of the army. If the overall budget represents, despite the claims of secretaries of defense, compromises among the services, each service budget represents internal compromises among different "communities." The self-image of many of those communities will have to change. The navy, for instance, may have to spend more time worrying about quiet, modern non-Soviet diesel electric submarines. The air force will need to reduce the influence of the Strategic Air Command, and the kind of thinking that produced the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), a master plan for the conduct of nuclear war against whose rigidity secretaries of defense have struggled with little success. A version of the SIOP may be necessary for the residual nuclear deterrence mission, but the blinkered planning culture that produced it is at odds with that required by a less certain world.

The services will also face common problems. They will need to rethink the career paths of officers, for example. The wartime pace of American military life during the past generation meant rapid turnover of officers in all responsible positions, a relative lack of interest in higher military education, and a premium on long hours in the office as well as the field. In the future we should revert to an improved version of the interwar system, in which certain institutions (particularly educational ones) have officers in charge for more than two years; in which professional learning is valued and time for it provided in two- or even three-year rather than eleven-month dollops; in which mediocre pay and occasional danger are compensated for by reasonable work schedules. Above all, the services—and the civilian leadership supervising them—must make certain that their officer corps do not become parochial and stale. In a large military the occa-

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sional nonconformist and oddball would get promoted, squirreled away in an obscure outpost or office, ready for rapid promotion in the event of war. In a shrinking military, the promotion boards, operating on traditional criteria of advancement, will tend to reward conventional behavior, attitudes, and career choices. Only a strenuous manipulation of promotion systems will protect the mavericks and thinkers who provide the intellectual yeast for the defense establishment.

AS THE United States gropes its way to a new strategy it needs to reexamine how it organizes itself to manage defense. This entails not so much another wearisome splitting, lumping, and reconnecting of the organization charts of DOD, as a rethinking of the nature of organizational relationships. For example, it may make sense to create a new Mediterranean Command on a par with our current European Command, in order to increase our focus on the strategic problems of the Middle East. If we are to become (as we should) a predominantly air and naval power, certain commands—Central Command, which handles the Persian Gulf, most notably—should come under an air force or navy flag officer.

The problem of civilian control requires renewed attention, for it will be of critical importance in the period of transition ahead. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 bolstered the prestige and influence of the Joint Staff. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) received no equivalent invigoration. More importantly, OSD still has nothing to compare with the inexhaustible reservoirs of staff officers available to the military services and the Joint Staff. Its systems analysts, who perform valuable services, are trained to look at the quantifiable aspects of defense planning, but this can lead to the kind of conservatism that rejects promising new technologies (such as the marines' tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft) in favor of comfortable old ones. Moreover, the systems analysts do not do the kind of policy work which is the proper concern of OSD.

To make matters worse, there is a danger that as a result of the walk-over success in Panama, civilian leaders will be inclined to defer to the military in large matters of defense planning. The remark of General Carl Stiner, commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, that "there were no lessons learned" from Panama, coupled with the reported remark of a Pentagon official that "[Secretary of Defense Richard] Cheney's biggest contribution to the invasion. . . was to get out of the way," suggests a level of complacency not warranted by events.[5] The United States has not paid heavily for its strategic failures in Panama—in particular, the delay in establishing civil order after the invasion and the exposure of several prominent potential hostage-taking targets—but failures there were. And the kind of civil-military dialogue in advance of the invasion that should have occurred appears to have been lacking.

This pattern of loose civilian control stems not from personalities (Secretary Cheney's inclinations appear to lie in quite an opposite direction) but in an institutionalized deference to military expertise at the higher levels of war. Such deference, though understandable, will be pernicious at a time when military organizations will need to be nursed through traumatic reductions and redirection. It is not, as Robert McNamara and his whiz kids appear to have thought, enough to figure out the right answers with nonmilitary analytical tools and impose them on recalcitrant generals. Such efforts only foster opposition and bureaucratic guerrilla warfare leading to deadlock. Rather, the civilian leadership needs to throw its weight behind the military leaders and groups that it thinks have the best understanding of new problems.[6] That will require substantive expertise and empathetic understanding of the military, coupled with bureaucratic skill and tough-

[5] "Inside the Invasion," *Newsweek*, June 25, 1990, p. 28.

[6] See Stephen P. Rosen, "New Ways of War," *International Security*, 13:1 (Summer 1988): 134–69.

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mindedness. In remolding the American military for a new age, the civilian leadership will have to not only allow, but actually force, the redistribution of roles and missions among the armed forces. Painfully negotiated treaties among the services must be reviewed, but this time (unlike the case in the late 1940s) civilian leaders must dominate the process. Here too, statesmanship of a rare order will be required to force disputes to the surface, while suppressing a fraternal savagery that the services dread, on the one hand, but are quite capable of on the other.

Commentators from both the conservative and liberal camps have suggested that henceforth we must transform our understanding of strategy. Instead of concentrating on military matters, strategists should consider as aspects of national security transnational pollution, economic competitiveness, and epidemiology. In the end, however, conceptual clarity (and hence the national interest) will best be served if strategy remains the business of preparing and ultimately using military force to serve political ends, and strategic thought remains concentrated on the how and why of that business. Although the logic of strategy may inform the study of economic behavior, even as the study of business organizations can illuminate problems in military administration, war is, in the end, different from all these activities. It is different, as Clausewitz observed, because it deals with the harshest of human activities, combat. The fundamental fact that war means killing creates peculiar problems and patterns quite different from those emerging from serious but non-violent international conflicts about trade or ecological matters.

Perhaps, in some sense, strategy will be less important for the United States than it has been hitherto—if so, students of strategy should not shrink from that conclusion. But in the final analysis, the problems of force will not disappear, and attempts to redefine national security expertise and institutions away from the study of real or potential war will only complicate the urgent task of renovating the study of strategy in the United States. That field has evolved over the decades into a major corporate and academic industry that now faces a problem of retooling almost as traumatic as that of East German factories. Like East German industry, most (though not all of it) should be declared bankrupt and abandoned to make way for new enterprises.

WHAT WILL be the challenges of a new strategic studies? It must, first and foremost, avoid the mistake of applying familiar analytical methods and policy prescriptions to problems for which they are utterly unsuited. Consider, as an obvious example, nuclear deterrence. It is probable that more and more potential enemies will have nuclear weapons. Yet in order to understand the dynamics of those relationships we need to think in categories quite different from those we are used to in the U.S.-Soviet standoff. Nuclear doctrine in the sense Americans understand it may simply not exist; weapons may be few and relatively poorly protected; plans for their use may be rudimentary; control by a central political leadership may be poor.

It is in American interests, and those of others, that the United States consciously decides to remain the world's foremost military power, which it can do at a cost substantially less than it took to persevere through the Cold War. That interest may not be an easy thing to explain to the American people, but it is the duty of American leaders to do so. If they do not succeed in convincing the American people of that need, we may all find a world at the beginning of the next century far less safe and comfortable than that we may reasonably anticipate in the autumn of 1990.

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Defining Our National Interest

Irving Kristol

IT IS VERY difficult for a great power—a world power—to articulate a foreign policy in the absence of an enemy worthy of the name. It is, after all, one's enemies that help define one's "national interest," in whatever form that definition might take. Without such enemies, one flounders amidst a plenitude of rather trivial, or at least marginal, options. That, it seems to me, is the condition of the United States today, as we enter the post-Cold War era.

I know that there are more than a few conservatives who bridle at the proposition that the Cold War is over. They point, for instance, to the fact—and it is a fact—that the Soviet Union's military capabilities are not at all diminished, and in some respects have actually increased under glasnost. They then go on to make the seemingly reasonable claim that it is by such a visible capability that we should judge Soviet foreign policy, not by inferences as to its intentions—inferences based either on rhetoric or on internal political developments of which we have only an imperfect understanding.

This sounds sensible enough, but it is nevertheless an error. Intention will always trump military capability in an analysis of a nation's foreign policy. After all, very few of the world's nations ever evaluated American foreign policy in terms of our impressive military capabilities. Only the Soviet Union and the other communist regimes, in the pre-Gorbachev era, ever thought along such lines, and the Soviet Union at least (and probably communist China as well) now realizes that it was a mistake. Anyone who has a basic understanding of American society and American politics understands full well that this society and this politics put strict limits on the exercise of our military power. No one—except again, Soviet generals and politicians—ever believed for a moment that the United States was capable of launching a surprise nuclear attack against the Soviet Union—or against anyone else, for that matter. There were, for several decades now, many maleficent interpretations of American foreign policy floating around the world—usually having to do with something called "capitalism" or "economic imperialism" or "cultural imperialism." But none of these interpretations—again, always exempting communist regimes—derived from a fear of an abrupt onslaught by our military capabilities. The occasional rare exception, such as Libya, involved nations that had taken actions so blatantly hostile to the United States as practically to invite military retribution.

It is therefore interesting to note that it is only our military analysts of Soviet affairs who still focus on capabilities, whereas our

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political analysts, focusing on overall developments within the Soviet system, all concur that the Cold War is indeed over. They agree that the Soviet Union today is simply impotent, lacking in the political energy, to sustain an intention of aggressive expansion. Moreover, it no longer even desires to. The classical and long-dominant Soviet intention, which properly alarmed much of the world, has withered away.

The best analysis of the condition of Soviet intentions today is to be found in the brilliant article by Stephen Sestanovich, "Inventing the Soviet National Interest," in the Summer 1990 issue of this magazine. In it, Professor Sestanovich demonstrates conclusively that the Communist leadership and policy elites of the USSR, having abandoned (sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly) the Marxist-Leninist mode of thought, are struggling to rethink foreign policy from the ground up. "Where," they are openly wondering, "is the Russian national interest?" They are questioning the expensive investments of this near-bankrupt nation in such places as Cuba, Ethiopia, Vietnam, etc. "Of what use are these impoverished regimes to us?", they ask, and having forsaken the dream (now a nightmare) of World Communism, they are inclined to discover no use whatsoever.

This sea-change within the Soviet system belies the accusation of "appeasement" levelled by some conservatives against the West's response to these changes. It is they, not we, who are in disarray. It is they, not we, who are making the substantial concessions. It is no exaggeration to say that they have lost the Cold War by forfeit. And if they have lost, we have won.

But what shall we do with this victory? What do we expect of the world, what do we want of the world, what role shall we—the sole remaining world power—play in the world, in this post-Cold War era? Our discussion (it is too early to call it a debate) of this issue is, to date, at a much more primitive level than the Soviets', as Sestanovich's article reveals. Even to mention "national interest" as a lodestar for American foreign policy excites controversy or revulsion. The Russians know that they have been deprived of the guiding principles of Soviet foreign policy, as established by the Bolshevik Revolution. We, the victors, are naturally inclined to think that our principles have been vindicated. But if one asks what these principles are, one gets a cacophony of responses. It isn't that we didn't know what we were doing this past half-century. It's just that we had so many good reasons for doing it. And these reasons, today, reveal themselves to be not only different from one another, but incompatible.

IF ONE LOOKS back at the basic principles—ideologies they may fairly be called—that have shaped American foreign policy since 1917, one can distinguish four which overlap and interweave, while always rubbing each other the wrong way. They are, in chronological order:

1. Wilsonian liberal internationalism—a grand design for a new world order based on self-determination, nonaggression, conciliation and arbitration, and "collective security" ensured by a League of Nations.
2. A chastened and revised version of liberal internationalism, wherein the same ideal informed our rhetoric while the actualities of the Cold War shaped a modestly realistic policy of "containment." With the end of the Cold War, the rhetoric has moved to a unilateral emphasis on "enhancing democracy" abroad.
3. Isolationism, of the Right and of the Left.
4. A conception of the American "national interest," vague and inarticulate, but which nevertheless leads a kind of underground existence in our thinking.

Wilsonian liberal internationalism was based on the thesis that it would be possible to create a "world community" in which nations would subordinate national interests to the sovereignty of international law, as incarnated in such institutions as the League of Nations, the World Court, and a constella-

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tion of other, more specialized institutions (such as the International Labor Organization) that would cope with specific, narrowly defined problems. The league would not only pass judgment but would have the authority to enforce its rulings through the exercise of collective action, such as sanctions or even, if necessary, military intervention. In this vision, first elaborated two hundred years ago by Immanuel Kant, we would at last be moving toward world stability, world peace, and a "community of nations" whose shared values would make for a world order in which all nations would recognize the principles of self-determination of peoples and government by popular consent.

The popularity of this point of view is best understood as a revulsion against the nationalist excesses that produced the First World War, an especially ghastly war. But this popularity was both fragile and thin. Fragile because the spirit of nationalism, once reawakened, simply swept aside, as so many glittering cobwebs, the Wilsonian dream. Thin, because it took solid root only in the American State Department (and, to a much lesser extent, in some other foreign offices) while never being taken seriously by the overwhelming majority of the American people (or, it should be said, of any other people).

By the 1930s, this conception of American foreign policy had established itself so firmly in our State Department and in the minds of our policy-making elites—the Council on Foreign Relations being a noteworthy example—that even though the league was by now discredited for reasons of ineptitude, and the American people were moving massively into an isolationist mood, the Roosevelt administration could think of no other principles with which to fashion its foreign policy. After World War II, the United Nations replaced the League of Nations, but otherwise nothing much changed.

The post-World War II goals of American foreign policy, as officially stated, were Wilsonian. They seemed to represent the only mode of thought within which the American government has found it possible to explain its policies, and to a large degree the Cold War itself was interpreted and described in Wilsonian terms. We were the leader of "the free world," as well as of an anticommunist coalition of nations whose goal was the "containment" of communist messianism. The tensions this often involved us in turned out to be fatal. Thus, we fought a war "against aggression" in Korea, a war conducted under the aegis of the United Nations. It was also a limited, defensive war of "containment" that simply sought, at great cost, a reversion to the *status quo ante*. The American people soon made it clear that they did not like this kind of war—a fact soon forgotten (or haughtily dismissed) by our policy-makers. So we ended up fighting exactly the same kind of war in Vietnam, only this time without success. By the end of that war the American people had, in effect, disengaged themselves from any Wilsonian national purpose, while "containment" itself was tainted with the hue of defeat. Fortunately, it turned out that "containment" had done its work even while many Americans were getting weary of it.

In the years between those two wars, however, the American people and their foreign-policy-makers were—or seemed to be—largely in agreement. In a sense, American foreign policy in this period had two distinct strands—the rhetorical and the pragmatic. When President Truman announced his doctrine in 1947, he did so in familiar Wilsonian terms. The policy it inaugurated, however, was the "containment" of communist expansion through the use of American economic and military power. The American people supported this foreign policy because they despised communism as an ideology and were outraged by communist expansionism. The rhetoric they regarded as, well, just the kind of official rhetoric normally exuded by our State Department. In short, they felt involved in the Cold War *as Americans*, not as a leader of "the free world"—an abstraction that never meant much to them. Wilsonian ideals, indeed, meant nothing to them. The profound distrust that the American people

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felt toward the League of Nations has been transferred to the United Nations—an organization not simply futile but one that, more often than not, has exhibited a clear anti-American bias. Both Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick became national heroes by giving eloquent expression to this distrust.

American policy-makers shrewdly adapted to this reality. Their liberal internationalism gradually became less international, more unilateral, even more nationalist. One heard less—and hears less today—about a community of nations living tranquilly under international law, and more about our commitment to the "enhancement of democracy around the world." As the Cold War has come to an end, this remains the dominant, official motif of American foreign policy. It has appeal not only to liberals but to many conservatives who are ideologically adrift in the post-Cold War era. From anticommunism to pro-"democratic capitalism" is a tempting move for those who wish to remain engaged in world politics.

This is, of course, a uniquely American idea, one that even our democratic allies in NATO, or out of NATO (e.g., Japan), do not share. Their conception of the Wilsonian ideal has, in any case, always been more cynical—perhaps one should say "realistic"—than ours, in that they have never permitted their internationalism to override their specific national interests. They do believe in using international forums and international organizations to defend those interests—which is why the State Department finds them to be such faithless allies at the United Nations. None of the European democracies thinks it an important part of its foreign policy to "enhance democracy" all over the world. None of these democracies thinks of itself as "a city on a hill," as we do, having a special moral-political mission in the world, as we habitually think we do. Indeed, the very strength of this post-Cold War current of thought is its ability to tap the springs of American nationalism and American moralism, fused in a sense of *the* "American mission" or *the* "American purpose."

The inspirational rhetoric in which this foreign policy is clothed is itself so peculiarly and parochially American—no other nation talks about foreign policy this way—that one is bound to be skeptical of its viability. It may move Americans, but certainly not foreigners. Besides, it is Wilsonian enough to run into all the older Wilsonian dilemmas—dilemmas resulting from the disjunction between ideal and reality, general principles and particular issues.

For instance, there is the issue of "self-determination," a Wilsonian principle that our State Department will never, never disavow—but will ignore if convenient. We are silent about self-determination in Kashmir, but outspoken about the right to self-determination of the Palestinians on the West Bank. One picks and chooses, while "holding firm" to the principle.

THE CASE OF Lithuania revealed starkly this unprincipled deployment of principle. Since we have never recognized the Soviet annexation of Lithuania under the Nazi-Soviet pact, there seemed to be a good case for recognizing the newly established government in Soviet-occupied Lithuania. Such a case was argued enthusiastically by those who wished to see us "enhance democracy" wherever possible. But it turned out that our Western European allies, along with the newly liberated nations of Eastern Europe, all vehemently opposed any such action. They saw no point, at this time and in these circumstances, in engendering a crisis in our (and their) relations with the Soviet Union over an issue which, compared with other things at stake, was marginal. There can be little doubt that the State Department and the White House were of the same opinion—but they couldn't figure out how to say so. So they hemmed and hawed and vacillated, showing weakness and indecision when, in truth, none existed. Such is the disadvantage of defining foreign policy in unequivocal moralistic-idealistic terms. It leads to an endless series of self-debilitating equivocations.

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In any case, how do we go about "enhancing democracy" where we do have freedom of action? One now hears—revived from the intellectual dead, as it were—much talk of the importance of "economic aid." One would have thought that the myth of economic aid, as an effective adjunct to foreign policy, was by now utterly discredited. In fact, it is. We know that, except in very special, and usually temporary, circumstances, economic aid does nothing to "enhance democracy" abroad. It feeds corruption, economic inefficiency, and political irresponsibility. The evidence leading to this conclusion is so overwhelming that it cannot even be called controversial.

So why are people, who not only ought to know better but do, suddenly so enamored of the idea? The reason is obvious: they cannot think of anything else to do. They dare not contemplate, much less raise, the prospect of American military intervention and occupation to "make democracy work" in friendly countries where it is in danger of collapse—in short, to create something like an American empire with a purely ideological motive. This was never a serious possibility, and now that the Soviets have realized how futile it is, it is not and cannot be a serious option for American foreign policy.

True, one cannot object to the cluster of very small-scale programs that are being recommended to "enhance democracy" here or there or anywhere—supplying countries, for example, with "expertise" in everything from sewer construction to prenatal care. No harm in that, but no visible gain, either, so far as foreign policy is concerned.

One swift question ought to be enough to reveal the ultimate hollowness of this mode of thought: What shall we do about the Philippines? Here, after all, is a country with which we have had a long and intimate association. We understand this country better than we understand most others, and they understand us reasonably well. It also happens to be a country whose democracy we have helped establish and sustain. Nevertheless, that democracy is floundering and seems headed for disintegration. So what should we do about it? To ask the question is to provoke an echo, not an answer.

When a nation has played a leading role in world affairs for more than half a century, doing nothing comes hard.

THE FUTILITY of a foreign policy whose purpose is to "enhance democracy" abroad is apparent to most Americans, and so the end of the Cold War has led to a resurgence of an isolationist temper. Among a handful of conservative thinkers this has led to a recrudescence of pre-World War II isolationism, a vein of thought streaked with nativism, chauvinism, and an unassuaged hostility to Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal as well as to America's involvement in World War II, an involvement they attribute to a liberal conspiracy. There is also a handful of liberals (overrepresented in Congress) whose isolationism (though they would vigorously deny the title) derives from the desire to spend the maximum amount of money on social programs at home and the minimum abroad. In general, sections of the political Left, in all countries, display this predisposition. The Left has always tended to regard foreign affairs as a wicked distraction from its noble efforts to create a "better world," beginning at home.

Though these two currents of isolationism will often coincide over specific issues of policy—such as the stationing of several hundred thousand American troops in Europe—the tenor of their thinking is radically different. Right-wing isolationism is nationalist, left-wing isolationism is antinationalist. (They violently disagree on the permissibility of flag-burning and the importance of a large military establishment.) And because of this difference, right-wing isolationists are sometimes prepared to use military force against a foreign government that engages in actions hostile to the United States, while the Left would prefer to ignore it, or make some purely symbolic gesture. (The differential responses to our bombing of Libya come to

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mind.) There was a time when the Right was firmly attached to the Monroe Doctrine, so that its isolationism was actually hemispheric rather than national. This is less true today, but the benign reaction of the Right to the invasion of Panama, while the Left was disconcerted, suggests that something of this traditional attitude still survives. It is also obvious in the disparity of sentiments toward Castro's Cuba.

Both right-wing and left-wing isolationism aim to exploit an instinctual isolationism, almost nonpolitical in character, that has always pervaded American opinion. George Washington's admonition against "foreign entanglements" remains engraved in American hearts, so that every such "foreign entanglement"—World War I, World War II, Vietnam—however enthusiastically endorsed originally out of a sense of patriotism and pride, is followed by an isolationist revulsion. It was the Cold War, in which our "foreign entanglements" were understood as necessary to prevent a communist takeover of the world, that permitted our policy-makers, operating in the liberal-internationalist mode, to multiply such "entanglements," and to convince themselves that this mode of foreign policy would continue for the indefinite, perhaps permanent, future. But the end of the Cold War has changed all that. Our State Department may still believe that a strong, visible "American presence" in Europe is essential to "stability" on that continent. But it is increasingly difficult to make sense of such vague rhetoric. Our troops in Europe have been there to resist a Soviet invasion. If there is to be no invasion, why are they there? Not, one assumes, to intervene in case of "instability" in Eastern Europe, or Yugoslavia, or even the Soviet Union itself. If such intervention is necessary, surely our Western European allies can cope with it on their own. And if quarrels erupt among those allies, whose side are we to intervene on? It is the inability of our official foreign policy to cope with such direct, "naive" questions that is giving impetus to an isolationist revival, on the Right as on the Left, in the United States.

Isolationism today has a bad name, largely deserved, because some of its more prominent spokesmen, especially on the Right, evoke echoes of the 1930s—echoes of nativism and xenophobia, indifference (or worse) to nazism and fascism, broad hints of anti-Semitism. One forgets that in the 1930s there were perfectly decent spokesmen for isolationism, especially on the Left, notably Norman Thomas and the remnants of the old Progressive movement. Their case had been put eloquently by Macaulay back in 1845:

> I do not say that we ought to prefer the happiness of one particular society to the happiness of mankind; but I say that, by exerting ourselves to promote the happiness of the society with which we are most nearly connected, and with which we are best acquainted, we shall do more to promote the happiness of mankind than by busying ourselves about matters which we do not fully understand, and cannot efficiently control.

This "little England" approach to British foreign policy, though not at all unpopular, was nevertheless swept away by events, as Britain engaged in competitive empire-building in order to retain its status as a world power—indeed, at the time as *the* world power. One can predict with much confidence that a version of American isolationism will suffer the same fate. In a way, we have no real choice, any more than Britain did. A great power is responsible for what it does not do, yet is in its power to do, as for what it does. Power breeds responsibilities. Britain had no *British* reason to use its supreme naval power to suppress the international slave trade, in which the British had not been involved for many decades. Under existing international law, it didn't even have the authority to do so. Nevertheless, it used its navy for exactly that purpose, for no better reason than that such an action defined the *kind of* great power Britain would be. It was a matter of national identity, not of foreign policy in any strict sense of the term. One cannot easily divorce the foreign policy of a superpower from its very national identity.

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So the United States does not really have the option of withdrawing into a "Fortress America." Not only does the degree of our integration in the world economy today make this economically impossible—our prosperity cannot be separated from the relatively unrestricted movement of goods and investments—but the American people are not about to relinquish their position as a world power. That would go against the American grain, against the sense that Americans have of their historic destiny. It would be like demanding of Americans that they be indifferent to the performance of American athletes in the Olympics—or that we hold a kind of minor-league Olympics of our own. That is psychologically unthinkable. You don't hear American sports fans chanting "We're number two!" or "We're number three!"

But if both the old and the new liberal internationalism are bankrupt, and if isolationism is a nostalgic fantasy, where does that leave American foreign policy? It is at this point that the idea of constructing a foreign policy in terms of our "national interest" gains credibility.

THE NOTION of an American "national interest" is not a new one, and has a perfectly respectable history—until it was swamped and discredited by the liberal-international mode of thought propagated by Woodrow Wilson. Throughout the nineteenth century, the term was freely and casually used here, as it was in Europe. After all, George Washington and Alexander Hamilton and James Monroe had established its propriety, and no American thought it strange to be informed by elected officials, or by journalists and publicists, that some particular action was or was not in our national interest. After the Wilsonian revolution in American foreign policy, however, it was felt that we no longer had a national interest in having a national interest. The term and the idea were associated with either a reactionary parochial isolationism or a ruthlessly amoral *realpolitik*. Even to talk about "realism" in foreign policy was regarded as suspect—as it still is today in many circles.

It was, of course, Vietnam that dealt a mortal blow to liberal-internationalism. As has been noted, the unpopularity of the Korean War should have transmitted a warning signal that the prescribed role of the United States, as defined by our commitment to the United Nations Charter, was not something the American people felt at all comfortable with. But the intensity of the Cold War in the ensuing years, and the natural hostility of these same people to communism and communist expansionism, served to obscure this unease. After Vietnam, no president could echo John F. Kennedy's rhetoric about "our" willingness to endure any sacrifice in order to "deter aggression." Liberal internationalism remained the orthodoxy in our State Department, but the American people were leaving that church in droves.

Ironically, it was the Left, in its opposition to the Vietnam War, that breathed new life into the idea of "national interest." Much of the Left, of course, was oriented only to an anti-anticommunist foreign policy that merged into a traditional kind of left-wing isolationism. But there were scholars and writers on the Left who, seizing upon the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan, did revive the concept of the "national interest"—though, lacking the vestiges of a nationalist instinct, they didn't know quite what to do with it. It is only today, in the post-Cold War era, that some conservatives, finding anticommunism no longer a useful compass with which to orient themselves in world politics, and with the kind of nationalist bent that has always been natural to conservatives, are trying to envisage an American foreign policy that is defined in "national interest" terms.

It is no easy task. Traditionally, national interest is defined in terms of plain military security or maintaining a "balance of power" among nations that are potential enemies or actual competitors for world status. But the United States has no reason to be concerned about its military security, so long as it

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retains a nuclear capability that nullifies the threat—for the moment, and one suspects for the foreseeable future as well, a minimal threat—of a hostile nuclear attack. And as the sole remaining superpower, there is no "balance" for us to worry about. True, there are theorists who would happily burden us with the mission of monitoring and maintaining a "balance of power" among *other* nations, large and small, in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, etc. This would make the United States the "world's policeman" for the status quo, or at least the world's arbiter for all changes in the status quo. Imagine the United States accepting responsibility for the fate of Kashmir and for "enforcing the peace" between India and Pakistan! We are just not going to be that kind of imperial power. Perhaps a future historian will decide we should have been. But it is not to be, because ours is a democracy and the American people violently reject any such scenario.

WHERE, THEN, do we look to find a national interest? Well, history has seen to it that we do not begin with a *tabula rasa*, and the contours of such a definition are given to us by the realities we confront. Let me suggest the following principles that can serve as guidelines:

1. It is in our national interest that no other superpower emerge whose political and social values are profoundly hostile to our own. To put it another way: We did not win the Cold War against Marxist-Leninist messianism in order to tolerate, yet again, any comparable confrontation. As things now stand, there is no visible threat of any such superpower emerging. But history has not come to an end and is still pregnant with surprise.

2. It follows that it is in our national interest that those nations which largely share our political principles and social values should be protected from those that do not. As Edmund Burke wrote more than two centuries ago:

> Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in law, customs, manners and *habits* of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart.

The United States enters the post-Cold War world with standing attachments and commitments. NATO may be an anachronism—I think it is—but we are not about to isolate ourselves from our fellow democracies in Western Europe, the Pacific, or the Middle East. Just how strong that attachment is, and how strong that commitment will be, will depend on circumstances—which, as Burke also pointed out, is the governing force in all policy-making.

3. Our relations with the other nations of the world will be decided candidly on a case-by-case basis. Now that the "Second World" has, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist, and along with it the category of "non-aligned nations," there is no other basis on which to operate. To the degree that any of these nations has a foreign policy friendly toward us, we will surely be disposed to be friendly to it. To the degree that it displays hostility, we will reciprocate. Similarly, to the degree that any country adapts its socio-economic-political arrangements to correspond to those prevailing in "the West," we will find it easier to be more intimate in our friendship. To the degree that it does not, our relations will be, at best, cool and correct.

There is no general formula that enables us to arrive at easy conclusions in any particular case. If there were such a formula, we could run our foreign policy by computer, feeding it such ambiguous concepts as "self-determination" or "aggression" and triumphantly announcing the results.

4. But what about the moral dimension of American foreign policy? It has always been there and, since we are an untraditional nation founded on a liberal creed, it always will be there. Have we nothing "higher" to offer the world?

Perhaps we do—though, with every passing year, I become less convinced. When some foreign political scientist or politician asks what books to read so as to discover the secret of our success, I find that I can think

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only of books by long-dead authors, many of them unread by Americans today. And when they consult American constitutional lawyers on how to go about writing a new constitution, I tremble for their future. It is these same lawyers, for the most part, who are busy rewriting our own constitution so as to rob it of its original merits.

Nor am I thrilled to observe the sweeping popularity of American popular culture throughout the world. I wish it were a lot less popular here at home, since it seems to me to be so recklessly subversive of the traditional ethos on which this democracy was founded and for so long sustained. We all talk easily about "values" today, but who today speaks for "virtue" as our forefathers once did? Even I find myself tongue-tied before that term.

Despite all such reservations, however, we are a successful nation—no question about it—and the envy of much of the world. It is perfectly understandable, therefore, that Americans believe we are still "a standing monument and example" to the world (to quote that brilliant rhetorician and much-inflated statesman, Thomas Jefferson). But what, precisely, does a "standing monument" do? Our isolationist tradition would have it just stand there, a role model (as we would now say) for the world to emulate. But the American people are of an activist temperament, which is why, as we became a "standing monument" that is also a world power, it has been so easy for a concern for universal "human rights" to grab hold of our imagination.

This concern was first elaborated, in its present form, in opposition to communist totalitarianism, which deprived human beings of all rights—deprived them, in fact, of their humanity. The apocalyptic vision of Orwell's *1984* provided us with the key text. But, in the course of the 1950s and 1960s, the issue was seized by the Left and used as a club with which to batter the moral legitimacy of anticommunism in general and of American foreign policy specifically. The strategy employed was to revise the conception of "human rights" so as to include, as human rights, the civil rights and civil liberties that are to be found in a modern liberal democracy. Since many of our allies in the Cold War were not particularly respectful of such rights and such liberties, we became vulnerable to the accusation of using a "double standard," one for communist regimes and another for noncommunist or (especially) anticommunist regimes. Today, this revision of the original idea of "human rights" is so orthodox that liberals and conservatives alike find themselves imprisoned in it.

But this blithely ignores the fact that there are large areas of the world which do not share our conception of civil rights and civil liberties, and are unlikely to move toward any such commonality in the foreseeable future. Saudi Arabia, for instance, does not permit Christians or Jews to become citizens or even permanent residents. Are we to allow this fact to disrupt our relations with that very important and relatively friendly country? Are we to contemplate the religious reformation of Saudi Arabia? No, we are not.

THE TRUTH IS that, not only does our foreign policy have a double standard with regard to what is now called "human rights," but we have a triple and quadruple standard as well. Indeed we have as many standards as circumstances require—which is as it should be. We react more cautiously to China's antiliberalization than we would to Russia's because our ally, Japan, whose interest in China is considerably greater than our own, has strongly urged such caution upon us. There is nothing "immoral" about such deference. We are free to engage in the quiet diplomacy of persuasion, the open diplomacy of intimidation, a foreign policy that may or may not involve military intervention—always depending on circumstance. If a Pol Pot regime were to be reestablished in Cambodia and reinstitute its genocidal policies, we would surely break off diplomatic and commercial relations. But we would limit our response to that level. Should such a Pol Pot emerge in Cuba, on the other hand, we

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would almost surely intervene militarily. The reason for this disparity is that our interest in Cuba is radically different from our interest in Cambodia.

All in all, it is perfectly possible to envisage a post-Cold War foreign policy for the United States which, constantly defining (even redefining) our "national interest" as the world changes (and as we change, too), would be sensible and realistic. It would disburden itself of the incubus of liberal internationalism, with its utopian expectations and legalistic cast of mind. It would not be, could not be isolationist—unless, that is, one identifies the abandonment of liberal internationalism as *ipso facto* "isolationist." It would be realistic without being a species of brutal *realpolitik*—itself a special theory of international relations, originating in a special period of European history, that has no relevance to the American position in the world today or to the predispositions of our democracy. Obviously, such a foreign policy will have plenty of room for failures as well as successes. But both failure and success would flow from errors of judgment, not from illusions about the world and the people (including Americans) who inhabit it.

Will we move toward such a foreign policy? It is hard to see what other direction there is for us to move in. But it would be much better for us and for the world if this movement were clear-sighted, rather than if (as is all too likely) we marched backward into our future, constantly troubled by nostalgic intellectual loyalties and inappropriate paroxysms of self-doubt.

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America's Purpose Now

In this issue we conclude our America's Purpose series in which contributors were asked to respond to the question: If the Cold War has ended (or, for the more cautious, is now ending) and the global containment of communism is no longer an urgent task, what central purpose—if any—should inform America's foreign policy for the rest of this century and beyond?

Earlier contributions to the series may be found in this year's Winter, Spring, and Summer issues.

A Win-Win Game

Robert L. Bartley

THE ELITES WHO formulated the policy of containment in the late 1940s recognized the paramount trend of their time: the emergence of the totalitarian state, represented by a communist Soviet Union as well as nazi Germany. They understood that this was a threat to mankind generally and to our own national security. They formulated a realistic and patient policy, and after two generations and despite occasional missteps, it seems to have succeeded. In 1989, the communist empire started to crack from within, as containment predicted. We cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that the ongoing revolution in Russia will throw up its own Bonaparte, but for now we can hope that the Cold War has been won.

As this hope is redeemed, we need to ask, what will be the character of the emerging era? Is there a new paramount trend affecting our security and well-being? I think the answer is clear: Over the rest of our lifetimes, we will live through a second industrial revolution. As the steam engine transformed an agricultural economy into an industrial economy, the computer is transforming the industrial economy into an information economy. Economically, this represents an enormous opportunity. Diplomatically, it means the emergence of an interconnected, integrated, interdependent world order. These developments will of course have their own frictions, but in general the trend is benign; our policies should facilitate it. Attempts to resist it will squander opportunity and sour both international relations and the domestic mood.

The emerging world order is not driven by the heady idealism of Dumbarton Oaks, but by economic and technological reality. Already, the economies of the nations are linked by twenty-four-hour financial markets. With nearly instant communication, the peoples of the world will increasingly be

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bound together. And it is becoming clear that, Orwell's fears to the contrary, permeating communications empowers not the state but the individual.

This was manifestly evident, indeed, in the miracle year of 1989. The Communist Chinese leaders found that to suppress a student uprising in Tiananmen Square, they first had to confront Dan Rather. This did not keep them from shooting their way to continued power, but it did complicate their problems, raise their costs, and cast enormous doubt over their ultimate success. All Mikhail Gorbachev's intercontinental missiles could not impose his will on Eastern Europe, and probably in the long run not even on Lithuania. Even some new Bonaparte would face the same problems; how long could he sustain a gulag for millions of former Communist party members? And with Russian, or Chinese, elites plugged into the world, dissent would merely start all over again. In Albert Wohlstetter's phrase, "The fax shall make you free."

If the new era emerges as we hope, our national purpose will be to build international institutions appropriate to the order waiting to be born, and to manage the frictions it will create. This surely does not mean creating a new United Nations or other world-government-at-a-stroke. But it may very well mean a broader application of the slow, step-by-step, economics-first evolution toward unity we are already witnessing in the European Community.

Internationally, the first big step would be a new Bretton Woods—formalization of the exchange-rate stabilization implicit in the G–5, G–7 accords of the Plaza and Louvre meetings. The volatility of exchange rates opens and closes factories and destroys and creates jobs in ways that appear arbitrary, and indeed are. This creates enormous friction and pressures for protectionism. It would also be helpful if institutions could be designed or redirected to bring market economics to bear on the development of the Third World, and where possible to help nations, like Mexico, that have embarked on that course.

Militarily, the Soviet Union still holds a massive nuclear capacity, so deterrence will remain necessary in most foreseeable futures. If ultimately the end of the Cold War means the end of the threat of nuclear catastrophe, an integrated world economy would still require the historic military mission of suppressing piracy. When pirates come the size of Saddam Hussein, this will require international efforts, but the U.S. will still have to lead the way. A prison sentence for a German businessman selling poison gas equipment is surely a hopeful sign.

But it is at home that America, and its elites, can make their biggest contribution to forging the new world order. If the whole world is about to become a melting pot, where else should it look for lessons or leadership? Similarly, it is America that has the history and experience of federation, presumably the future of Europe and perhaps even larger areas.

This above all means America must be true to its historic principles. It must strive to keep its markets free domestically and open internationally. Similarly, American immigration policies should be generous, by no means solely for altruistic reasons, but to keep our own society vibrant and young. It should strive to make its own economy "competitive," not to beat foreigners, but to make its best contribution to world prosperity.

It is appropriate for the U.S. to maintain diplomatic pressure against residues of mercantilism in nations such as Japan, but America should remember the patience behind its containment success. Mercantilist governments basically exploit their own citizens, and these policies too will be unsustainable in an information age. The main lesson for elites to teach, and learn, is that unlike military competition, economic competition is a win-win game.

These lessons sound trite, but they may not prove easy to implement. Ironically, the information age seems also likely to produce a rebirth of nationalism. Centrifugal tendencies are growing, in all likelihood precisely because nationhood has become less important. If there

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is free trade with the U.S., Quebec does not need English Canada. In the end it may not matter, but in the medium term these trends can be destructive. American elites should seek to dampen American chauvinism, not to arouse it.

If America seeks to resist the new world trend, to retreat into an isolated, inward-looking redoubt, the biggest casualty will be the American spirit. A newly isolationist America would be out of step with history, fighting a losing game, and watching other nations build a new world—in many ways based on American inspiration and American traditions but ironically without America.

Even now, the "decline of America" neurosis that has seized our elites stands in stark contrast to the optimistic, present-at-the-creation mood evident in the elites of nations of the European Community. Only five years ago the whole continent was sunk in Eurosclerosis. But by adopting old-fashioned American notions such as privatization, entrepreneurial spirit, cuts in super-high marginal tax rates, and movement toward monetary union, Europe got itself into step with the emerging world trend. The United States can, should, and—after the current hesitation and debate—will do the same.

Robert L. Bartley is editor of the Wall Street Journal.

An Independent Course

Ted Galen Carpenter

THE SUDDEN collapse of the Soviet Union's Eastern European empire at the end of the 1980s seems to have been nearly as traumatic for members of the Cold War foreign-policy elite in the West as it was for Leninist true believers the world over. American policy experts who had grown accustomed to viewing global developments through a Cold War prism for more than four decades are now having to confront entirely new issues and contemplate a markedly different role for the United States. For the most part, they have not made the intellectual adjustment. In the months since the opening of the Berlin Wall, there has instead been a frantic search for new rationales and alternative missions to justify the perpetuation of Cold War policies and institutions.

Underlying such efforts is the assumption that although the Cold War may be ending, the United States must continue to play an activist role—especially a security leadership role—throughout the world. Michael Mandelbaum of the Council on Foreign Relations was only a little more candid than most of his colleagues in expressing that view when he told Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times* that although the Cold War is over, "We can't just pick up our chips. We have to stay at the table and get involved in a new game."

That is a distressingly myopic approach. Instead of reflexively clinging to a strategy of global interventionism, U.S. leaders need to define an entirely new role for the United States in a post-Cold War world. America must position itself to take advantage of opportunities that may arise from the breakdown of the bipolar Cold War system while avoiding the pitfalls that are also likely to emerge in what will be a more diverse and, at times, disorderly global environment. What is needed is a policy of strategic independence—an independent course free from the dangerous and expensive burdens of obsolete security commitments.

Several principles should guide that new strategy. Perhaps the most essential is that policy-makers must overcome the belief that America lacks the luxury of choice, that it must continue to play the role of Atlas, carrying all the world's security burdens on

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its shoulders. That attitude is a product of the early years of the Cold War when the global balance of power lay in ruins and the United States seemed to be the only nation that possessed the economic and military strength to thwart Soviet (or more broadly, communist) expansionism. Today the assumption that only a U.S.-dominated network of alliances can prevent global catastrophe represents egregiously retrograde thinking.

SEVERAL MAJOR centers of power have emerged or reemerged over the last forty years. The nations of Western Europe long ago ceased to be war-ravaged waifs incapable of defending the security of the continent. Japan now has the world's second largest economy and is capable of playing a more active political and military role in the Far East. China, India, and other nations have become significant regional actors with their own political, economic, and security agendas. Not only does the United States no longer have to police the planet, it is increasingly unlikely that it can do so without intruding on the interests of other powers, thereby creating needless frictions and confrontations.

A related principle is that in a post-Cold War world, U.S. leaders must learn to define American interests, especially security interests, with greater precision. Throughout the Cold War, there was a tendency to define "vital interests" far too broadly and casually—with the vast overcommitment to Vietnam as the quintessential example. The concept of vital interests should be reserved for those geopolitical assets that have a direct, immediate, and substantial connection with America's physical survival, its political independence, and the preservation of its domestic freedom.

Not all adverse developments in the world automatically impinge on vital American interests, thereby becoming national security imperatives that justify the use of force. Indeed, in a post-Cold War setting there may be many local or regional quarrels that are—or at least should be—of little relevance to the United States. It will require a major conceptual adjustment to restrain the interventionist impulses of policy-makers who have been accustomed to viewing even the most obscure conflicts as possible Soviet expansionist probes carried out by political surrogates.

There is a danger that the United States will inject itself into such imbroglios even if the Cold War rationale for doing so no longer applies. The Bush administration's obsession with preventing "instability" in the world is especially ominous. It seems intent, for example, on converting NATO from an anti-Soviet alliance into an arrangement with the amorphous objective of preserving European stability. That approach creates a multitude of unwarranted risks. The ethnic cauldron of Eastern Europe in particular may well be a prolific source of future conflicts. It was one thing for the United States to risk war to prevent the Soviet domination of Europe (however improbable that danger seems in retrospect); it is quite another to undertake such risks to suppress a struggle between Hungary and Romania over the status of Transylvania, or to curtail ethnic bloodletting among newly independent components of the Yugoslavian federation. The stakes simply do not justify the expenditure of American resources or the sacrifice of American lives.

Instead of regarding local conflicts as matters of wider concern involving the United States, Washington should seek to avoid such entanglements. That objective would require America to phase out its system of alliances. Even during the Cold War, alliances had become, in Earl C. Ravenal's apt phrase, "transmission belts for war," converting otherwise minor conflicts into potential superpower confrontations. Indeed, both the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently found themselves in the midst of quarrels between clients, usually involving issues that were at most of marginal relevance to the patrons. The tense confrontations between India and Pakistan, Syria and Israel, and the two Koreas are examples. The pros-

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pect of being drawn into unwanted and unnecessary conflicts by irresponsible clients will persist in the post-Cold War era. At the same time, without the Cold War rivalry even the most theoretical benefits to the United States of maintaining patron-client relationships will recede to the vanishing point.

An effective post-Cold War strategy for the United States would involve a more limited definition of vital security interests and the adoption of a more independent approach to world affairs. The shedding of alliance burdens could reduce America's defense costs by nearly two-thirds, producing a sizable peace dividend for the American people. Even more important, a policy of strategic independence would materially reduce the level of risk in what promises to be a dangerous and disorderly world.

The third principle that should guide American policy-makers is that the necessary curtailing of security commitments must not lead to a headlong plunge into economic autarky or intolerant nationalism. The proliferation of protectionist trade proposals, the hostility to foreign investment in the United States, the drive for more restrictive immigration laws, and the ugly tone of many alliance "burden-sharing" debates show that the danger of such insularity is not imaginary. It is both possible and desirable for America to play active economic, cultural, and diplomatic roles in the world without being the planetary gendarme, and it is essential for the people of the United States to make that crucial distinction. The challenge for American leaders will be to avoid the extremes of either the promiscuous interventionism that has characterized U.S. policy since World War II, or the storm shelter isolationism that immediately preceded it.

Ironically, many of those who seek to preserve the strategy of compulsive global activism are employing arguments that could eventually play into the hands of chauvinists and advocates of economic autarky. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, for example, insists that "the United States needs a military presence in Europe to maintain political ties with Western Europe" (the *New York Times*, February 13, 1990). That is a crabbed view of America's influence, measuring it in only the most narrow military terms. Such reasoning fails to take into account the weight of the common democratic heritage, extensive cultural links, and pervasive economic ties between the United States and Europe. It demeans both the Europeans and ourselves to argue that estrangement will automatically occur without a large U.S. troop presence on the continent.

THE NOTION that unless the United States virtually occupies a region militarily it cannot have productive economic and diplomatic ties with the nations there is fallacious. Other countries, most notably Japan, have been able to establish such ties without an overbearing military presence, and America did so throughout most of its history. Americans must relearn how to operate in a multipolar environment.

In fact, the United States enjoys some enviable advantages in a multipolar world. Unlike other major powers, it does not have large, potentially hostile neighbors. Its security problems are therefore less pressing than those of Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and the nations of Western Europe. America's economy is by far the world's largest, and with the manifest failure of centralized planning in the communist bloc as well as the Third World, societies around the world are looking with renewed interest at the free-market values that have made that prosperity possible. Likewise, America's political values are a source of considerable influence. From Tiananmen Square to the Berlin Wall, those who sought to bring a greater measure of freedom to their societies openly cited the American example of individual rights and limited government.

It is essential that a post-Cold War strategy contain an element of idealism as well as a more rigorous, realistic assessment of America's security interests—as important as the latter may be. Throughout the history of

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the Republic, most Americans have wanted their nation to stand for enduring principles, not merely practice a calculating *realpolitik*. It is that subtle but important point that Pat Buchanan and other advocates of a conservative national approach to world affairs fail to comprehend.

The challenge for policy-makers in the 1990s is to formulate a strategy that leaves room for the promotion of values without embarking on an interventionist binge that will entangle the United States in dangerous and unnecessary conflicts. Long ago, John Quincy Adams made the correct distinction when he stressed that America "is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." A policy of strategic independence would make that same distinction in a post-Cold War setting. It would reserve the use of military force for the defense of vital American security interests while emphasizing the potent example of America's economic and political values. Such a strategy offers the best hope for minimizing the risks and maximizing the opportunities for America in the emerging multipolar international system.

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A Time for Modesty

Nathan Glazer

THERE IS A good deal of extravagance, to my mind, in the first two contributions to the "America's Purpose" series by Charles Krauthammer and Nathan Tarcov (*The National Interest*, Winter 1989/90). Whatever other disagreements I may have with Pat Buchanan, I find nothing objectionable in his flat assertion, "When this Cold War is over, America should come home." We should not be frightened by the word "isolationism." Context is all: The original isolationism demanded that the United States should do nothing in the face of a rising nazism, that this was Europe's problem, not ours, and it added some considerations that turned out to be false, such as that an increase in military power to confront nazism would lead to the decline of freedom in the United States itself.

Well, it certainly did have consequences—an enormous increase in the power and influence of central government in the United States. But on the whole, freedom has been well secured in the United States, better secured than in the period when military spending was a mere fraction of what it is today, and our military manpower numbered in hundreds of thousands rather than millions. The original isolationism also included a good dose of selfishness—let the world take care of its own problems—and a more suspicious dose of neutrality as between fascism and democracy. Indeed, in some isolationists, one suspected a positive preference for some aspects of fascism. Thus, isolationism had to be opposed.

But the main reason it had to be opposed by those concerned for the national interests of the United States was its indifference to the truly mad expansiveness of nazism. The agonies suffered by Jews and socialists and communists under nazism played hardly any role in getting us into war or guiding what we did once we were at war. Jews and those concerned for Jews had to press their case for a more activist American foreign policy in almost underground ways, rather than publicly. In those days, the only legitimate expectations in the way of a governmental response to nazi persecution were such things as presidential statements or changes in trade arrangements—that was after all the model for American intervention in czarist Russia's persecution of Jews.

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During the first eight years of Hitler's rule and the beginning of the war, the purpose of saving the Jews from vicious persecution would hardly have swung any weight in arguing for a military alliance with the enemies of nazi Germany. Death camps might have been more persuasive, but we knew nothing of the plans to exterminate the Jews of Europe until late in the war. This was a unique event in world history; it would have justified almost any response. The fact is, however, that knowledge of the destruction of the Jews of Europe would have had little effect in a country then rather anti-Semitic and much less inclined to intervene for human rights. Indeed, even after we knew about the death camps, immigration laws kept out the victims or potential victims of nazism, even the smallest and most innocent.

It was the threat of nazi expansion that brought us onto the world military stage. And the main reason American troops have been stationed in Europe and Asia since has been the fear of the expansiveness, and threat to our own security, of what remained in our minds until the late 1980s an apparently self-confident and aggressive communism. We were of course also committed to democracy, with varying degrees of commitment from successive American administrations. This was our way, and the way of the countries of Western Europe with which we most closely identified. But as we know, there were many divergences from support of democracy as we carried out our policies. Anticommunism came first in affecting our foreign policy, and from the point of view of our national security interests, that was correct: Authoritarian, nondemocratic regimes did not threaten us, nor did they possess the powerful ideological arms of nazism and fascism in the 1930s, or of communism in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

Whatever our commitment to governments of freedom and democracy, it would never have justified the enormous expansion of American military power were it not for the threat of communism. The fact is that communism is now almost everywhere in disintegration, and that the part of it which truly represented a military threat—the Soviet Union—is unraveling, preoccupied with its own internal problems, and has lost as allies its subjected satellites in Eastern Europe. There is no longer a meaningful Warsaw Pact. One must ask why there is need any longer for a military alliance called NATO? One concludes that the only reason we seem committed is inertia. And so we continue to think of new nuclear missiles, and we remain committed to maintaining armies in Europe and Japan, bases around the world, and a huge military establishment proportionately twice the size of those of our allies, and which will decline, according to the Bush administration, only at a derisory 2 percent a year.

The arguments for the maintenance of such a policy seem to be a mix of empty words, not further analyzed, and of specific and particular considerations of one or another country which really should not centrally concern us. The isolationist Left and Right, Charles Krauthammer writes,

> ignore the indispensable role that the deployment of American power plays in the maintenance of global stability. There is nothing that would more destabilize Asia, for example, than the withdrawal of American troops from Japan. No country from South Korea to China to Thailand to Australia—not even Vietnam—fears the deployment of American troops. . . . Not that they expect immediate Japanese rearmament.

I find all this mystifying. Japan does not rearm *not* because American troops protect it or because our troops prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism, but because the Japanese find it a good thing to get along without a huge military establishment. And after all, it is *we* who keep encouraging them to strengthen their military forces.

There is, of course, always reason for small countries to fear large countries. To take an example, Canada and Mexico on occasion and for some purposes fear American power. Would that be an argument, had

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the world evolved differently, for some other great power (Japan?) to station armies permanently in the United States? And in view of the fact that Japanese relative economic power is enormous and grows apace, just when *does* a United States in relative economic decline get to withdraw its armies from Japan?

WE HEAR even more of the need for American arms in Europe to defend "stability" there. The issue is no longer defense against the Soviet attack through Germany that was the original basis of NATO and NATO planning over these last four decades, even though that has seemed increasingly unlikely for the last twenty years. We now have more complex arguments for the American military presence: Poland will be frightened if Germany is not included in NATO, or if an American general is not in command of NATO forces. But why would anyone believe these tensions and fears are the prelude to destabilization and war? Almost all European nations are now democratic or becoming democratic, and there is a universal horror of war in democracies which have experienced major wars. Further, there is a universal desire for a better material life, which would be threatened by war. Is it reasonable to expect German military power to be exerted on Poland or Czechoslovakia? Azerbaijan and Armenia are near war, Hungary and Romania glare at each other, Lithuania may be crushed by Soviet forces—but what can an American army in Germany do about any of these conflicts? One can—as in the case of Japan—propose scenarios of a resurgence in militarism, with an inflamed Japan or Germany ready to reconquer lost territories, but that is so unlikely when one takes into account the mood of most Japanese and Germans as to be a very wispy basis for a foreign or military policy. (It is also an argument for *permanent* American military forces in Europe, for who knows when the scenario might not come into effect?)

True, their nuclear arsenal and ours still exist, and careful approaches to bringing them down remain necessary. But one is at a loss to see what role continued American military forces in Germany will play in affecting that process.

Big countries with great economic power will inevitably carry weight, and that will be the case with Japan and Germany, but there is no role for American occupying forces, whether to restrain these countries or reassure their neighbors, in this inevitability. And the world does, after all, change. There is something like a fragmentary and evolving world order, which will evolve more effectively now that the formerly communist countries are joining the rest of democratic Europe. There is international law, the United Nations, the GATT process, and many other international institutions, and despite the growing strength of some countries and the continued weakness and poverty of many others, the former do not ride roughshod over the latter. Boundaries remain stable, the rich countries provide aid to the poor, they try to adopt trading rules which assist the poorer countries, and the like. The poorer countries have a moral claim rather than any force with which to pursue their interests. For a long time they did have the chance to threaten allying with one of the two great antagonists if the other did not provide aid, and that did shake loose a good deal of aid. But will aid end now that Russia is withdrawing from the competition?

Even if the great change that Francis Fukuyama discerns may be debated, lesser changes of significance in the relations among nations have occurred. Big, developed, democratic countries now engage in no or very small wars. Germans and Japanese have discovered that economic growth and competition bring greater rewards, and much safer ones, than big wars. England and France have learned that colonies are a headache and they do better without. The United States has learned that wars to maintain "stability," as in Vietnam, can be very expensive and domestically disruptive, and may be very hard to wage and win. We engage now only in very little and very safe (for us) wars—

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Grenada, Panama. Even regarding these, one may well ask, was this war necessary? I think not. Even little wars kill a lot of people. Our Panama adventure turned out to be very expensive, Panama is no better off, and American policy-makers now undoubtedly wish they had not brought Noriega into the toils of the American system of justice, where he will demonstrate its incapacity, ineffectiveness, and fecklessness for years to come. (The Falklands involved a more substantial issue of principle.)

SO THEN, what is America's purpose now that the Cold War is over? Are we to be simply a country like any other country? No country likes to think of itself that way, and certainly not one that is still for a time the greatest economic power in the world. Of course, as Nathan Tarcov tells us, the United States ". . . remains explicitly founded on universal principles of human equality, individual rights, government by consent, and the right of peoples to alter or abolish their governments when destructive of these ends." We are proud, and rightly so, that these principles are increasingly accepted as the right principles for the organization of governments and societies, that even African dictatorships now fumble their way to multiparty regimes.

What I find difficult to understand is why our promotion of these principles in the present-day world requires a great military establishment, with bases throughout the world. Admittedly, many specific issues remain to be worked out. Should there be an American military presence in South Korea? Do we need the huge bases in the Philippines? What do we do about an Israel surrounded by permanent enemies, and which takes the largest single country share of American aid? I would say there are varying commitments derived from history, from our own responsibility for certain problems, and from internal political pressures—none of these are to be fully denied. Military forces and commitments will remain: I speak about scale.

Some of these specific issues seem easier to resolve than others. Some are bedeviled by the nonsense of a Cold War which is disappearing. One is thus mystified as to why the United States was involved in bringing the Khmer Rouge back to power in Cambodia, and can only explain it as a leftover of the Cold War—and a very complicated and almost incomprehensible leftover at that. As well as one can figure it out, because Cambodia is ruled by a regime backed by communist Vietnam, we seemed to think anything else was better, even the Khmer Rouge, because that was backed by the "good" communists (China), while Vietnam was backed by the "bad" communists (Soviet Russia), except that we now think better of the "bad" communists than the "good" communists, do we not? I will leave it to the foreign-policy specialists to explain this and other follies; for example, the fact that we continue to back Pakistan. This is a country that was also backed by the formerly "good" communists, China, and which we hoped would oppose the "bad" communists, Russia. The reality was that the only thing that truly concerned Pakistan and the only country it would conceivably fight was India, which had resorted to the "bad" communists, Russia, to get arms because we were supplying arms to *their* permanent enemy, Pakistan.

One has the strong feeling that these and other nonsensical American policies are simply leftovers of a Cold War which is rapidly disintegrating and will be left to wither on the vine. But one is not so sure. Policies seem to have a way of surviving whatever reason justified them in the first place.

To return to our purpose. It is not to become enmeshed in permanent alliances, whether based on the balance of power, some presumed geopolitical conflict, or an assumption of permanent and unchangeable ideological division. It is not to be the policeman of the world. George Washington was also a Founding Father, and his lasting heritage was the Farewell Address.

We should maintain our commitment to democracy and to free government. We

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should applaud and, if we can, give aid to those who want to institute free government. We should show our disapproval of authoritarian, dictatorial, or totalitarian rule. Our direct weight and influence in making democracy and free economy the attractive things they now are in so much of the world has been limited: our example has played a larger role. And this was all the Founding Fathers intended. They had no idea that one way we would promote our permanent commitment to those universal principles on which this country was founded would be to maintain armies around the world. These armies served their function in the age of expanding antidemocratic ideologies. It is hard to discern the emerging problems—and they are numerous indeed—against which American armies could be effective. In promoting and recommending those universal principles to which we are attached, it is now time to withdraw to something closer to the modest role that the Founding Fathers intended.

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Entangled Forever

Josef Joffe

"IF COMMUNISM is dead," Irving Kristol pointed out to the 1990 gathering of the Committee for the Free World, "then anticommunism is dead, too." This is true in a way of a tautology—*per definitionem*. Alas, there is more than a vacuous truism to this proposition. For it puts the axe to the roots of almost half a century of American foreign policy.

Or does it?

Realpolitikers would fiercely deny such a lapidary DOA pronouncement. They would insist that anticommunism was but the icing on the cake, rich as it was. American foreign policy since 1945 has followed interest rather than ideology, and so the former will outlive the latter. Cut through the anticommunist clamor, they would contend, and you discern the classic behavior of a normal great power.

Their rebuttal might continue along these lines: The end of American innocence came as early as 1947—when Britain abdicated responsibility for embattled Greece. With Stalin set on expansion, and Britain and France—both exhausted—out of the equation, the United States had to assume the burden of the balance for good. No longer could the U.S. withdraw behind the cozy barrier of the Atlantic (and the fog of idealist *pronunciamento*). Like the great powers of yore, America was now irrevocably stuck in the self-help system that is the essence of world politics, and so it had to obey the system's eternal rules.

Which it did—consciously or not. True, the Truman Doctrine, the founding document, was enveloped in the grandiloquent oratory of antitotalitarianism. So were NATO, SEATO, et al., those Cold War alliances thrown up around the Soviet Union. But in essence, these were the time-honored tools of power politics—coalitions sponsored by the U.S. in order to constrain the one and only rival who threatened America's physical security.

Move and countermove, thrust and parry, became the choreography of a stylized, sometimes bloody "grand strategy" Americans had always learned to despise as the game of princes and despots. But "containment" was the same game nonetheless. Whether it came to coalition-building (as in NATO) or coalition war (as in Korea), whether the crisis was over Berlin or Cuba—all the way down to the Euromissile Battle of the 1980s—the U.S. acted as great powers have

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always done: so as to balance or best its existential foe.

By way of Q.E.D., our *realpolitiker* would conclude: The power of Soviet Russia and not the threat of communism was the motivating force of postwar American foreign policy. How else would we explain our long-term love affair with the communist despots of China, which even the Tiananmen Massacre could not interrupt? How else would we explain our "policy of differentiation" in communist Eastern Europe which ranged us along such sterling characters as Nicolae Ceausescu? Indeed, if the real game was value rather than balance, why did America fall into bed with a long succession of nasties from Chiang Kai-shek to Manuel Noriega (before he was fingered as drug lord)?

If the *realpolitikers* are right, then all is not lost now that "communism is dead" and Mikhail Gorbachev is dragging his country into democracy and the free market. If Russian power rather than Soviet ideology is the problem, then America's purpose must still address itself to the great existential threat embodied by Moscow. Communism might disappear, but thermonuclear weapons and vast conventional forces will not. (Precisely for this reason, even a disintegrating Muscovite empire will pose the single most important danger for world stability and American security.) Russian democracy would change hardball into softball, but not the rules themselves (which, at any rate, must always take into account a reversion to yesterday's pitching and slugging). Alas, in spinning this tale, the *realpolitiker* has left out a critical part. Democracies do not like *realpolitik*, and none has disliked it more than America, the oldest democracy which was founded in revulsion against the "corrupt game of princes" that was Europe's bloody lot.

In their own minds, Americans never went to war to uphold the balance of power, let alone for glory or booty. What really riled them in their first war was the "Cruelty & Perfidy" of George III—above and beyond his "plundering our seas [and] ravaging our Coasts." When America at last entered the war against Germany in 1917 and 1941, the nation did not think about the European balance but about the sheer evil of Kaiser Bill and Adolf Hitler. Nor was Russian power the problem that galvanized American society during the Cold War; it was the *ideological* enemy as embodied in the persons of Stalin and his successors.

Writing about "Democracy in America," Tocqueville reminds us of the basic reason: "There are two things that a democratic people always will find very difficult—to begin a war and to end it." In other words: Democracies do worst in the twilight zone between war and peace. Unless they are roused by great passions or great ideologies, they turn their backs on "reason of state." Yet once they are so roused, they similarly ignore the subtle intricacies of diplomacy. Instead, they will fight to the bloody finish when the foe is at last crushed as prelude to his moral-political reform.

Indeed, reason of state or the "primacy of foreign policy" are fundamentally alien to the democratic spirit. They imply a realm of policy that is above and beyond the fray of democratic politics. If the people are the sovereign, *no* issue must be excluded from the public debate. The very idea of the "primacy of foreign policy" is antidemocratic because it presumes a "national interest" defined and guarded by an elite not beholden to the normal democratic contest.

Finally, the principles of democracy do not mesh too well with those of diplomacy. Diplomacy must be subtle; democracy lives by the rough and tumble of domestic politics. Democratic politics is to choose between stark alternatives, either ideological or personal; diplomacy is a game of ambiguous rules and stark dilemmas that are not so much resolved as muted or suspended. Democracy obeys the rule of law; diplomacy is the art of ruse and reinsurance. Democratic politics thrives on publicity and public discourse. Diplomacy must act with circumspection and secrecy, frequently pretending one objective

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(portrayed as lofty) even as it pursues another (which happens to be quite self-serving).

In short, democracies do not like Clausewitz. It is either total peace or total war, be it hot or cold. If suitably galvanized by an ideological threat and moral purpose, they will "pay any price" and "bear any burden," as John F. Kennedy put it, but they will not move smoothly along the "Clausewitzian continuum" where ideology means little and power everything, where diplomacy and force are but shades of one and the same spectrum of choices.

Yet if the Cold War (a.k.a. ideological threat) is over, then we have a problem. Neo-isolationists could point to the collapse of Soviet power, declare victory, and go home. Internationalists could point to the collapse of communism, declare the "end of history," and also join the homeward trek. Both sides would unite in the conviction that America no longer needs to sustain the struggle—indeed, remain chained to the world—because the threat had vanished. Isolationists would feel safe in physical insulation; internationalists would conclude that the vision of the Enlightenment had at last come true. Since only despots make war, while democracies are inherently pacific, international politics henceforth will be reduced to global domestic policy. Welfare, not warfare, will shape its rules; global threats like ozone holes and pollution will dictate the agenda—and cooperation, to boot.

Realpolitikers ignore the domestic side of democratic foreign policy and pooh-pooh change. *Idealpolitikers* fall for the opposite temptation. Believing, as had Jefferson, that there is "but one system of ethics for men and for nations," they are always quick to spot a new "paradigm" in the making while ignoring that states, no matter what their constitution, remain chained to the self-help system. Whereas the citizen can *assume* security, the state cannot. In the self-help system, great conflicts like the Cold War may abate, even vanish—but not so the necessity to worry about security, status, and position. Old conflicts might return, new conflicts might supersede them. Even in peace, nations cannot take tranquility for granted as long as they live in a "state of nature" lacking both an arbiter of conflict and enforcer of peace.

The existence of *states* defines the essence of the game. Whence it follows that only their disappearance could usher in a new paradigm of global politics. Yet despite the onslaught of trans-, sub-, and supranational forces, the nation-state is alive and well. And so, the old rules of the self-help system will survive, too. Nor do the retraction of Soviet power and the collapse of Soviet ideology change the fundamentals. Even without its far-flung empire, Russia will still be the largest country on earth. Even with a democratic political culture, nuclear-armed Russia will still be the only country that can annihilate the United States.

HAS NOTHING changed then? This is not the real issue. If completed, the democratization of the Soviet Union certainly would remove the peculiar intensity that attended the conflict in decades past. If continued, the retraction of Soviet power will remove many sources of the struggle—above all in Europe, the original and foremost arena of the Cold War, where the forward-projection of Soviet power was the *casus belli*. Yet waning stridency and diminishing stakes do not signify the end of conflict, let alone the end of the self-help system. And so, there is no exit for the United States.

First, take the Soviet Union. Though lily-white democrats they might yet become, the heirs of Lenin and Stalin will still preside over the greatest military power apart from the United States. Though the competition will be muted and encased by cooperation, one thing will and cannot change: Unless the USSR self-destructs or another superpower arises, only America and Russia can extinguish one another. That is an existential fact with consequences. It limits both trust and cooperation, and it will keep the game of containment and counter-containment going. Each must still keep a wary eye on the other, and each must take care that his competitor-

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partner does not accumulate too many assets that might yet be turned to malign uses. And so, American policy must still harken the commands of the self-help system, cooperating where it can and competing where it must.

SECOND, take the international system. Twenty years after the first wave of "multipolarism," whose proponents declared the death of bipolarity and the birth of a tri- or quintapolar world, there is now the sequel with the subtitle "The Decline of American Power." The obvious need not be gainsaid. The U.S. is good merely for a quarter of the gross global product, and no longer for one-half. Germany (plus the EC) and Japan are serious, though still much smaller, commercial competitors, and there are at least five nuclear powers. As force has become less fungible, other "currencies" of influence have moved to the fore; power in general has become more diffused. Yet in a critical respect, the world is more "unipolar" than ever.

As was true twenty years ago, the U.S. is the only nation present at each gaming table—the strategic, the conventional-military, the diplomatic, economic, and ideological-cultural one. And at each table, it is the dominant player to boot. The Soviet Union was always a developing country with thermonuclear weapons; today, it is an economic basket case which has lost even its ideological trump card. To make this case is not to crow but to stress the special responsibility that has devolved upon America as its existential rival is deflating.

Nor are the new centers of power—Germany, Japan, China—ready to assume the burden of global management. China is a societal earthquake waiting to happen. Germany has its hands full with reunification and thereafter will be busy with its many conflicting obligations between EC integration and *Mitteleuropa*, between pacifying and containing Russia. Japan will have to come to grips with the sharpening tensions between consumerism and mega-mercantilism before even beginning to contemplate an autonomous strategic role in East Asia. The mighty yen and deutschemark can always bring down the American dollar, beholden as it is to the German interest rate and to Japanese bond hoarders. But neither MITI nor the Bundesbank can deal with Soviet SS–24 missiles, Lithuanian separatists, or Iraqi poison gas.

Which brings us to the third reason why there is no exit for the United States. As the previous dominant conflict (a.k.a. Cold War) is declining, many lesser ones (with a heavy growth potential) are jostling to take the Cold War's place. Here is an abbreviated checklist: the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Iraqi ambitions, Libyan mischief, economic catastrophe in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia's explosion, Arab-Israeli war, nuclear and poison gas proliferation, Islamic fundamentalism, the collapse of the marvelous Western economy that stretches from Frankfurt via New York to Tokyo. Take your pick and try to imagine any crisis management minus the United States.

To all of this, a neo-isolationist might rightfully reply: "You have made the *world's* case for America's entanglement. But what's in it for the *United States?*" The point is well taken. To shoulder the burden would require a sense of responsibility that is (a) costly and (b) not self-evident to a society unwilling to sustain *les vastes entreprises* (as de Gaulle put it) in the absence of an overweening ideological threat. Moreover, many items on the checklist of conflict do not undermine the isolationist creed because such crises do not necessarily affect American physical security. Let the Europeans take care of Qaddafi. Yugoslavia '90 is not Sarajevo '14; today, no great power will start World War III because of Serbian nationalism.

The counter-reply is an old one. If you don't believe that power is destiny, then how about: "What is good for the world, is good for America?" While it is true that a nuclear-armed United States can assure its own security (as it always could), great powers have interests which transcend their national

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space, requiring order beyond borders. Conflict in Yugoslavia may not spill over; conflict in the Middle East, a strategic locale harboring a strategic resource (oil), has a nasty habit of attracting outsiders. Europe may be on the road to pacification, but it is not foreordained that the Continent can take care of itself.

The underlying problem has hardly vanished. There is Russia, larger and militarily more potent than anybody else, and there is Germany, the biggest economic player at the fulcrum of the European balance which is now being liberated from the fetters of dependence the Cold War has wrought. On the other hand, there is an abiding American interest in European order for reasons both strategic and economic (which this analysis assumes to be self-evident). If the past 120 years are a guide, Germany and Russia are not the ideal co-managers. When they have not been at each other's throat, they have conspired against the rest while simultaneously trying to weaken each other. By contrast, Europe has flourished, as after 1945, when a power stronger than both was ensconced in the system. That power was, and remains, America.

The U.S. need not be there with 300,000 troops once force levels come down everywhere. But given America's stake in a prosperous and peaceful Europe, the U.S. ought to play the same role tomorrow as it did yesterday: as protector and pacifier from within. America on the inside would hold the balance against a diminished, but still potent Soviet Union. And in so doing, the U.S. would pull the sting of German power, thus allowing the entire continent to acquire the cooperative habits that came to bless Western Europe in the past forty years. It should not be assumed that an autochthonous order will arise, just because the Cold War structures are crumbling. Renationalization and the return to pre–1945 modes of behavior are just as likely in the absence of an Atlantic anchor.

But what if there is a "new paradigm" in the making—with welfare shouldering aside warfare? That would add, rather than subtract, reasons for America living up to its Number One role. Twenty years ago, exports came to 4 percent of American GNP; today, that proportion has more than doubled. At the same time, America's vulnerability to global economic forces (interest rates, capital movements, protectionism) has soared. While the U.S. can no longer dominate the world economy, its two closest competitors (Germany-EC and Japan) are neither willing nor able to assume the burden of global management that underlies the marvelous resilience of the Western economy. By virtue of size and position, the U.S. remains the hub. That role and new vulnerabilities hardly counsel self-sufficiency because the United States will suffer more than most if free trade and monetary stability collapse. But there is more: Precisely because the U.S. has accumulated new economic handicaps in the 1970s and 1980s, it must not abandon its politico-strategic assets. Being present in Europe, for instance, gives the U.S. a more audible say in economic decision-making than from a solitary perch across the Atlantic.

Granted, but why should Washington bomb Qaddafi, stop Iraqi nuclear ambitions, fiddle with Messrs. Shamir and Arafat, "resocialize" Iran, democratize Nicaragua, and seek a settlement in Cambodia? The answer is twofold. First, while peace and the "new paradigm" might yet rule over the "northern" world that stretches eastward from San Francisco to Vladivostok, the "old paradigm"—ambition, fear, and violence—is alive and well everywhere else. Second, these conflicts have a way of impinging on the United States. Iraqi nuclear weapons may pose threats at one step removed, but when Pan Am 103 explodes over Lockerbie, the challenge is direct, brutal, and bloody.

Wherever the "old paradigm" persists, American interests will be affected. Nor could American interests be scaled down like those, say, of Canada, in order to get out of harm's way. The United States is too big, too visible, and too much of a weight in the balance to revert to the role Tocqueville had described thus: "The country is as much removed from the passions of the Old World

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by its position as by its wishes, and it is called upon neither to repudiate nor to espouse them"; hence "the foreign policy of the United States. . . consists more in abstaining than in acting." Yet today, even abstention will have consequences for the world and then for America itself, and so there is no exit.

Finally, there is also *pleasure* in being Number One. To exert power is better than suffering it; to be at the helm is better than hunkering down in the hold. With the Soviet Union (temporarily) receding from the world scene, the U.S. need not respond to each and every change by treating it as harbinger of bigger and worse things to come. There will be some safety in indifference, and not every crisis need be approached as if it were a wholly-owned subsidiary of American diplomacy. But the death of communism spells neither the birth of a new order nor the end of conflict. It is the great powers that build and maintain international order, and those who shape it most also gain most. With the decline of the Soviet Union, there is only one truly great power left in the system. Therein lies the purpose and the profit of American power at the threshold of the twenty-first century.

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A Normal Country in a Normal Time

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

IT IS THE first time since 1939 that there has been an opportunity for Americans to consider what we might do in a world less constrained by political and military competition with a dangerous adversary. I am pleased that *The National Interest* has provided a forum for this discussion.

The United States arrives at the end of the Cold War with some obvious assets. We are a powerful, affluent country with real strengths, great but limited resources, some bad habits, and a few real problems. We have virtually no experience in protecting and serving our interests in a multipolar world in which diverse nations and groups of nations engage in an endless competition for marginal advantages. This is precisely the kind of world now taking shape.

Assuming our resources and their limits—what kinds of goals should Americans and the U.S. government pursue in this post-Cold War period in which there is no pressing need for heroism and sacrifice? Some preliminary observations should help in answering the question.

American purposes are mainly domestic.

A good society is defined not by its foreign policy but its internal qualities—by the existence of democracy, opportunity, fairness; by the relations among its citizens, the kind of character nurtured, and the quality of life lived.

Foreign policy becomes a major aspect of a society only if its government is expansionist, imperial, aggressive, or when it is threatened by aggression. One of the most important consequences of the half century of war and Cold War has been to give foreign affairs an unnatural importance. The end of the Cold War frees time, attention, and resources for American needs.

America's chief collective purpose should be to make a good society better: more productive, more cohesive, more caring, more safe, more challenging, more serious.

Our purposes in the world are merely human, not transcendental.

Unlike countries with a long complex history and a clear national composition, the

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United States is the quintessential eighteenth-century contractarian society—a people who constituted themselves by political will, who defined themselves in terms of their purposes and organized a government—all much as John Locke described. The U.S. Constitution is the act of incorporation whose preamble defines and limits our collective purposes. Only one of the purposes stated there unambiguously applies to foreign affairs: to "provide for the common defense."

There is no mystical American "mission" or purposes to be "found" independently of the U.S. Constitution and government. There is no inherent or historical "imperative" for the U.S. government to seek to achieve any other goal—however great—except as it is mandated by the Constitution and adopted by the people through elected officials.

To be legitimate, the American government's purposes must be ratified by popular majorities.

Except in the case of urgent, unanticipated events of great importance, the U.S. government cannot legitimately devote taxpayer monies to any cause not authorized by democratically elected officials—not to the establishment of democracy around the world, nor the elimination of war, hunger, and chaos, nor the establishment of a stable world order, nor an orderly global trading system, nor any other worthy good *except* as these issues are discussed and endorsed by majorities of voters and adopted by their elected representatives. It can be expected that policies so adopted will reflect U.S. national character and basic values.

It is frequently argued that foreign policy is so different from domestic policy that majority rule should not apply. It is certainly true that foreign policy has distinctive characteristics. Its objects are more remote and exotic than the objects of domestic politics. Because most people know less about foreign than domestic affairs, the issues can more readily be distorted and manipulated. And as Tocqueville noted, the common sense and everyday experience of ordinary people is less readily relevant. It is also true that foreign policy decisions may be uniquely catastrophic. Major mistakes in economic policy may cost people their jobs and income, but major mistakes in foreign policy cost people their freedom and their lives.

Under the conditions of global interdependence and proliferating weapons of mass destruction, U.S. foreign policy has become progressively complicated, expensive, and dangerous. More nations, more civilizations, more horrors are involved. American civilians—like the passengers on the *Achille Lauro*—have been sucked into foreign affairs in new ways as the U.S. became involved with countries and people who consider us all combatants in an ongoing war for the liberation of somewhere.

It has become more important than ever that the experts who conduct foreign policy on our behalf be subject to the direction and control of the people. We should reject utterly any claim that foreign policy is the special province of special people—beyond the control of those who must pay its costs and bear its consequences.

Like many other aspects of social policy, foreign affairs requires expert knowledge from those who frame issues and options and implement policies. But this is no reason to exempt it from democratic controls.

Only elected officials, continuously reminded of their immediate dependence on the people, can insure that government does not impose inappropriate, excessive, or unbearable demands on the polity. Elected officials must therefore accept responsibility for foreign policy, and we the people should hold them responsible for its conduct. This means that discussion of the broad issues of foreign policy should have an important place in any election campaign. Such discussion is not the rowdy intrusion often charged, it is an essential element of democratic government in an interdependent world.

Foreign-policy elites may have distinctive views.

Maintaining popular control of foreign policy is especially important because foreign-policy elites often have different views

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than those of popular majorities. In the long years of World War II and the Cold War, the United States developed a foreign-policy elite based in the bureaucracy, academic institutions, and heavily associated with nonprofit institutions. Members of this foreign-policy elite grew accustomed to thinking of the United States as having boundless resources and purposes which transcended the preferences of voters and apparent American interests—expansive, expensive, global purposes—and eventually developed a disinterested globalist attitude which became identified with the liberal position in foreign policy.

In American discussions of foreign policy, "internationalism" is often identified with this "disinterested globalism," and opposition to it is thought of as "isolationism." But disinterested globalism is only one American variant of internationalism, rarely practiced by other governments, most of which practice another variety of internationalism.

As for isolationism, most Americans know it is not a viable alternative in the contemporary world. The isolationism v. internationalism debate is in reality the debate among the various *types* of internationalism: that which aims frankly to serve the national interest, as conventionally conceived (to protect its territory, wealth, and access to necessary goods; to defend its nationals); that which aims to preserve and defend democracy; and a brand of "disinterested globalism" which looks at the world and asks what needs to be done—with little explicit concern for the national interest.

Today, when the Soviet Union has lost its political dynamism, when democracy is growing in strength, when Europe, Japan, Taiwan, Korea are strong and friendly, the United States is free to focus again on its own national interests without endangering the civilization of which it is a part. That is a normal condition for nations. It is not incompatible with playing a constructive global role.

What should we do?

The U.S. should first clean up the residue of the Cold War and the communist threat: eliminating Soviet troops and weapons from Eastern Europe, negotiating the dramatic reduction of strategic weapons, drawing down American forces and commitments overseas, and assuming no new obligations in remote places.

There are two new major tasks which U.S. foreign policy should address. It should support the U.S. economy and work to strengthen democracy.

First, the U.S. government has the responsibility for writing and negotiating rules under which American business can compete effectively internationally. It is the U.S. government's responsibility to negotiate rules which give U.S. products fair access to foreign markets and give foreign businesses no better than fair access to U.S. markets; to make certain that U.S. laws (such as antitrust laws) do not handicap U.S. industry in competing with European and Asian firms; to ensure that the patterns of trade competition do not undermine the United States' industrial and technological base; to provide a strong, stable dollar which does not handicap American businesses seeking to deal in foreign environments and does not give foreign competitors an advantage in acquiring resources on the American and international markets. This is a *government* responsibility which cannot be ignored because of anxieties about an "industrial" policy.

Second, while it is not the American purpose to establish "universal dominance," in the provocative formulation of Charles Krauthammer—not even the universal dominance of democracy—it is enormously desirable for the U.S. and others to encourage democratic institutions wherever possible. Democratic institutions are not only the best guarantee that a government will respect the rights of its citizens, they are the best guarantee that a country will not engage in aggressive wars. Democratic institutions are the best arms control plan, the best peace plan for any area. A democratic Soviet government would quickly resolve outstanding problems in negotiating verifiable, mutual arms reductions. Democratic governments in the Middle

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East would resolve the so-called Arab-Israeli problem.

It is not within the United States' power to democratize the world, but we can and should make clear our views about the consequences of freedom and unfreedom. We can and should encourage others to adopt democratic practices.

What we should not do:

A decent regard for the interests of American taxpayers and national interests also indicates that there are some things the U.S. government should not do.

The United States should not seek to manage the political evolution of the Soviet Union. It is a large, sovereign country, very different from our own, with whom we have no special influence, and in which we have no special interest (except as a military threat). There are several reasons we should not offer significant financial aid.

We should not imagine that we can "save" Gorbachev, either with massive economic aid or any other way, because his tenure will depend on internal political factors beyond our control.

Economic aid will not necessarily help the Soviet economy out of its current crisis. Almost everyone understands that the sweeping structural changes required for the Soviet economy to grow have been slow in coming. So has the needed reorientation of incentives.

AMERICANS DO NOT know at this stage what is best for the Soviet people. Who would be more likely to move the peoples of the Soviet Union toward self-government and self-determination? Who would be more likely to provide self-determination to the constituent "republics" of the Soviet Union seeking autonomy? Who would be more likely to remove Soviet troops from Eastern Europe? Who would be more likely to reduce and destroy arms?

Any notion that the United States can manage the changes in that huge, multinational, developing society is grandiose. It is precisely the kind of thinking about foreign policy which Americans need to unlearn. We should also not get nervous, but understand that a period of instability in Eastern Europe is a necessary price of freedom for those long-suffering people.

The United States should also not try to manage the balance of power in Europe—we should neither seek to prevent nor assist Germany in reestablishing a dominant position in Europe or in Central Europe. We could not control these matters if we tried, and there is no reason to try. A united *democratic* Germany is a threat to no one. There have been forty years for the United States and Western democracies to encourage democratic political culture and institutions. There have been decades of careful step-by-step movement toward a European Community and Atlantic Alliance, one of whose functions is to integrate and reinforce democratic institutions of member states. If those have not accomplished the task, there is not much we can do now.

The United States also cannot eliminate the anxieties of Germany's neighbors—only positive experience with a powerful, sovereign Germany can do that. Neither can the U.S. be expected to sustain an expensive role in an alliance whose chief role is to diminish European fear of a resurgent Germany. Americans have more pressing priorities.

The relative strength and weight within Europe of the various European countries will be settled—peacefully, one trusts—by European countries in European arenas in which the U.S. will have a small role. This should be regarded by Americans as liberating rather than depriving the U.S.

The U.S. should also not seek to balance power between Japan, China, and, say, India, in North or South Asia; nor try to contain Japan's role in Asia and in the world. Our concern with Japan should above all be with its trading practices vis-à-vis the United States. We should not spend American money protecting an affluent Japan, though a continuing alliance with Japan is entirely appropriate.

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A normal country in a normal time.

The United States performed heroically in a time when heroism was required; altruistically during the long years when freedom was endangered.

The time when Americans should bear such unusual burdens is past. With a return to "normal" times, we can again become a normal nation—and take care of pressing problems of education, family, industry, and technology. We can be an independent nation in a world of independent nations.

Most of the international military obligations that we assumed were once important are now outdated. Our alliances should be alliances of equals, with equal risks, burdens, and responsibilities. It is time to give up the dubious benefits of superpower status and become again an usually successful, open American republic.

This is, in any case, the American purpose today—as I understand it. I believe these views are broadly shared by the majority of Americans.

Should that not be the case, I would, of course, respect their decision.

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Of Victory and Deficits

Stephen J. Solarz

WE ARE WITNESSES to an extraordinary moment in human history. The Berlin Wall has crumbled. The Warsaw Pact has collapsed. The Red Army has been driven out of Afghanistan. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, the Iron Curtain that so cruelly divided East from West has at last ascended.

In one Eastern European country after another, crypto-Stalinist dictatorships are being transformed into genuine parliamentary democracies. Even in the Soviet Union itself we are observing the gradual emergence of a multiparty system and the ineluctable dissolution of the last of the great empires.

We are on the verge of a nuclear arms reduction agreement that will reduce by half the number of nuclear weapons that threaten our continued existence on this earth. We are close to closure on a European conventional forces agreement that will entirely eliminate the huge advantage in conventional forces enjoyed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. In short, although vestiges remain, the Cold War is over.

But the end of the Cold War, while a major achievement, does not mean that we no longer face any threats to the vital interests of our country. Stated simply, the main challenge to our national security in the twenty-first century is economic competition from Japan, a united Germany, an integrated Europe, and even the newly industrialized countries of Asia—especially the so-called four tigers of East Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea.

This challenge is manifested in our appalling trade deficit, which reached $108 billion last year. It is reflected in our abysmal rate of savings, which has plummeted to a deplorably low 2.5 percent of GNP. It is illustrated by our stagnant standard of living, which has seen the median family income, measured in real terms, remain virtually unchanged since 1973. And it is manifested in the escalating size of the federal debt, which has more than tripled since 1980, and which during the past decade transformed the United States from the world's largest creditor to its largest debtor.

These gloomy macro-economic trends are a reflection of some dangerous and depressing social developments. For instance, one out of every five children in America lives

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in poverty. Ten babies die in the United States for every 1,000 live births—a shamefully high infant mortality rate that places us behind eighteen other countries around the world. One American adult in four is functionally illiterate, whereas in Germany, Japan, and South Korea, adult literacy is close to 99 percent. Nearly 29 percent of all U.S. high school students leave school before graduating, compared with a dropout rate in Japan of little more than 1 percent.

Similarly, much of the physical infrastructure of our nation is outmoded or overburdened, which further reduces our capacity to turn back competition from overseas. Thirty-five percent of the country's interstate highway system has outlived its design life, while gridlock is increasingly the rule rather than the exception not only on our highways but at our airports as well. More than 40 percent of the nation's bridges are structurally deficient or functionally obsolete. In short, it is not too much to say that we are now moving into a world where the major threat to our national values will come not from the Red Army or the Warsaw Pact, but from economic competition from abroad and social problems here at home.

In earlier centuries, countries whose military might and standard of living made them world powers—Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century, the Netherlands in the seventeenth, France in the eighteenth, Great Britain in the nineteenth—gradually slipped from the pinnacle of power into a shabby second-class status. The real challenge that confronts America is: Can we maintain our economic preeminence, or shall we, as did these other once-great countries, begin a long slow slide into stagnation, eventually to be eclipsed by other nations better able to meet the challenge of the technological age in which we live? Or to state this in slightly different terms, can we muster the will and marshall the resources to address these challenges in order to remain the wealthiest, most powerful, most envied nation in the world?

I believe we can. More to the point, I believe we must. But if we are to retain our place of preeminence, we will have to come to grips with the deficit, which stood at $152 billion in 1989. Already, interest on the debt represents the most rapidly growing component of the federal budget. Totalling $180 billion last year, the amount we paid in interest was more than eight times the total budget of the Department of Education.

Indeed, the immense size of the deficit is perhaps the single most important factor in eroding our nation's economic power and capacity to compete, since the deficit drains money otherwise available for economically productive investment and requires the Federal Reserve to keep interest rates artificially high. How can we hope to compete with the Japanese when our prime interest rate stands at 10 percent, while the comparable figure in Tokyo is customarily 2 to 4 percentage points lower? Reducing the size of the deficit in a prudent and expeditious fashion will produce a higher rate of savings, lower interest rates, and ultimately increased industrial productivity.

But it would be a profound mistake to believe that the only problem we have is the budget deficit. It is equally important that we deal with the social deficit as well. What those now engaged in hammering out next year's budget ought to be looking at is not simply a one-year decrease in the budget deficit, but a five-year program to substantially reduce the deficit, revitalize our human resources, and rebuild our physical infrastructure.

All of this, of course, will cost money—lots of it. A comprehensive plan to address these problems will cost as much as $600 billion over the next five years.

Much of this money can and should come from the defense budget. As we have seen, the end of the Cold War and the dramatic reduction in the threat posed by Warsaw Pact forces should allow us to safely make major reductions in military spending, thereby freeing up resources for investing in our country's human and physical capital while simultaneously getting the deficit down to more manageable proportions.

Of course, America will need to remain

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militarily strong. In an unsafe and uncertain world, threats of a military nature may still emerge. Unilateral disarmament is no more an option today than it was at the height of the Cold War. But given the diminution of the Soviet challenge, it certainly should be possible to eliminate systems and forces designed to deal with a threat that no longer poses the danger to our national security it did only a few years ago.

Let us not fool ourselves, however. A program designed to maintain our preeminence in the world cannot be funded by the defense budget alone. Already there are almost as many claims on the "peace dividend" as there are customers at McDonald's in Moscow.

ULTIMATELY, dealing with the human and physical needs of our nation will require a significant increase in government revenues. As a practical matter, that won't happen unless there is a bipartisan agreement between the White House and the leadership of both parties in Congress. And without such agreement, it will be possible neither to reduce the deficit substantially, nor to provide the resources necessary to rebuild our country's human and physical capital.

To be sure, the economic future of the United States will depend primarily on the efforts and energies and entrepreneurial creativity of the private sector, which is responsible for 83 percent of our country's jobs, and which produces 80 percent of the GNP of the United States. But there are some problems—revitalizing our educational system, for instance, or rebuilding our infrastructure—that the private sector alone cannot solve. And in these areas, unless we make resources available from the public sector, these needs will not be adequately addressed, and the private sector will be held back.

Of course we should not for a moment think that we can solve the problems facing our nation just by throwing money at them. All too often in the past, we simply assumed that providing resources automatically guaranteed results. Now we know better. It will be essential, therefore, to link the provision of any additional resources to strict performance standards, in order to make sure we get our money's worth. For the fact of the matter is that unless we can show a tangible return on our investment, political support for additional expenditures will evaporate.

Over the past two hundred years—little more than the tick of a second hand on the clock of history—we have accomplished many good and great things. We have stood for fundamental human values of decency, justice, and fair play. We have nourished freedom at home and nurtured it abroad. We have been generous in sharing our bounty with those less fortunate than ourselves. We have achieved a level of affluence undreamed of by our ancestors and unparalleled in the annals of mankind.

That, however, is the past. We cannot afford—now above all—simply to sit back and rest on our laurels. At the moment that we celebrate the collapse of communism and the triumph of democracy, we must also remember that the failure of communism has not meant that capitalism has eliminated all our social ills at home. Capitalism has made the American economy the envy of the world. But the "magic of the marketplace" will not, by itself, solve the problems of adult illiteracy, of fatherless families, of chronic unemployment. Capitalism, as dynamic as it has been, as robust as it can be, will not, on its own accord, repair our bridges, unclog our roads, or unfoul our environment.

This, then, is both a moment of national celebration and of national challenge. For more than two centuries—indeed, ever since the first European settlers set foot on the shores of the New World nearly four hundred years ago—Americans have kept alive the American dream. For generation after generation they nourished the belief that their children would enjoy a better life and a higher standard of living than they did.

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Now this comfortable assumption, this American dream, has been called into question. Let us not be the generation that says we can no longer guarantee the American dream for our children. Let us not be the generation that gives up the sense of optimism and achievement that has made the United States the great nation it is today. Let us, instead, forthrightly recognize the new nature of the challenges to America's well-being. And having done so, let us once more summon up the will, the courage, and—above all—the vision to pass on to the next generation, and the next, and the next, the hope and the promise that has so richly blessed our own.

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The Ultimate High Ground

Malcolm Wallop

IT IS NOT at all certain whether the Cold War is truly over, or merely entering a more subtle and dangerous phase. But regardless of external conditions, America's purpose in an ever-changing world remains constant: to preserve the union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.

I believe the American idea was divinely inspired. It is God's antidote to man's unlimited ingenuity in finding ways to oppress and enslave his fellow man. America is the only society in history established expressly as an alternative to despotism, to allow the maximum liberty within a framework of public order. In standing for liberty and justice, America stands for something beyond itself, for liberty and justice are the ends of decent men and women at all times and all places. What is unique in history is the existence of a particular country devoted to these universal ends.

As long as it continues to embody these ideals, America is worth preserving at all costs. But such a nation, whose very existence is both a constant reproach and an alternative to oppression, will always be threatened, for the thirst for the power to enslave his fellow beings flows naturally from the heart of man. It is a natural consequence of that ancient temptation, old as man himself, that "ye shall be as God"—autonomous and accountable to no one or nothing except one's own desires. Communism is merely one of the most clever and persistent forms of the lamentable human tendency to despotism. But it will not be the last. Human nature is immutable, and there will always be aggressor nations and nations which fall prey to the aggressor.

Nations, like all else in nature, cannot remain static. They are either on the pathway of growth and strength and maturation, or they are stagnating and regressing. Some people think a nation can stop its development at some chosen point, or perhaps move sideways. This delusion merely obscures the true course of such movement, which is decline.

The United States has grown and matured into a world leader—and not merely a leader, but a force in the world for positive good. As a result, we have a responsibility first and above all to our own liberty and independence, but to an extent also to the rest of the world. Can a great nation simply shrug off its responsibilities?

How do we feel about a father who deserts his children, or a policeman who ignores a cry for help? This is not to suggest that the U.S. should be a father to mankind or the world's policeman. But, inescapably, we do have responsibilities as a world power that we cannot lay aside without paying a

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severe penalty as a people and as a nation. Failure to meet responsibilities inevitably exacts a harsh penalty, even if the consequences are not immediately evident.

The irony is that today, in response to the dramatic changes shaking the world, many conservatives—some of whom I admire immensely—have joined the Left in calling for retrenchment from the world. The call of the Left to "Come Home, America" now has an echo from the Right. The Old Right rejects the global interventionism or worldwide crusade for democracy of Charles Krauthammer and Ben Wattenberg. But "neo-imperialism" or "neo-isolationism" constitutes a *false dichotomy*. There are other avenues open to us.

I agree with my colleagues on the Right that our first duty is to America's liberty, particularly now that it is under an insidious domestic assault potentially as destructive as the threat from Marxism-Leninism. The former victims of Soviet imperialism are struggling to free themselves of state control over mind, movement, intervention, and all the suffocating remnants of socialism. Yet at the same time, our politicians, the media, and academic elites are advocating them for us. We have to resist this siren song at all costs if there is to be a future America worthy of a national purpose.

But our fight for a renewed American polity must not become an excuse for turning totally inward, for showing our backs to our allies, for ignoring vital interests which do lie outside our borders whether we like it or not. Such retrenchment can be as stifling to national purpose as creeping socialism, and I must oppose it. It is simply another form of fatal stasis, an embrace of irresponsibility, an impossible autarky that means inevitable decline.

IN MY VIEW, there are three broad goals which together constitute our national purpose in the post-Cold War era. But to carry out any national purpose, we first have to understand and commit ourselves to this proposition: foreign policy and military posture must be synchronized. A foreign policy without the military power to assert it is emasculated. And a huge, costly military posture without a foreign-policy rationale is insupportable in our present democracy. But if we can harmonize the two, then we can achieve our goals.

First, *secure the victory* over Marxism-Leninism. We must make sure the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union result in a society that does not and cannot threaten the West, and that the process is not reversible. This is an extraordinarily difficult alchemy—changing the base metal of a moribund Marxist-Leninist empire into the gold of free, democratic societies. And although the Left perversely rejects this notion, we have little influence over the process. But by maintaining our military strength, by keeping up Solzhenitsyn's "Wall of Resolve," we can perhaps ensure that the transmogrification of the hostile system continues, and block its return to aggression and imperialism.

Second, *sustain free-market and democratic forces*. To paraphrase John Quincy Adams, we are the friends of liberty everywhere, but guardians of only our own. We do not meddle in every dispute, impose our form of government on alien cultures, or play midwife to every embryonic movement around the world that calls itself "democratic." But when conditions are right, when our help is needed and sought, we have a responsibility, an obligation as a friend of liberty, to sustain those fighting for freedom, remembering our own struggle for independence which could not have succeeded without outside help. If we cannot bring ourselves to do this much, then we cannot call ourselves the "friend" of liberty, and our liberty simply becomes an expression of selfishness, not a blessing shared.

Pat Buchanan's litmus test of a legitimate national purpose is "Are Americans willing to fight for it?". But if this test becomes the standard of leadership when liberty is at stake, then opinion polls become the criterion by which decisions are made. And without firm, enlightened, principled leadership, America will follow the polls into permanent decline.

Third, *pursue our interests*—as *we* define

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them—the first of which is security and survival. This means we must remain engaged in the world, confident, not aggressive, but retaining the initiative—the ability to act on behalf of our vital interests how, when, and where we choose.

Simple geography compels us to remain engaged and active outside our own borders. We are an island continent and a great maritime power. At present, we depend primarily upon the seas for life-sustaining trade, for access to foreign markets, energy sources, and raw materials. It is a military imperative—a sea power must have bases and friendly ports around the world, a network of allies. Ships need to be repaired and refitted, stores replenished, crews rested, and all must be protected. "Good armies have good friends," said Machiavelli. The same may be said of good navies. Without them—without our active engagement worldwide—our strategic depth and reach would extend only a few days' steaming from our own shores.

BUT SIMPLY meeting the limited external requirements to support our sea power is not enough. Contrary to the Krauthammer thesis, there is no assurance that the future will produce a hegemonic world order friendly to America or our ideals of liberty. The final chapter is not written on socialism. We have plenty of experience with capitalist nations turning to Marxist socialism, but no experience with the reverse. The return to democracy is not assured, and in any case will not be without intense struggle. Socialist states, while groping for freedom, may even try to alleviate the pain of the transition by asking the capitalist West to shoulder the cost of their failed programs and policies, and draw *us* deeper into the socialist morass. Thus it strains credulity to think the socialist paradigm will be undone in favor of some worldwide consortium of capitalist democracies whose policies will be compatible with our interests.

Rather than attempt to orchestrate such an unlikely policy, I would prefer to see us concentrate on making U.S. sovereignty so unchallengeable, and the U.S. economy so dynamic and competitive, that we would never be drawn into a supranational world order. The beguiling notes of "one-worldism" are in essence a cry of despair, a lament that nation-states and the *particularity* that people everywhere cherish are somehow obstacles to freedom and prosperity. But the opposite is true. We must continue to move forward into the future full of hope, affirming our identity, our principles, and our unique heritage.

To be forward looking in this era is to be *upward* looking. To continue to grow as a nation no longer demands expanding outward on land and sea, but upward into space. I am convinced we cannot achieve these three broad national goals without two things—the strategic defense of the United States, and mastery of space.

Space is not merely one vital factor of U.S. security. Space control, or at the very least assured access to space and unrestricted freedom to operate in it, are *indistinguishable* from our long-term national security and prosperity, for two reasons.

First, space is the ultimate strategic high ground, the "terrain" from which conflicts of the future may be determined. We are embarking on a new "Revolution in Military Affairs," an era when traditional ideas of war-fighting must yield to the dominance of new high-technologies and the importance of military assets in space. Already our terrestrial forces, whether army, navy, or air force, rely heavily upon space for surveillance and intelligence, navigation, command, control, and communications. In many ways the crucial military leverage is shifting to space in such a way that space control may determine the course of events on the ground without a shot ever being fired by terrestrial forces.

The Soviets clearly understand the strategic dominance of space, and have a vigorous military space doctrine coupled with a formidable operational capability. They may well believe that a military monopoly in space is the one thing that could salvage the dramatic unraveling of the Soviet empire. Certainly

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they believe that denying it to us assures their continued presence as a superpower on the world's stage.

If Gorbachev or some resurgent Stalinist leader should decide reform has gone far enough, or if the USSR acquires a sufficient transfusion of trade, credits, hard currency, and Western technology to resuscitate their dying empire, then a Soviet monopoly in space could reverse the supposedly irreversible process.

I can envision a future scenario in which the Soviets could checkmate us from the ultimate high ground, in keeping with their doctrine of victory without war. They would be able to dictate terms, to coerce us "peacefully" into submission. If they can control the ultimate high ground of space, and have the confidence that their ICBMs—space weapons, by the way—can strike targets without hindrance, then it matters little who rules Poland or East Germany. Their dominance and leverage would be global, and their diplomacy would reflect it. Soviet military control of space would enable them to engage in a new type of strategic intimidation, with the possibility of a more subtle but more powerful form of coercion than is possible even with traditional nuclear strike forces.

Conversely, to deny the Soviets the ability to blackmail us from space is one way to secure the victory which has begun, and ensure that the "Evil Empire" changes irrevocably into a nonthreatening confederation of democratic states or independent nations.

This is the real significance of SDI. Strategic defenses will counter the military utility and blackmail potential of the Soviets' ICBM arsenal and first strike capability, or that of a third nation or terrorist regime. Furthermore, a vigorous SDI program will produce far more than simply missile defense. The technologies and operational capabilities flowing from SDI, the tremendous breakthroughs in sensors, miniaturization, and high-speed computers for example, and the anticipated development of cheap, reliable space-lift, all suggest that strategic defense can be the cutting edge of U.S. dominance in space, while at the same time reducing the threat of ballistic missiles. And the domestic impact of the technological advance will assure us economic competitiveness as well.

Second, space is also the great high seas of the future. It is the new frontier, with unique properties that will make possible forms of human endeavor generating wealth and benefits to mankind that we can now only begin to imagine, and make the U.S. truly competitive with the rising economic centers of Europe and the Pacific. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the nations that learned to exploit the new frontier of the high seas prospered. Spain, Holland, and England in particular became great nations because they were *seafaring* nations. In the same way, the great nations of the future will be the *spacefaring* nations.

Space will prove to be increasingly essential for communications, data-handling, and transportation. It will generate new forms of products manufactured in near-zero gravity, new minerals mined on the surface of the moon and asteroids, and an inexhaustible source of energy. The list of possibilities is endless.

I ALSO believe the challenge of space will lift the eyes of Americans, inspiring them with new dreams and new horizons. Our mastery of space will direct the entire national sensibility upward, draw prosperity along with it, and surround us with security. Without lofty horizons, our sense of national purpose atrophies. And when national purpose withers, transcendent goals degenerate into self-interest; the nation stops growing and moving forward; it looks to government for comforting solutions, even for meaning; and freedom dies.

I will not say that it is our Manifest Destiny to plant the flag of freedom and human dignity on distant planets. It has been over twenty years since we raised our flag on the moon, and in many ways we have turned our backs to that momentous achievement. It is entirely possible that we will flinch at the challenge of space, turn inward, and slough

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off our responsibilities as a great power. That is certainly a course of action we might choose, either actively or by default. But the high ground of space is where the United States may renew its strength, and find new national purpose. Mankind benefitted immeasurably from the exploration of the New World. Americans benefitted immeasurably from the settlement of the Western frontier. The same benefits are available in space if we will reach upward for them. After all, "a man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?"

Malcolm Wallop is a Republican senator from Wyoming.

Neo-Manifest Destinarianism

Ben J. Wattenberg

IF, ONCE AGAIN, the problem is the American purpose, I offer this solution: neo-manifest destinarianism.

It makes sense, and it is much more fun than the alternatives. The Academic Declinists, with Paul Kennedy as brigadier, say America's purpose is to manage its decline gracefully. How thrilling. The Declinists are wrong when they say America will no longer be Number One, but more important, and less noticed, is the implicit notion that they don't want America to be Number One.

The Isolationists are led by Pat Buchanan. Writing in *The National Interest* (Spring 1990), Buchanan says American foreign policy should only be in the American national interest. How original. Buchanan says we should "come home" forthwith and stop already with this romantic democracy stuff. But doesn't the spread of democracy enhance our national interest?

Charles Krauthammer, also writing in *The National Interest* (Winter 1989/90), and Joseph Nye, in his new book *Bound To Lead*, make much more sense than either the Declinists or the Isolationists. Both know that America is and will be "Number One." They see that we must remain the major global actor. But for what American purpose?

Krauthammer envisions a "unipolar" world, explains that unipolarism means "the conscious depreciation not only of American sovereignty, but of the notion of sovereignty generally," and understands how difficult this would be politically. Nye says America should aim at "managing transnational interdependence" (MTI), and says that we reach the blessed state of MTI through the acronym soup: GATT, IMF, NPT, IEA, IAEA.

Alright. But, again, toward what end? Why shouldn't America go for the gold? Which brings us to neo-manifest destinarianism.

Surely, America ought to wage democracy. But we ought never forget that there are many chambers in the palace of democracy. We ought to wage democracy generally, and democracy American-style specifically.

Democracy American-style is a way of life as well as a political system. It is not the same as the democracy of Japan, Inc. Nor is it the same as the stultified Swedish-style democracy. And yet, in Eastern Europe today, one important school of thought says the newly-liberated countries should go Swedish. This doesn't seem to seriously stimulate Declinists, Isolationists, Unipolarists, or Transnationalists.

American taxpayers didn't put up trillions of dollars in the Cold War to create a few more Swedens. Not long ago Americans were troubled by the Swedish—read European—model. It was seen as decadent and even as "creeping socialism." Since then, they, and we, have gotten better. But differences remain. We might remember: Long before communism, the American revolutionary spirit was addressed to providing an alterna-

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tive to rigid European classism. There was a rich and fine fight between values of the New World and the Old. The "News" were winning, and we still are. Now, with the totalitarians out of the way, we ought to kick it into overdrive.

If the world should evolve toward European-style social democracy, or some democratic hybrid, or some unipolar transnationalism, we can live with that. We and our allies will still have won a free world. But that result is merely acceptable. As the last superpower, we should try to shape evolution.

How can we do this? Let's back up and see where we are, and how we got to where we are.

Democracy won the World Series. In some large part this happened due to modern communications. The victory was cultural and ideological; the weapons were informational.

That process will likely continue. In the future, the Number One country will be the one that is most successful in shaping the global democratic culture.

(The economic determinists—the Apocalyptic Bean Counters—are wrong when they say that Number-Oneness will be determined by who makes the most semiconductors, or who gets the rent from an office building on K Street, although, in any event, America will continue to do very well economically. We still have, by far, the highest standard of living in the world, and the next time you hear about how ill-educated and un-innovative we are, you might remember that in the 1980s Americans won two-thirds of the Nobel Prizes in science and medicine. By the way, does anyone remember what the merchandise trade balance was of the Roman empire?)

Today, only the American democratic culture has legs. Only Americans have the sense of mission—and gall—to engage in benign, but energetic, global cultural advocacy. We are the only mythic nation, says Max Lerner. We stand partially guilty as charged by anti-Americans—we are the most potent cultural imperialists in history, although generally constructive and noncoercive. (Neither the Romans, nor the Brits, nor the Dutch had the ability to put a VCR tape in every village in the world.)

If communications of values is the key, how do we get fully engaged? Americans have always felt they had something very special to offer. This sense of mission was once called Manifest Destiny. At times it did go overboard, into distant geographic expansion and wild-eyed cultural imperialism. We know now we can't clone the world American-style. And these days, any geographic expansion must be requested by the expandee, although there is direct dial from Canada to make things quicker.

WITH ALL THE caveats, American democracy has distinctive features. Tocqueville had it right when he spoke of "American exceptionalism." (Indeed, it is now measured clearly in cross-national survey research.) Most Americans believe most of that exceptionalism is beneficial. Individualism, pluralism, opportunity, capitalism, upward mobility, dynamism, and the absence of a rigid class structure come most quickly to mind.

We ought not be passive players. We have the sharpest cultural arrows in the biggest quiver. These include our global entertainment monopoly, immigration, the spreading English language, the prime tourist destination, the best universities, the most powerful and far-flung military, an opportunity society, and a worldwide information operation.

There are things that government could actually do. There are conditions that government may only encourage. And there are areas the government should butt out of, letting nature take its course. Here are a few examples, big and small:

Our government cheap-skate communication policy is penny-foolish-pound-foolish. Because of budget constraints, the Voice of America (VOA) recently publicly considered cutting language services. That may have been a Washington budget trick, but even its

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contemplation tells us more than we want to know about how we are conducting our public diplomacy.

Some budget-cutters say we should stop work on a new American shortwave transmitter, now under construction in Israel, designed to carry VOA and Radio Liberty into the Moslem areas of the USSR. The case is made that the Soviets are no longer our adversaries. Let's hope that's so. But won't the global uni-power (us) still have something to say to the sixty million Moslems of Central Asia, when Moslems are the fastest growing, and most volatile, segment of the world's population?

Luckily, American values are mostly spread by nongovernmental means. But shouldn't the government, when possible, encourage such enterprises?

All commerce is not of equal value in the contest for the culture. The export of computer chips is important. But more important is that American television programs and movies have fair access in other countries, that the English language spreads, that it is easier for tourists, teachers, and students to come to America.

The global entertainment business is dominated by America. Yet, television programs and movies are not included in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). That makes it difficult to keep foreign entertainment markets open and fair. But one reason entertainment is out of GATT is that Congress is under domestic pressure to keep the American maritime industry un-GATTed. That gives foreigners a case to keep entertainment out of GATT. Given our current circumstance, the box-office should have a higher priority than boats.

(The reach of the American cultural dominion is moving from incredible to awe-inspiring. When some California glitz-merchants held a trade show recently there was one unusual aspect: one billion people, in ninety-four countries, watched it on television!

Why? Because the California peddlers were selling American movies at the Academy Awards, and American movies—and television and music—are the only universal currency there is in the entertainment business. And getting stronger, as communications deregulate around the world, as the middle class grows everywhere, as the demand for products to put on the air grows geometrically.

Why so popular? Not because we have the best filmmakers, although we do. But because our films, even the left-wing, allegedly anti-American ones, reflect our style of life, and our style of life has a magnetic appeal to billions around the world.)

America is the number one tourist destination. People don't just gawk at Yosemite, the Empire State Building, and the Jefferson Memorial when they visit. Tourists soak up the flavor of the American experience and take it home. Yet, of the free countries, we have the toughest visa requirements. Another example: Other nations subsidize hostels so that young foreigners can easily visit. We don't.

The American Federation of Teachers estimates that there are more than 50,000 teachers of Russian in the five Eastern European nations, but fewer than 5,000 teachers of all the Western languages put together. The Russian teachers are skilled instructors—but are now without students. Most of them would like to learn English, and teach it. Let them study in our universities. In return, they could teach American students about the nature of evil empires. More important, they could instruct the faculty on the same topic.

We also ought to make it easier for foreign students to study here. About two million per year want to. Only about 350,000 can afford to.

We also ought to help American universities set up branches in Eastern Europe. The Eastern Europeans know there is a difference between American-style university education and the credential-oriented intellectualoid European system. They want to see the difference first hand, and we can provide that easily.

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We ought to take in more legal immigrants. Among other things, they are the greatest global gossipers. They spread the word.

We need a much broader definition of the phrase "public diplomacy." We are engaged in an enterprise called "foreign policy." That enterprise has many aspects. These include military, diplomacy, intelligence, and that stepchild, "information." As the global circumstance changes, the mix of foreign-policy activity ought to change. Thankfully, we need fewer tanks and less covert intelligence. We need more information diplomacy, and we ought to use all the arrows in our quiver.

Why? Because that's what Americans do for a living, and it's not new stuff. On the back of the dollar bill you will find the Great Seal of the United States with the Latin words *Novus ordo seclorum*—"A new order for the ages." They are words as old as America and as fresh as tomorrow.

Remember this about American Purpose: A unipolar world is a good idea, if America is the uni.

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A Populist Policy

Paul M. Weyrich

THE PERCEIVED end of the Cold War has, not surprisingly, precipitated a major foreign-policy debate, the first serious one since the isolationists effectively surrendered to the internationalists in the aftermath of World War II. This series of articles in *The National Interest* has played a useful role in laying a number of alternatives out for discussion. However, it has also showed the essentially fictitious nature of most of the debate.

On the one hand, there are a number of commentators who want to continue playing the old internationalist game as if nothing had changed. The decline of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War simply give internationalism greater scope, in their view. The United States can set itself new, grander objectives, going beyond the mere containment of communism to establishing a unipolar world, and even achieving nirvana itself—a *Pax Americana—á la* the Fukuyama thesis. All this will be done through the beneficent exercise of American power via the State Department, the Pentagon, the government generally, and, overlying and underlying all, the Establishment.

On the other side is isolationism. Having triumphed over communism, we will simply pack our bags and return home from "over there," to turn our attention inward. In fact, while there are a few actual proponents of isolation, for the most part isolationism is itself a conjuring trick by the internationalists, a hoodoo they call up whenever they feel threatened. They like nothing better than suggesting that the only alternative to their preferred "finger-in-every-pie" internationalism is isolation. If they can make that the debate, they know they will win.

Isolationism is the internationalists' preferred opponent because it is obviously not in accord with the real world. Our economy is increasingly integrated into the world economy; when the Persian Gulf sneezes, we all catch cold, and when the Tokyo stock exchange falls, we worry if we will be able to sell the bonds to cover our Treasury's borrowing. We drive cars from Japan, sell our agricultural products to the Soviet Union, and, increasingly, work for companies owned overseas. To suggest we isolate ourselves from the rest of the world is to say we should

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somehow separate ourselves from what we produce and consume.

So, in this caricature of a debate, the internationalists carry the day. But on closer study, their prescription is no more in accord with reality than that of the isolationists. The fall of communism could be less significant in the long run than the rise of many other power centers, ranging from Europe and Japan through India and a resurgent Islam to the Latin American drug cartels. The United States will control a shrinking minority of the world's power in the twenty-first century. It will hardly be in a position to impose a *Pax Americana*.

Of equal importance, the internationalists' position does not accord with domestic political realities. The American public has never been comfortable with having us poke our nose into everything that happens around the world. It is getting decidedly weary of foreign aid, and sees little reason for us to station troops around the world if the Cold War is really over. Our form of government, with separation of powers, does not lend itself to a foreign policy detached from public opinion. Often, when Congress messes up the executive's grand foreign designs, designs dear to the internationalists, it is doing, perhaps unfortunately, what it was intended to do: reflect the popular will.

SO DOES that bring us back to the isolationist position? No. Rather, it suggests we look beyond caricatures, to search for a real alternative to the internationalists' position.

That alternative begins to become visible when we realize that what the internationalists want is not merely U.S. engagement with the rest of the world, but a specific kind of engagement—engagement through government. Government is the establishment's playing field, and it is understandable that they should want engagement on that field, because it allows them to control the game and be the major players in it. It also allows them to profit from it; a great part of the establishment lives off the defense and foreign affairs game in general and the NATO game in particular. The threat the end of the Cold War poses for the latter concerns them gravely; they are in the position of fleas whose dog is dying.

But engagement need not be engagement through government. Only when we realize this do we begin to see the real alternative. What is that alternative? It is the policy we pursued through most of our history as a nation.

America was never isolationist or isolated; we were never Tokugawa Japan. Rather, through most of our history, we related very actively to the rest of the world, but not through actions by government. We did it through commerce and ideas.

America was active in international commerce right from the beginning. Even as a British colony, our economy was trans-Atlantic. From our inception as a nation, America also used ideas and ideals, especially the ideals of personal liberty and democracy, as channels to the rest of the world. What most distinguished both of these instruments from the usual diplomacy and military force was that they related not to governments, but directly to peoples. Ours was a populist grand strategy, in which the American people reached out directly to other peoples through their products, their markets, and the beliefs embodied in the American political system.

It was a powerful and active policy. The fact that it was driven by public beliefs and the independent vigor of a free market economy rather than the decision of a foreign ministry made it no less effective. Indeed, our official foreign policy was most effective when it sounded the same themes, as in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points proposal. Such policies were powerful internationally because they resonated among the publics of other countries. They did so because of the image of America our populist strategy had generated in those countries.

This was far from an "isolationist" grand strategy. It was, in fact, internationalist in a highly sophisticated way. It was equally so-

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phisticated domestically, in that it commanded broad, enduring public support because it was rooted more in private action than in government policy.

Is a return to a populist grand strategy a viable alternative to the strategy of playing the internationalists' game and engaging ourselves diplomatically and militarily in most of the world's events? Contrary to what the foreign-policy establishment argues, a strong and legitimate case can be made that it is. The current and prospective international environment promises to make commerce and ideas more powerful forces than they were in the nineteenth century, and the strategy worked then. The world economy is just that, a transnational economy in which foreign trade plays a growing role in most nations' economic life. In much of the world, the free market is growing as socialism proves a dismal failure. Free markets offer increased opportunity for people-to-people relationships through commerce.

The international market in ideas is also growing by leaps and bounds, largely as a result of new information technologies. It is becoming increasingly difficult for authoritarian governments to keep unwelcome ideas out. The new means of transmitting ideas past old barriers offer great opportunities for the ideals America has always stood for—the ideals of liberty and democracy. Again, the trend can foster people-to-people relationships, the basis of a populist grand strategy.

All of this is not to suggest that we never have to use our military strength in this dangerous world. Indeed, there are times—precisely to protect the sort of commerce we are talking about or to assist those struggling for freedom—when it is not only appropriate but necessary.

A good example of the opportunities today's world offers to a populist grand strategy are those to be found in Central Europe and the Soviet Union. The peoples of those countries—not their governments, except as they follow the people—are throwing off the yokes of dictatorship and socialism. We can help them. We can help them best by sharing our experiences with democracy and a free market with them, so they can learn from our mistakes rather than having to make their own. But this cannot be done through their governments, which even in the best cases—Czechoslovakia and Poland—are still enmeshed with the Communist bureaucracy left over from the old regimes. It must be done on a people-to-people basis.

OVER THE PAST year, I have had the privilege of being personally involved in this sort of work in Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union. The contrast with my many experiences working with government—including our own—could not be greater. The democratic opposition in these countries is desperately eager to learn from us. And they do learn: in many years of teaching political techniques to groups of citizens, I have never found people more talented, more imaginative, more intelligent. They have a dedication to their countries and their futures that far surpasses what we see in American legislators—in part, no doubt, because none of the democratic officeholders in these countries is a professional politician.

In the course of this work, I have encountered other Americans doing the same things in these countries—teaching democracy and free enterprise, not just as ideas, but from a "how to" techniques standpoint. Some of them have been from the liberal Democratic side of the spectrum. But none of them has been from the establishment, from the well-endowed, well-"careered" set. Why? Because the establishment only knows how to act through government. And what has our government been doing in the face of this tremendous opportunity in the East? Government activities range from trying to perpetuate NATO to trying to keep Gorbachev in power or discourage independence in Lithuania and other states controlled by the USSR.

Central Europe and the Soviet Union also illustrate the potential of a populist foreign policy in a reverse direction—in what we

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can learn from them. First, they can offer a definitive answer to the radical professors on so many of our campuses, who still rail at religion and Western culture and preach a socialist paradise. Let us make these radicals debate against people who can tell them what it is like to live in the kind of country they call for, a country where equality is the only virtue and traditional values are officially suppressed. Experience is a good answer to theory.

More broadly, we can learn from people who, despite severe repression, have held onto elements of our shared traditional culture, which we, in our consumer paradise, have let slip away. Religion is one such; it is no accident that the churches have played a major role in the collapse of communist governments. It is not impossible that a revival of religion in the West generally could come out of Russia and Central Europe. Similarly, while our culture has become a television culture, with all the decay that implies, theirs have remained literary cultures. Children still read the literary classics in school. Average citizens read books and listen to poetry. They discuss what the books mean. Literature, serious literature, plays a major role in their lives. Perhaps we can recapture that from them.

But none of this is happening or can happen through governments. It can only happen between peoples. Ultimately, which is more important to our long range future: the number of troops some treaty allows us to keep in Germany, or the flow of ideas about democracy and free enterprise into Central and Eastern Europe and the flow in return of ideas about man and God? Or, for that matter, the implications for our trade of a Central and Eastern Europe with open, expanding, dynamic economies? The answers are obvious. All contests, strategists have pointed out, are fought at three levels: moral, mental, and physical. Why should we continue only at the physical level when the moral option plays to our strength?

A populist foreign policy is what our Founding Fathers envisioned for us and championed. They were right then and they are right now. It is time for a foreign policy not just for America, but for Americans.

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Not Too Much Zeal, Please

Peregrine Worsthorne

AN AMERICAN role in the world is not like God. If it does not exist, there is no need to invent it. Does one exist? For the immediate post-Cold War world, I rather doubt it. At any rate, not in the sense of there being some single new burden the American people have a moral duty to shoulder—a new manifest destiny. This does not mean that intellectuals—or even journalists—should not try to devise a new role, as they have been doing in these stimulating columns in recent months. Certainly so far as I am concerned, the exercise has proved extremely useful, for the inadequacy of the answers so far have confirmed my hunch that nothing which can properly be called a role in the Achesonian sense—"Britain has lost an empire without finding a new role"—any longer exists or is likely to exist for many years to come.

The need for a foreign policy, of course, always exists. But a national role is a lot grander than a foreign policy. Containing the expansion of Russian power was a foreign policy. Containing the expansion of Russian communism was more like a role. By "role" Acheson meant a missionary foreign policy—something equivalent to the white man's burden. In that sense, Britain has not had a role these last forty years. I suspect that the U.S.

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would be wise to resign itself to the same perfectly bearable fate.

But America, I will be told, is not Britain. Whereas it is possible for Britain to have a foreign policy without having a role, America needs a role to have a foreign policy. That is to say, without a moral purpose Uncle Sam won't be prepared to act abroad at all. I wonder. That the American people won't sustain over a long period the kind of enormous effort abroad required to win the Cold War, without a moral purpose—that is obviously true. But then neither would Britain or France, or any of the allies. It does not seem to me at all self-evident that Uncle Sam is so foolish as to suppose that the choice is always between going flat out on a foreign crusade or doing nothing abroad at all.

In any case, there simply is no great crusading cause around at the present time for the Americans to lead. What about the cause of democracy, some *National Interest* contributors ask. I trust those who propose the championship of democracy all over the world as a new American role are joking. Here I ought to declare an interest. My faith in democracy is very far from absolute. Most of Britain's important freedoms date from the pre-democratic age, and only very recently has Britain moved irreversibly away from aristocracy to democracy—with results that are by no means all to the good of the country. These are highly complex matters. Democracy has unquestionably proved a disaster in Africa, and Britain was very ill-advised to try to impose parliamentary government in areas where it had no chance of taking root. In Singapore, however, autocracy has proved very successful. Indeed, compared to so-called democratic Kenya, for example, so-called autocratic Singapore is much more civilized and prosperous—and even free. As for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, should America really play a crucial role in deciding which particular form of government they eventually adopt? If the Hungarians and Romanians, say, want to restore their monarchies, is there any possible justification for the American influence to be thrown against such an attractively reactionary development?

I am not trying to be frivolous. There are horses for courses, and democracy is not necessarily the right horse for all courses. Presumably the American ideal is that all peoples should enjoy a system that brings them "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." In certain historical circumstances, that utilitarian ideal can just as easily be fulfilled by a despotism, a theocracy, or a military empire as by a free republic, just as regional peace and prosperity can just as easily be brought about through imperial rule as through national self-determination.

AS AMERICANS watch the dissolution of the Soviet empire they should remember what happens when empires collapse. Heaven knows this century has provided plenty of chastening examples. The case against imperial rule is that it lacks consent. Nobody ever asked Gauls or Jews or Britons whether they wanted to be part of the Roman empire; nor Indians and Africans and Malays whether they wanted to be ruled by Britain; nor Croats, Poles, and Moldavians whether they were happy to belong to the Hapsburg monarchy. What neither rulers nor ruled, however, fully grasped were the consequences of national liberation in terms of disruption and violence. For if the case against imperial rule is that it lacks consent, the case for it—recently argued cogently in the *London Sunday Telegraph* by Geoffrey Wheatcroft—is that it imposes stability, at least until its final hours. Quite apart from its function of holding different peoples apart who would otherwise be at each other's throats, great empires are usually too burdened with a vast administrative apparatus to be able to think of attacking their neighbors. Great wars stem from the unleashing of national passions—such as were unleashed by the French Revolution—rather than from imperial rivalries.

At the turn of the century, Europe was faced with a profound challenge not dissimilar from the one facing it now. It was called

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the Eastern Question and arose from the disintegration of the Ottoman empire. No satisfactory answer was ever found to the problem, which was why nineteenth-century British statesmen in their wisdom favored propping up the sick man of Europe, as Turkey was then called. The First World War, which destroyed a generation, was the direct consequence of the failure of that policy. As a result of that war, not only was the Ottoman empire destroyed but so were the Romanov, Hapsburg, and Hohenzollern empires, in whose wake came the Bolshevik and National Socialist revolutions which exterminated millions and in turn led to the Second World War.

Supranational empires don't dissolve into a vacuum. They give way to succession states, ostensibly representing the principle of national self-determination; in practice usually more intolerant of their own minorities than the old empires had been and in any case puffed up with long-frustrated national pride. After 1945, none of these lessons was learned. Under American prodding, the Western European powers embarked upon another great bout of imperial dissolution—the decolonization of the maritime empires. As a result, Africa is now littered with impoverished successor states incapable of doing anything much more than oppressing their own peoples. Asia is torn by conflict between Hindus and Moslems, Tamil and Sinhalese with one successor state having been in the hands of a ruler, Pol Pot, whose crimes equal that of Hitler and Stalin. As for the Middle East, where Arab and Jew threaten mutual extermination, that, too, is an area which has suffered grievously from the so-called blessings of the end of empire.

SUFFICE IT TO say, then, that the end of empires need careful handling. Crudely handled, these historic processes can go disastrously wrong. The Baltic states today are very much a case in point, as are the Soviet Union's central Asian republics. The American Congress would like to see Washington encourage today's independence movements within the Soviet empire with the same indiscriminate enthusiasm as it encouraged the independence movements within the British, French, and Dutch empires. President Bush, to his credit, has adopted a much more cautious and skeptical position, courageously refusing to allow public opinion to force him to make the same mistakes as were made by his predecessors, Woodrow Wilson after 1918 and Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower (remember Suez) after 1945. Perhaps the point that needs to be emphasized in this respect is that morality offers no clear idea to what should be done about the decay of empire. Certainly there is nothing for America here which could properly be called "a role"; nothing to set the Potomac on fire or provide a sense of crusading mission.

This does not mean that there will be no simple calls on American idealism. There will always be enough odious regimes, like that of Marcos in the Philippines or Noriega in Panama or Amin in Uganda, that can safely be overthrown by a righteous use of American power. But even in these cases I would prefer American intervention to be justified as a defense of civilization rather than as a defense of democracy (the two, unfortunately, are not always the same).

The Cold War simplified these difficult questions. For it could plausibly be argued that Russian communism constituted a uniquely evil challenge which required from the United States a uniquely virtuous response. Just as some kinds of infection are so awful as to justify the forcible quarantining of anyone suspected of harboring them, so there was one kind of political infection—communism—which justified the compulsory quarantining of any country suspected of falling victim to that terminal political sickness. Academics can now argue whether communism ever did constitute such a terminal sickness. What cannot be argued about, however, is that it made perfect sense to assume that it might have. Nor can it be doubted that the Russian superpower was dedicated to spreading this terminal virus over the world. So, during the Cold War, there was "a role" for

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the United States. Nothing of that order exists any longer. Not only is communism a crumbling ideology; but the Soviet Union is also a crumbling empire.

Am I suggesting, therefore, that the United States should withdraw into its own continent—return to its old policy of isolationism, as Patrick Buchanan recommends? Quite frankly, that seems to me a silly suggestion. Is it really supposed that the U.S. might wash its hands of the fate of Israel, for example, or of South Africa? America's Jewish and black votes preclude isolationism in both these regions of the world. A protectionist fortress Europe would soon bring into play other equally powerful pressure groups calling for Washington to take some action or other. Then there is the not-so-little matter of terrorism. Unless an isolationist America kept all its citizens within its own borders, there would undoubtedly be cases of Americans being murdered and kidnapped in foreign parts. Here again, public opinion, probably led by Mr. Buchanan, would call for American intervention.

U.S. noninvolvement in the world is no longer a serious option. But to be clear about this does not lead us any closer to the definition of anything resembling "a role." Where this inability to define a new "role" could be seriously damaging is in respect to European defense. For obviously only "a role" can begin to justify keeping 300,000 American servicemen on my side of the Atlantic. So much is indisputable. But might not a mere foreign policy be sufficient to justify the maintenance of a much smaller force?

HERE I COME to my only constructive suggestion. The end of the Cold War does not put an end to the need for some American presence in Europe. But it changes the justification for that presence. During the last forty years, the justification has been to keep the Russians out. In the next period the justification will be to keep the Germans down; or if not exactly down, at any rate not too triumphantly up. Pacifism is the new danger in Europe, not militarism. Above all, this is true of Germany. Germany wants to get rid of all soldiers from its soil and will happily give up its own if this means getting rid of other people's as well. The form German's revived nationalism is likely to take is antimilitaristic, neutralist, and pacifist, if only because the Western allies do not want it to go down any of these paths. Just as in the 1930s independence for Germany meant the freedom to rearm, in defiance of allied wishes, so now in the 1990s it means freedom to disarm, also in defiance of allied wishes; or at any rate Western allied wishes. Russian wishes will be another matter. Russia would welcome a disarmed Germany and possibly make the withdrawal of its own troops conditional on a neutralized Germany as well.

Of course, peace and the end of the Cold War are to be welcomed. But nothing is ever quite what it seems. It is through peace that Germany can now achieve the dominance of Europe. For in a disarmed Europe, East as well as West, where economic strength counts for everything, German economic power will carry all before it. So long as Western Europe was frightened by Russia, Britain and France, because of their nuclear armory, carried much clout. Now that NATO has officially made its declaration of peace, their prestige and influence will count for far less. Indeed, it can now only be a matter of time before Germany mounts pressure on them to renounce their nuclear weapons altogether as the price to be paid to keep Germany non-nuclear. Not only will the decline of Soviet strength favor Germany; so also will the decline of the military importance of Britain and France.

In my view the European Community has no serious chance of containing a resurgent Germany whose economic influence over both Eastern and Western Europe will soon lead to political influence as well. Without some external factors, the balance of power in Europe will soon become dangerously upset. An American military presence on British soil should be that balancing external factor. It need not be a large one; only really a token of American political involve-

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ment. Arguably, in the post-NATO period, France, too, would accept American bases. I see a British-French-American military alliance as being the successor to NATO with the purpose of maintaining some sort of European balance of power. Nothing more grandiose is going to work. For Europe in the next period will be in a state of flux, and it is idle to try to build any very solid or ambitious political edifice on such shifting sands. We are not talking about a new role for America so much as a holding operation while Europe, East and West, sorts itself out. For this purpose, Britain is America's ideal partner—antipacifist, antiprotectionist, and still basically pro-American.

Even when the Russian threat to Western Europe was at its height, there was little stomach for the fight in most of the Western European countries. Now that the Russian threat is thought to have disappeared, there will be even less. Pacifism will grow apace. Britain and France are the great exceptions to this European rule. In our two countries, the rot has not set in to anything like the same extent. In both cases the morale of the armed forces is exceptionally high. Some of the best and brightest of the young are eager to join. Whereas in most British institutions standards have fallen, in the armed forces they have risen. Where is willingness to die for one's country strongest in Europe?—undoubtedly in Britain and France. Germany, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and even Italy may now be richer. But if there should ever again be a need for Europe to defend itself—against, say, a resurgent Islam—the only hope for effective action would lie with Britain and France.

Not too much zeal—that should be the motto for American foreign policy at the present time. The tides of history are running fast in the right direction. So only a light and delicate touch on the tiller is needed. Perhaps, for America, this is to ask the impossible. I don't believe it. For America, nothing is impossible.

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Smashing an Icon

The Soviet Military Today

William E. Odom

FOR MOST OF the seven decades of Soviet rule, the military has been virtually an icon—a secular icon, to be sure, but an icon nonetheless. Observant visitors to the Soviet Union have been (and still are) quickly struck by the military's reach into everyday life: the monuments to the military battles and heroes, the ever-present officers and troops on the streets, the children involved in military drills, the military training in schools, the public lectures devoted to military-patriotic education, the aged veterans wearing their medals on civilian clothing, the parades. As the ubiquitous Soviet slogan has had it, "Army and People—United."

No military parade in the world matches the traditional pageant on November 7 in Red Square, which includes every kind of weapon from foot troops to ICBMs. Uniformed marshals have usually shared the viewing platform on Lenin's mausoleum with Politburo members. No less moving are the Red Square funeral ceremonies for senior military leaders, during which somber orations to massed troop formations fade into cannon salutes thundering against the Kremlin walls.

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To say that the military has occupied a central place in Soviet life is to state the obvious. Precisely because it *is* so obvious, however, it tends to be forgotten when we analyze the Soviet political system. This extraordinary icon within the church of Marxism-Leninism seems to overwhelm almost all other elements of society but the party. Together with the party, it has been the centerpiece of Soviet culture. While critical portrayals of some aspects of Soviet life have passed the censors on occasion, the military—as writers, theater directors, and filmmakers know—has been wholly exempt from such treatment. Until quite recently, that is.

Since the fall of 1988, glasnost and perestroika have begun to change all of this. Not only has Gorbachev initiated a unilateral reduction of military forces and spending, but he has also allowed open debate about military service, subjecting the military to vicious public criticism and radical proposals for reform. The critics engage in icon smashing; the military leadership and party officials aligned with them fend off the attacks as best they can. This campaign may have reached its zenith in the winter of 1989–90, but so much hostile feeling has been vented openly, and military reforms have now proceeded so far, that it is unlikely that the military as an institution will soon recover its icon status.

The military's crisis in Soviet society is symptomatic of a deeper and more fundamental crisis of legitimacy for Soviet power.

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It reflects the underlying dilemma that has always confronted the Russian empire. On the one hand, removing the military from its central place in society is imperative if there is to be a liberal economic and political development. On the other hand, smashing the icon opens the way for the forces of social chaos and civil war. For centuries, the military has been both the source of political stability and the instrument of dictatorship. Its preeminence has resulted from a dynamic relationship between two problems: lagging economic development and expansion of Russian rule over non-Russian peoples. The policy of securing and expanding the empire has always required great military power that could only be maintained by extracting large resources from the economy. When market economic forces have not supported the military priority, they have been constrained, pushing popular consumption into second place. These structural conditions were eroding in the last decades of the Russian empire; but the Soviet period, as we shall see, has given them a new and intensified form.

"An Army of a New Type"

THE RUSSIAN Civil War created something of a crisis in ideology for the Bolsheviks. All Russian Social Democrats before the revolution, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, agreed that after a socialist revolution there would be no need for a standing army, an army of the "barracks type." It would be replaced by a workers' militia, which, of course, would make it impossible by definition to use the army to repress the working class. A postrevolutionary socialist regime, therefore, would have difficulty explaining its insistence on retaining a standing military force.

By February 1918, however, the Bolsheviks found it necessary to create a regular army. It was essential for winning the Civil War and securing the Revolution, but the ideological formula for answering the "military question" did not vanish so easily. In 1919, the second party program formalized the Bolshevik commitment to a workers' militia and no regular army. The compromise on a standing force was temporary, not an ideological revision. After the Civil War in 1921, the issue was once more sharply on the party's agenda. Could the young socialist republic disband its military while it was still surrounded by capitalist states? The answer was clearly no, but party leaders differed sharply on what kind of army to maintain and how to justify it ideologically. The solution was found in the concept of "an army of a new type," one that belonged to the vanguard of the working class, the party. A purely workers' militia would have to be postponed until the socialist camp finally prevailed over capitalism in the leading industrialized states.

In fact, the Red Army did become "an army of a new type." The party cadres had moved into it *en masse* during the Civil War, and Red Army service was a promising way to enter the party after the war. An integration of the party and the army occurred that has distinguished the Soviet military ever since. The military tasks in support of socialism in the two-camp alignment and the international class struggle have created enormous requirements for military power. The command economy, run by the party, has ensured resource priority to the military. This highly symbiotic relationship is the very foundation of the Soviet state and has created civil-military relations fundamentally different from those in other kinds of regimes.

WESTERN observers have repeatedly anticipated conflicts and fissures in party-military relations, and they have tried to see them where they do not exist. They have failed to understand the radically different rationale and organizational structure given the Red Army at its inception and refined in the early years of the regime. Though factionalism has always existed within the party elite over policy, and though debate has frequently involved the "military question" (a euphemism for the whole set of military-policy issues), neither has ever split the party into purely a uniformed faction versus others. A major party

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fight occurred in 1918 over the incorporation of ex-czarist officers into the Red Army. At the same time, a debate broke out over the maintenance of a regular army as opposed to a workers' militia, one that was not settled until well into the 1920s. The factional lines split party and uniformed ranks in both cases, and they continued to do so until the purge of the Red Army in 1937. Throughout the postwar decades, the same kinds of cross-cutting alignments reappear dimly in the historical record. More recently those alignments have become public and readily visible. The crisis today, however, could alter this traditional pattern of civil-military relations, particularly if the Communist party loses its "leading role" and its institutional controls are weakened or destroyed.

Historically, the Soviet military was viewed not only as an instrument for spreading the revolution but also for assisting in the social transformation of a largely peasant society. The Red Army was put to work teaching literacy within its ranks in the 1920s. Mass public organizations were created to involve the society as a whole in elementary military training. The fusion of army and society was thereby carried into the organizational structure of state and society. Universal military service was the rule from 1918, and it has never changed in principle (although in practice certain "class aliens" were excluded until 1939). The military-society institutional fusion has not only survived but expanded.

National minorities posed a particular problem for the Red Army from the very first. Language and political considerations forced the regime to tolerate separate national minority formations until 1938, and again during World War II. After the war a few were retained as late as the 1950s but disappeared thereafter. They were always seen as a threat to the coherence of the union of many national republics. The policy of "extraterritoriality" for place of service has been maintained steadily since World War II. It means that no conscript will serve near his home, and it permits the military to mix national minorities throughout the armed forces.

Alongside the new relationship between the Red Army and the population, a new relationship emerged between the military and the economy. When the first five-year plan was launched, a military five-year plan was also promulgated. In retrospect, it is clear that military considerations were a major constraint in the profile of first and second five-year plans. The emphasis on heavy industry, on aviation and motor transport fitted the needs for wartime mobilization. Unlike any other customer in Soviet society, the military department was truly a "buyer." Its network of "military representatives" watched over the production of military goods and accepted them only if they met the stated criteria for quality and performance. Military industries received priority in supply of resources, both quantity and quality. The interlocking structure that came to exist in the late 1920s and the 1930s continued to grow in the decades after World War II. Without it, the military build-up over the past three decades would have been impossible.

When he became general secretary in 1985, Gorbachev inherited the most fully integrated military-industrial complex in history. Its impact on Soviet society has been dramatic. It ensures that the ordinary consumer will be last in the queue for goods and services in the Soviet economy. While the military has been the most advanced sector of the Soviet economy, it has also prevented the diffusion of technology and innovation to much of the rest of the economy. As Gorbachev himself observed in a speech in the fall of 1989 on ideology, "information age technology" has only touched the military and space sectors of the Soviet economy. The central planning system is key to its grip on priority in economic affairs, and no reform of the economic system can proceed very far without coming up against the military-industrial structure as an obstacle. As we are learning from the public debate under glasnost, Soviet citizens have long been keenly aware of the impact of this structure and the economic privations it forces on them.

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Postwar Transformations

THE RED ARMY of the Civil War was composed largely of peasants. Literacy was low even among the officer corps. Although this technical-cultural lag in the military manpower base was considerably ameliorated by training in the 1920s and 1930s, the great purges of the late 1930s essentially decapitated the officer corps, wiping out most of its brightest and best educated. The Red Army leadership during World War II was once again mainly of peasant background, suffering from low literacy levels coupled with little familiarity with motorized vehicles, aircraft, and radio communications.

Among the many changes in the military after World War II, the improved education of the officers is perhaps as significant as any. Commissioning schools not only increased in number but also in length of curriculum and quality of education. Their number today totals over 170, and all the old one- and two-year commissioning programs have been converted to four and five years. About two dozen military academies provide continuing career development for field grade and general officers. The consequence has been the disappearance of the old hard-drinking, ex-peasant marshals and the emergence of a sophisticated and technically competent senior officer corps. This process came to full fruition in the 1970s.

A parallel phenomenon occurred in the enlisted ranks. The number of conscripts with secondary educations and an urban industrial background has risen from a small percentage to well over half. The Soviet soldier from the Baltic and Slavic ethnic regions is no longer a semiliterate peasant. Those from Muslim regions are another matter. Even where they are literate, they most often cannot speak Russian adequately. Nonetheless, overall, the military manpower base today is remarkably better educated, with a much higher technical-cultural level, than in the 1950s and 1960s.

This social transformation has undoubtedly improved Soviet military potential, but it has also brought many problems. Small unit leadership has never been a strong point of the Soviet military. While the military-political apparatus preaches concern for soldiers and the setting of example by junior officers, the reality has been quite different. Leadership by fear, rigid regulations, and oppressive discipline has been the rule. Life for the ordinary soldier has always resembled life in Soviet penal camps more than anything else. Ill-educated peasant conscripts adapted to it, survived, and went home. Today's Soviet youth are less willing to accept the brutal methods of discipline. Moreover, the mix of ethnic groups tends to exacerbate problems in such a climate, creating social fissures within units. Many of these problems were already apparent in the early 1970s. Since that time, they have become more acute, leading to increasing numbers of suicides, murders, mutinies, and similar disorders.

Thus, even as the Soviet military has fused with society, society has grown alienated from the military. A deepening rift has appeared, as this alienation has manifested itself in three ways. First, among the intelligentsia, the awareness of the dominant claim on resources creates deep resentments. They understand the stifling impact it has on the economy. Second, the society at large, particularly the youth approaching draft age, sees the military as a most undesirable influence on their lives. Third, national minorities harbor deep resentments against service in the military, not only ethnic and cultural resentment but also physical fear for their well-being. Brutal hazing and even murder of ethnic minority soldiers is widely reported.

The Context of the Crisis

WHETHER GORBACHEV intended to do so is not clear, but with the political and economic aims he pursues with perestroika, he has risked destabilizing the system itself, throwing it into chaos, even civil war. He has apparently

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come to realize that he cannot reform the economy without denying the military its traditional priority on resources. And he cannot deny the military its priority without political reform. Yet political reform undermines the multinational state and restores the rationale for the military's traditional priority. This dilemma is as old as the Russian state itself.

Both Russian and Soviet history can be seen as a dynamic relationship created by three interlocking structural problems. The origins of that relationship go back at least to Ivan III and the last decades of the fifteenth century. Though historians differ over why Muscovy began to expand, none disputes that Russian history is marked by successive and dramatic territorial expansions. These have required costly military power. The necessary resources were squeezed from the peasant economy, making it all the more impoverished and occasionally inspiring the peasantry to revolt openly. Expansionist military campaigns succeeded, adding non-Russian territories and frightening neighboring states. The regime felt threatened, not only by these worried neighbors, but also by sedition within the newly acquired territories and discontent within its own peasantry. Accordingly, more military and police power was needed for security and eventually further expansion.

In the course of the nineteenth century, these three interlocking problems acquired topical identification: the "peasant question," meaning how to develop the economy; the "military question," or how to build and maintain adequate military power; and the "nationality question," that is, how to deal with the centrifugal political forces in the non-Russian regions of the empire.

This dynamic relationship thrusts policy initiative almost wholly into the hands of the central government. Local economic initiative and market relations would tend to limit the regime's discretion over the use of resources. Consumer choices driving the economy would hardly allow the enormous allocations to the military that have always characterized the state budget. Thus economic development has been dictated by the regime and guided by the rising technology level of Western weaponry. The marketplace and broadly-based free enterprise were never allowed full sway because the regime did not trust the consequences of capitalism for the political-military system.

The only truly liberal reforms in Russia have come on the heels of military defeats that forced the regime to recognize that it could not continue to compete with its traditional economic and social order. Peter the Great pressed a policy of Westernization in Russia primarily to improve his military capabilities. While his reforms were dictatorial, they were "liberal" in the historical context of the times. They aimed at smashing the social rigidities of the old social order and stimulating Western rationalism within Russia's scientific and industrial development.

No major and sustained effort at liberal reform came again from the throne until after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1855. Military requisites seemed to have played a large role in Alexander II's decision to launch his reforms in the 1860s. The crux of the program, of course, was the emancipation of the peasantry—a precondition for economic development. In other words, Alexander addressed directly one of the three big structural problems—the peasant question. He continued traditional emphasis on a strong military and exacerbated the nationality problem by allowing further expansion in the Balkans and Central Asia. Nonetheless, he set in motion social and political forces that began, slowly but surely, to break out of the traditional structural predicament.

Another push for liberal reform came on the heels of defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. The October Manifesto brought the regime very close to constitutional monarchy. The final push came with military exhaustion in 1917. The provisional government promised a constituent assembly, and the prospects for liberal reforms looked good. Some would argue that the rate of progress since 1861 was much too slow, but nonetheless, the

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direction was a fundamental break with the Russian imperial tradition.

In any case, the Bolshevik seizure of power brought the process to a halt. The whole of the Soviet period, especially since the first five-year plan, essentially threw the system back to its pre–1861 structural conditions, reimposing the dynamic relationship of the three problems. The nationalities, promised the right to self-determination, were denied it (except in the cases of Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states which escaped through military successes against the Red Army). The peasants were put back into serfdom through collectivization. The state reasserted much stronger central control over economic development. Expansionism, in the new guise of international class struggle, was the aim of foreign policy. Once again, military requisites dominated the regime's preferences.

TODAY'S EVENTS should be understood against this historical pattern. The defeat in Afghanistan, coupled with economic stagnation, public demoralization, and the longest American military build-up since World War II, have once again brought the kind of crisis that has traditionally inspired liberal reforms. Not surprisingly, the three big issues debated under glasnost have been the economy, the nationality problem, and the military question. The new climate has allowed all of these to surface sharply. Again, it is difficult to know precisely how much of this Gorbachev intended. Perhaps he somewhat naively believed he could introduce major economic reform without having to confront the nationality and military issues on the scale that they have emerged. It really does not matter. The very structure of the situation was bound to put all three issues back on the agenda.

One can argue that a shrewd political strategist would have decided first on the order in which he would deal with these problems. To try to resolve all three at once is to risk letting the system fall into chaos and disorder. Given Gorbachev's central concern with improving the economy, he must have realized that he had to cut military outlays and priorities on resources. Since the military question provides the impetus in the traditional dynamic relationship, it made sense first to try to remove the factors that make great military power necessary. Gorbachev has done that in part by his ideological revisions, raising questions about the relevance of class struggle today and subordinating it to the maintenance of proper state-to-state relations. That step has done much to reduce fears of Soviet aggression in Europe and East Asia, and it has thereby allowed him to begin to cut back Soviet military force levels.

What Gorbachev apparently failed to recognize, however, was that Soviet rule over non-Russian regions is among the primary reasons for maintaining significant military and police power. A status quo foreign policy is not enough to relax the military requirements. He must deal with the nationality problem, not just NATO and China, if he is to undercut the persistent need for heavy military and police spending. Yet he has permitted a sustained public attack on the military, shaking its self-confidence, and readying it for additional major reductions. That, of course, raises serious questions about whether the military will be effective in keeping the centrifugal political forces in the national republics under control.

Here, then, we have the essence of both the military's crisis and Gorbachev's dilemma. Gorbachev has created the military crisis to facilitate economic reforms but finds himself having to fall back on military power to deal with the nationality upheaval in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and to a lesser degree in the Baltic republics, Moldavia, and the Ukraine.

The importance of having reliable military units rose dramatically as the crisis in Baku came to a head in January 1990, as troops were sent to restore order and arrest members of the Azerbaijan popular front, and as the Lithuanian decision to secede prompted the show of military force there. In the case of Baku, according to Radio Free Europe, parents of Russian and Ukrainian

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reservists openly protested the call-up of their sons to military units directed to carry out this repressive action. Thus the ethnic issue has also begun to affect ethnic Russian soldiers as well as national minorities. While discipline and troop reliability are still adequate in light of the effectiveness of military units used in Baku, Tbilisi, Dushanbe, Vilnius, and elsewhere for maintaining Moscow's authority, the growing signs of public disaffection with the military have to be alarming to the leadership. Moreover, the commander of a division in Tadzhikistan reportedly refused to let his troops help put down the disturbances in Dushanbe in early 1990 because he did not want to be blamed for violence—as were the commanders of the army units that acted in Tbilisi in April 1989.

The Military Crisis Today

THE SOCIAL crisis for the military was not prompted initially by the ethnic minority problems. It started with Gorbachev's determination to purge the officer corps and reduce manpower levels.

The opportunity to purge the officer corps was presented to Gorbachev in the spring of 1987 by the West German youth, Mathias Rust, who flew through the Soviet air defense system unobstructed and landed his Cessna aircraft in Red Square. Not only did Army General Sokolov, the minister of defense, lose his post, but so did several generals and dozens of lower ranking officers in the air defense forces.

During the next two years, a sweeping change of senior military personnel was effected—one that rivaled the purge of the Red Army by Stalin in 1937. Only the deputy minister for armaments has remained in office since Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Those replaced include the defense minister, every other deputy minister, the chief of the General Staff and his two first deputies, the commander of the Warsaw Pact and his chief of staff, all four "high command" commanders, every commander of a group of forces (in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary), every fleet commander, and every military district commander. In some cases, especially in military district commands, the commander has been changed as many as three times. How much farther down in the ranks this purge extends is not clear, but it likely goes at least to the division command level, perhaps lower.

Moreover, the quality of the new appointees marks a sharp change. The appointment of then-Colonel General D.T. Yazov as minister of defense was a strong hint of what would come. In his memoirs, Boris Yeltsin describes Yazov as ". . . the classic bluff, honest soldier, both sincere and hard working. One might entrust him with the command of a military district or an equivalent headquarters, but he completely lacks the background for the post of Minister of Defense." Marshal Kulikov soon retired as commander of Warsaw Pact forces, and shortly after Gorbachev's announcement of a 500,000 reduction in Soviet military manpower, Marshal Akhromeyev retired as chief of the General Staff. In fact, *all* marshals of the Soviet Union have retired, and Gorbachev said there would be no more in peacetime. He kept that promise for a time, promoting Yazov only to army general, but on the eve of May Day, 1990, Yazov was promoted to marshal. Moiseyev, the new chief of the General Staff, was perhaps an even more surprising appointment than Yazov. This post has always been occupied by officers of vast experience, education, and intellect. If reports of the judgments of his subordinates are true, Moiseyev lacks all three.

The pattern in the senior ranks, of course, is not an anomaly for perestroika. A similar and equally sweeping purge of the party apparatus has also been carried out. The changes in the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Central Committee, and the regional party committees are just as comprehensive. On the eve of the 28th Party Congress, July 1990, only Vorotnikov in the Politburo and Ligachev in the Secretariat pre-dated Gorbachev's time as general secretary. The Party Congress dramatically expanded the Polit-

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buro, changing its character fundamentally. All republican party chiefs and all but 23 of 155 *krai* and *oblast* first secretaries had been replaced by the fall of 1989. The purge of the military, therefore, should not be taken out of this overall party context. It clearly is part of the whole of the perestroika purge.

Although some senior officers (like some senior party officials) have made unkind comments about perestroika and glasnost, the officer corps has accepted party and military discipline and made no effort to resist as an institution. This can only be explained as the result of the ideological and institutional fusion of the party and the army from the early days of the regime. Colonel General Makashov's tirade at the Russian Party Conference in June 1990 roundly condemned liberal critics, but he spoke as a party member, declaring the communists in the army would not surrender ideologically. The senior officers clearly support the old, tight military linkage. One can only wonder how long it will last. It could eventually produce a major political crisis, especially because many aspects of Gorbachev's reforms are undercutting the traditional preeminence of the party in society. They threaten to destroy the traditional fusion of party and military along with the "leading role" of the party. A military crisis, therefore, is also a party crisis.

What the military will do in such an event is anybody's guess. Tradition suggests that if its senior leaders broke with Gorbachev, they would be likely to champion a conservative party leader as the alternative. They need the party as much as the party has always needed them. For the military to split with the party, it would either have to find another political party to support, or resort to direct military rule.

THE SECOND dimension of the social crisis in the military, as we noted above, concerns reducing manpower levels. For reasons not altogether clear, Gorbachev permitted the opening of a public debate over military service in the fall of 1988.[1] In any event, a roundtable debate in Moscow in the fall of 1988 raised a whole series of sharp issues concerning military service. Seven officers and six civilians participated, making all kinds of accusations and rebuttals. For example, one declared that there is no military threat to the Soviet Union. Another asked where the military would be if perestroika is threatened—on whose side would it come down? Yet another complained that two years of military service only let soldiers learn how to break military equipment, not master it; another called for an all-volunteer professional force. The officers cited the experience with a territorial militia and a small cadre force in the 1920s as a model for today.

The impact of this roundtable was the breaking of a dike against a sea of pent-up resentments and hostile attitudes in the society at large. The press has been filled ever since with rebuttals, proposals, criticism, and discussions, some bordering on the hysterical, others saturated with biting cynicism, viciously critical of the most senior officers. Army General Moiseyev, for example, has been ridiculed in *Izvestia* for his vague estimates of the probable costs of a volunteer army. Amid the shocking, sometimes amusing, candor of the public debate, several general points emerge forcefully.

First, the public's view of the military threat to the Soviet Union seems to have declined dramatically. Some critics declare there is none at all while others say it resides not in the West but on the Soviet Union's southern borders in radical Islam. A few more thoughtful observers suggest that party conservatives may be the real threat. Finally,

[1] It looks in retrospect like the kind of gambit he has employed in other areas, particularly the economy: using glasnost to allow dramatic policy initiatives to be suggested and whipping up public enthusiasm which puts the opponents of the initiatives on the defensive. They must reveal their hand and show their strength, giving Gorbachev the advantage in choosing tactics for defeating them.

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a number of civilian military policy specialists insist that Soviet military programs and capabilities themselves are responsible for creating the military build-up in the West. These have provoked hostile reactions from senior military officers, alleging "military incompetence" and ignorance in such arguments. The civilian specialists have answered with no less anger. Meanwhile, Generals Yazov and Moiseyev speak about NATO and U.S. military programs, earnestly arguing that there has been little Western response to Soviet unilateral reductions.

Second, a strong feeling exists that the military is separated from society, even hostile to society, hiding in its closed world of military installations. Throughout the spring of 1989 this charge was repeated again and again. Behind it resides the belief, not unfounded, that the regime cultivates this separation so that military units will develop no affection for the local populace that might make them reluctant to use force against disorderly crowds. The military has responded in many places by opening up installations for public visits and organizing occasions to reduce the public's expressed alienation. Military press reporting, however, suggests that these efforts have had virtually no positive effect.

A THIRD ISSUE is officer privileges. The higher ranks in the military are seen as just as much a part of the privileged elite, enjoying special incomes and benefits, as party officials. What is worse, this is contrasted with the awful conditions in which soldiers live. A fuller sense of this problem is provided by the case of a company of soldiers from the Transcaucasus military district. The entire company, according to Radio Free Europe, went absent without leave to demonstrate in front of Moscow State University. They complained that their commander was selling their labor to local farmers in exchange for brandy.

The senior military spokesmen take every opportunity to elaborate on the hardships that officers and their families are facing. In the Baltic republics they are denied housing and adequate schools for their children. Large numbers of officers working on the General Staff in Moscow have no apartments. Discharged officers are not always given jobs and housing as promised. While such points are undoubtedly true, their rhetorical purpose is to counter the general view that the officer corps is excessively privileged.

A fourth theme that fills the pages of papers and journals is hazing and brutal treatment of first-year soldiers by second-year soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers. The colloquial expression, *dedovshchina*, or "grandfatherism," describes this phenomenon, which has been around at least since the early 1970s. The second-year soldiers make the new recruits perform personal services for them, physically and verbally abuse them, and generally make life miserable. Suicides are frequent. Ethnic tensions seem to be exacerbated by *dedovshchina*. Slavic soldiers are particularly brutal to Central Asians and Transcaucasians. The popular front movements in the Baltic republics also have exacerbated the relations between recruits from those ethnic groups and Russians. Numerous mysterious deaths among ethnic minority soldiers are believed to be primarily the result of *dedovshchina*. A USSR People's Deputy asked for an investigation of 167 deaths of Uzbeks in the first nine months of 1989. The Ministry of Defense responded that there is no evidence of an organized campaign to kill Uzbeks or any other group. Over the same period, 123 Russians, 25 Ukrainians, 15 Kazakhs, 13 Byelorussians, 7 Georgians, and 7 Azerbaijanis died.

Parallel to *dedovshchina*, crime and drugs are rampant in many military units. *Red Star*, the military newspaper, reported early in 1990 that 59 officers had been murdered in 1989 but only 2 in 1988 and 1 in 1987. Even the elite airborne divisions are seriously affected, according to Lieutenant General V. Achalov, commander of airborne troops. In 1989, he reports, over 1,500 conscripts for his units had criminal records and 500 were known drug abusers. A 1987 study of drug

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use indicated that nearly 70 percent of soldiers surveyed reported the availability of hashish, and 22 percent of those serving in Afghanistan said they could get heroin. General Moiseyev and other high-ranking officers have complained about "hooliganism" in the military, insisting that it reflects larger social conditions in the society. In such conditions, Soviet parents are increasingly reluctant to see their sons enter military service.

A fifth problem concerns the impact of military service on young men pursuing higher education. In most cases they are assigned to the technical services, where three years is the required term. In spring 1989, the service law was amended to facilitate deferrals as a concession to this complaint. Early release was also granted to 176,000 soldiers in the summer of that year to permit them to return to universities. This loss of the more capable and skilled of the conscripts has drawn complaints from the military. It has also prompted the charge that the intelligentsia was behind the change to save its sons from service, leaving the burden on sons of workers and collective farmers.

The sixth problem relates to the fifth. High-technology weapons require better educated soldiers and longer training. Indeed, the modernization of the Soviet military is likely to continue to exacerbate this problem, and it may prove to be the point on which a compromise in the military law can be reached. The senior military is certainly aware of the problem and might well see an advantage in longer periods of service that a volunteer army would bring.

The seventh and eighth problems are closely related: the "extraterritoriality" principle (i.e., service in a place distant from one's home) and the national minority problem. Intense objection to extraterritoriality for place of service is widely expressed. The senior military quite rightly complains that it would be impossible to maintain units in the remote regions of the country—Siberia, Kamchatka, the far north, and on the borders—if all soldiers must serve near their homes. The intensity of opposition to extraterritoriality, however, is strongest in the national republics where it is connected to the demands for national independence.

Similarly, military service by ethnic minority youth has become a major problem. Chief of the General Staff, Army General Moiseyev, reported to the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1989 that over 7,500 young men were currently refusing to be conscripted. Most of these are from the national minorities. Earlier in the fall, the Baltic Council called for all youths in the Baltic republics to be allowed to perform their military duty within their home republic. Concessions, however, have not stilled the discontent. In the winter and spring of 1990, popular front and informal organizations, especially in the Baltic region but also in the Caucasus, were still encouraging young men to refuse the call-up for service. And with effect. Approximately 5,000 Lithuanian draft-age youths reportedly turned in their draft notices during a demonstration in February 1990. The issue here, of course, is not just the horrible life in the army. It reflects the minority republics' desire to take away the right of the Soviet military to draft their youth into the army. The General Staff reported that as of June 1, 1990, when the semi-annual call-up should have been complete, only 26 percent of the conscripts countrywide had reported. A few weeks later the figure was reported as above 90 percent, a doubtful number if the earlier one was correct. Lithuania had only a 19 percent response by June 1, Estonia 10 percent, and Armenia zero. It is little wonder that a Ministry of Defense study has concluded that the army is now in a "crisis situation."

A ninth problem arises from the war in Afghanistan. The public was denied information about casualties, and the dead were brought home for burials as quietly as possible. The society at large depended on rumors as the basic source of information. Now, glasnost has allowed increasing attention to the Afghan veterans into the press, making the plight of the wounded and maimed more

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widely appreciated and raising the issue of the total number of war deaths.

Such public resentment should hardly surprise the authorities. Undoubtedly it has fueled much of the outcry abut the military since it began in the fall of 1988. In turn, conscripts have carried this mood into the army's ranks, creating new morale problems for the military leadership. The public reaction to the war has perhaps been the major catalyst in the overall critical outrage we are witnessing in the society against the military. The moral foundations that victory in World War II gave the Red Army have been slowly but surely eroded in the course of the 1980s, with the Afghan issue alone going far to destroy the icon-like character of the Soviet military.

The Military-Industrial Complex

THE EXTRAORDINARY place of the military within the Soviet economy makes any basic reform and improvement impossible without addressing military-industrial arrangements. Gorbachev seemed to have understood that from the beginning. His tactics, accordingly, reflect a somewhat more clearly thought-out approach, albeit with a lot of trial and error.

First, he turned to the official ideology. His revisions, introducing the novel concept of "humankind interests" and relegating the "international class struggle" to obscurity, essentially undermined the ideological rationale on which the military has rested its claims for resource priority since the 1920s. It allowed him to invoke a purely "defensive" military doctrine and to begin to restructure the military accordingly. The reductions in the military budget—14.2 percent overall, including a nearly 20 percent decrease in procurement—and his unilateral reductions in troop strengths and force levels are merely the more visible aspects of his attack on the military priority.

Simultaneously, he has attempted to undermine the military-industrial system. His defense industries "conversion" program, which has already reportedly moved 246 firms to civil production, has generated high expectations. Because the military industrial sector is the most advanced, there is hope that it can provide the same kind of edge to other sectors through the conversion program. The view of the process that emerges from those trying to implement it, however, suggests that the results may be disappointing. There is no overall plan, no coordination, and very mixed results.

One need only reflect on the nature of Soviet military industries to infer some of the major problems. Conversion to civil production can be done where civil product lines already exist. Radar plants and missile plants have long produced televisions and refrigerators, but this product mix hardly meets the wider needs of Soviet consumers. Second, a new mix of products will require massive capital outlays for new machine tools and other equipment. Third, the quality of such goods, as many media reports indicate, is far below world standards and quite inferior to the quality of military equipment from the same plants. Thus there is no panacea in this program. It could, however, force a shift from military procurement priority, but it would have to go much farther than industrial managers have so far been willing to take it.

A more interesting program was implemented in January 1989, when all military industries were reportedly put on a "cost accounting" basis. That means they must cover the costs of production from earnings from sales. No credits or grants from the State Bank will cover losses. Within a few months many firms were in the red, unable to cover costs because the state-dictated prices for weapons are notoriously low. One critic suggested in *Kommunist* that the only way to get out of this bind is to negotiate new prices and to turn the firms into private cooperatives. Otherwise these firms will go bankrupt as they now operate. Since little more has been reported, we can only speculate that the state bank has probably bailed out most of these firms.

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If the Soviet centrally-planned economy is to be decentralized, and if market forces are to be introduced, the traditional lock of the military industries on priority of resources has to be broken. To date, that appears not to have been achieved. When the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Ryzhkov, put through yet another five-year plan in December of 1989, it became clear that no systemic change had yet been agreed on. As long as it is not, the military-industrial complex will remain a major obstruction, albeit one reduced somewhat by budget cuts. If Gorbachev does try to use his newly won presidential powers to force through radical economic changes in 1991, he may have second thoughts about maintaining his attacks on the military. He will need its support to deal with the likely public disorders as unemployment and inflation take their toll on family incomes. Yet winning back the military could force him to have second thoughts about radical economic reforms.

No major reduction of the military-industrial priority will mean no major reform of the economy, and the perpetuation of the structural relationship between the three "questions"—peasant, military, and nationality. Whether Gorbachev and his advisers perceive the historical legacy they have been bequeathed is far from clear, but their perestroika efforts seem directed in economic affairs by a basic appreciation of the military-economic connection. Thus far, however, the military icon on its industrial face has proven fairly resistant to more than superficial defacement. Moreover, the official military policy line, which Gorbachev seems to support, is that the military must shift from "quantity" to "quality," and this will mean that significant and leading industries must be protected.

To Genuflect or Not?

THE CRISIS IN Soviet military-societal relations is not a secondary affair in the overall perestroika phenomenon. It is central. Smashing the old icon is essential to a systemic reform of the Soviet regime. Without it, the prospects for moving to a market economy and a more liberal political environment are dim to say the least. The icon-smashing efforts to date show determination to carry out systemic reforms. They reflect an understanding within Gorbachev's close circle of advisers of the centrality of the issue. They also indicate a far more sweeping approach coming from within the communist elite than most foreign observers of the Soviet Union could have imagined.

These encouraging signs notwithstanding, enormous obstacles remain. Above all, Gorbachev did not initially seem to appreciate the degree to which his reforms, particularly of the military, but also of the economy and the political system, are entangled with the nationality problem. In the final count, his military perestroika will hinge on his willingness to allow some of the national republics to secede and his ability to work out a new, much looser, federal structure permitting national diversity and autonomy.

Failing to do so will make him increasingly dependent on police and military forces to maintain the present union. He will be thrown back into the old structural dynamic that has been the central feature of both the Russian empire and the Soviet empire. The military will remain the key to stability and imperial maintenance. Its icon status with the public will have to be restored, and people will have to be forced to genuflect before the icon whether they accept it in spirit or not. Liberalism, even in a moderate form, will have to suffer accordingly.

But this raises a major question about Gorbachev's Soviet Union: Could the icon actually be restored to its former place if it was thought necessary to do so? Or has the fissure gone too far? The same question can, in fact, be asked of Gorbachev's efforts to reform the party. He has damaged its image, diluted the power of the Politburo, created chaos in the Central Committee Secretariat, and thrown confusion into the ranks of the lower party apparatus. This is no less true for the party apparatus within the Soviet mili-

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tary. The Main Political Administration has very serious problems. Its clout is limited compared to a few years ago. Some reports suggest that it is being purged and strengthened. Other reports say that it has lost all chance of a significant comeback. A push was made at the 28th Party Congress to abolish it entirely. That could happen.

The importance of this question cannot be overemphasized. The ideological justification for the military's role, the party institutions within the military, the KGB institutions that watch the military, and the military's predominance in the industrial economy are all experiencing tensions, change, and perhaps even being dismantled. In all events, this dramatic crisis for the military and society is likely to provide one of the most reliable indices of the progress and future of the entire reform effort. The stakes are enormous. To succeed, Moscow must break the old relationship of its three structural problems. That would mean a fundamentally new kind of political development in Russia. As the leadership hesitates in accepting the consequences of national self-determination, it imposes severe limits on how far both political and military reforms can go. Until the nationality issue is settled in a fashion that relieves the regime of its need for repressive means to check secessionist forces—and this probably means letting most republics secede—the military question cannot be resolved.

Sequence is important in addressing the structural problems, and the nationality question must come first. The reformers are hammering away at the key issues, but they may have chosen the wrong sequence for addressing them. That would indeed be tragic for all concerned.

Note:

The analysis presented in this article is supported by extensive documentation. The parts dealing with contemporary affairs are based entirely on materials from the Soviet press and conversations with a few Soviet citizens visiting the United States. Radio Liberty materials and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service provided translations and references for some of the Soviet press, radio, and television materials. *Red Star* (the Soviet military newspaper), *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (the party-military journal), *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Kommunist*, *Voprosy filosofi*, *Voennyi vestnik*, and other Soviet publications were also used.

For most points in the text several sources can be found, and many anecdotal cases are available to provide a more textured and complete picture than the article could include. Anyone desiring full documentation should write to the author at the Hudson Institute.

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Defeat: A Neglected Subject

John Keegan

"VICTORY HAS a thousand fathers," says the Chinese proverb. "Defeat is an orphan." What goes for generals goes also for historians. Most military history is about victory, not defeat, and for understandable reasons. Victory is an engine of change—the machine to which historians have shackled themselves—while defeat, except when the victors are magnanimous enough to let the defeated learn from their mistakes, is not. There are exceptions to both these rules. The victors of 1945 were not merely magnanimous, they actually made sacrifices—represented today by the American deficit—to put the defeated back on their feet. And some defeats do acquire modishness as a subject of historical study. The overthrow of the Confederacy is one, the Fall of France—chosen by the authors of this work as an exemplar of their technique of analysis—another. In general, however, defeat is a neglected subject, which makes the appearance of Dr. Cohen and Professor Gooch's book all the more welcome.*

The welcome should be warmer because the authors have succeeded in refining our understanding of the concept of defeat. It need not, they point out, be the black to someone else's white. The landscape of war is a grisaille, in which dark patches of failure can be relieved by lighter shades of recovery from setback, as the history of World War II amply exemplifies. Until the autumn of 1942, Churchill's great chronicle relentlessly reminds us, the democracies reeled from one disaster to another at the hands of the Germans and Japanese. That the democracies' greater economic potential should have spared them the ordeal is beside the point. Potential and power are not the same thing, and it was only after the economies of the democracies had been militarized, and their underused industrial capacity harnessed to the war effort, that the dictatorships' bold but brittle thrust to win hegemony could be contained and then defeated. In retrospect, we can see that Dunkirk, Pearl Harbor, and Singapore were defeats only when viewed narrowly; in the longer view they appear as what the authors would call misfortunes. It is that perception that makes their book so creative. Defeat is difficult to recover from, misfortune not necessarily so. One can learn from one's mistakes. That is the theme of this book.

Having stated the theme, the authors proceed to technique: *how* to learn from one's mistakes. They tackle first the issue of how mistakes are made and identify conventional explanations. Number one is individual incompetence, what they call "the man in the

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*Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Free Press, 1990). 296 pp., $22.95.

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dock" explanation, or "criminalizing an individual"; they reject it as an oversimplification. The second they call "the man on the couch," or the indictment of individual psychopathology, which they also reject. The third is collective incompetence, the proposition that *déformation professionelle* can infect a whole command structure with wrong thinking. The fourth is institutional failure, when a military system goes wrong from top to bottom, as the French army is alleged to have done between the wars. The last is cultural failure, when a society loses all military virtue, as the democracies appear to have done in the appeasement era.

THE AUTHORS dislike all these explanations because they address symptoms and appearances rather than processes. What they are looking for is the worm in the apple and the galleries of corruption it eats through a structure, whether that be the mind of a supreme commander or the sort of complex bureaucracy which dominates a modern military system. Such worms, they suggest, may damage a structure in a variety of ways. The damage may be limited and *simple*, or it may be extensive and *complex*. Whether simple or complex, its effects in either case may prove disabling, but will be found to fall into one of three categories of error: failure to learn from past mistakes, failure to anticipate predictable challenges, or failure to adapt to novel challenges. Failure in any one of these categories the authors define as simple; failure in more than one they call complex, with failure in two producing an *aggregate* crisis; and failure in all three leading to *catastrophe*.

The authors also point out that failure may occur at different levels of responsibility, from that of supreme command, through service command and regional command, down to the tactical level. Categories of failure and levels of command can be represented as a diagrammatic grid, and paths can be charted between them—though the authors do not use the term "critical path analysis," it has clearly been useful to them—leading the analyst to nodal points at which what the authors call "critical failure" occurs. Some grids, particularly where *aggregate failure* and *catastrophe* are under examination, reveal more than one "critical failure" knot. The links between these knots the authors call "pathways to misfortune," and they argue that it is by following them that military analysts will most readily come to understand how operations miscarry and so propose means to avoid miscarriage in the future.

Claiming that there is a "missing dimension strategy," they suggest that "military organizations and the states that develop them" naturally attempt to diagnose past failure quantitatively, by assessing deficiencies in force levels, logistic resources, output of weapons, and the like, but fail to scrutinize "the adequacy of their organization as such." As an example, they adduce command arrangements in Hawaii in the months before Pearl Harbor, where relations between the commanding admiral and general were excellent, indeed so amiable that the two men had not hammered out exactly who was responsible for what. Their staffs, as a result, were infected by the spirit of "Let George do it," so that some essentials were no one's business. In retrospect, the U.S. services recognized and corrected the failing. In general, however, the authors argue that resistance to organizational self-criticism is normally so strong that patterns of error persist or recur, and can only be extirpated by the espousal of habits of mind akin to the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola. That is not how they put it, but that is what they mean.

St. Ignatius dealt in case studies, the review of personal conduct in the immediate past. That is the authors' method also. They have chosen four cases which reveal, respectively, failure to learn, failure to anticipate or adapt, aggregate failure, and catastrophic failure. The authors applied their "matrix of failure" to each case. How convincing is their demonstration?

The first, largely written by Dr. Cohen, concerns American antisubmarine warfare in 1942. I found his analysis fascinating and

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highly convincing. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Dönitz, Hitler's U-boat chief, redirected his captains from the mid-Atlantic to the American "Eastern Sea Frontier," expecting the pickings to be richer. Reality exceeded expectations by a factor of fantasy. The U-boat captains, who called this the "happy time," succeeded in the first six months of 1942 in sinking over 650,000 tons of shipping each month, or 200,000 tons more than was being launched and twice the monthly average for any period of the war that far. Dönitz had always set his sights on a total of 700,000 tons per month as the victory figure. No wonder that the U.S. Navy's chief antisubmarine warfare officer bluntly told the chief of Naval Operations on June 24, 1942, "The Battle of the Atlantic is being lost."

It appeared that it was being lost, moreover, by fecklessness—a view that has persisted. The U.S. Navy would not convoy and the coastal cities would not put out their lights. As a result, from Norfolk, Virginia to New Orleans, U-boat captains were presented with an endless succession of single-ship targets, unprotected by escorts, sailing in stately procession against the brilliant illumination of honky-tonks and boardwalks. They had only to fire to hit and then could wait in perfect safety until the next silhouette appeared.

That is the story. What Dr. Cohen demonstrates is that it was not as simple as it is told. The coastal lights should have been blacked out, but blackout was a responsibility of the army not the navy—an explanation if not an excuse. The navy had better than an explanation about its failure to protect the ships. It was absolutely not feckless in its attitude toward antisubmarine operations, having had delegates at British antisubmarine headquarters since well before Pearl Harbor. Their reports on British equipment and technique were eagerly studied and put into effect. The trouble lay elsewhere. The Atlantic Fleet was short of escorts in early 1942, so short that it concluded that convoying would be pointless until more escorts had been built. Even when it had assembled sufficient escorts to begin convoying, however, the fleet continued to lose merchantmen in large numbers, while failing to sink U-boats—and it did so for the simplest of reasons. The Americans had learned the letter of British methods but not the spirit. The British were good at sinking U-boats not just because they had developed sonar but because they had designed a system which maximized the efforts of all agencies—intelligence, shore-based aircraft, escorts, convoy control—concerned in the Battle of the Atlantic. So they should have done, because the battle was life and death to them. It was not to the Americans, who took eighteen months to adapt their organization to the British model. As soon as they did so, the results flowed in. So much for failure to learn.

DR. COHEN is equally interesting on the Israeli failure to anticipate the Syrian-Egyptian attack of 1973. His account is exceedingly well-informed, suggesting privileged access to Israeli sources—though, typically, the Israelis were also exceedingly frank in their postmortem, of which, equally typically, even the secret parts have been extensively leaked.

Israel, he insists, was not strictly taken by surprise on the day of Yom Kippur. On the contrary, it had proceeded some way with an anticipatory mobilization. It would not go whole hog for two reasons, however. One reason was that what he calls "a very special source of intelligence"—presumably meaning an agent at the highest level of the Egyptian or Syrian government—was expected to give two days' warning of war. The other was "the Concept." "The Concept," held as an article of faith by many in the Israeli high command, deemed that no attack would take place unless Syria and Egypt could launch one simultaneously (true) and that such an attack would only be launched if Egypt had the means to mount long-range air strikes at Israel proper (false). What falsified the second premise of "the Concept" was that Sadat had set war aims more subtle than those of material victory. He had concluded

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that to damage Israel's sense of security by inflicting losses, even if such losses were not large enough to bring victory, would win a diplomatic success large enough to make a war worthwhile.

How right his perception was. Israel in practice did far better than its blinkered adherence to "the Concept" should have allowed; tactical flair on the battlefield saved Israel yet again. But tactical flair could not save Sinai for Israel at the conference table, and from the loss of Sinai has flowed all the renewed anxiety about frontiers which bedevil Israeli politics to this day. Dr. Cohen is also right to emphasize how central adherence to "the Concept" was to the Israeli debacle. It was, indeed, so central that, if we accept his account, we are left to doubt whether his application of the "matrix of failure," with its links and nodal points, has much purpose—whether it is a complication of analysis rather than a help to understanding.

The same thought attends his review of the defeat of the American Eighth Army in Korea, November through December 1950. That defeat, Cohen says, denotes an "aggregate failure"—failure to anticipate and failure to learn. Failure to anticipate that the Chinese really meant to attack if MacArthur's forces approached the Yalu is a charge he lays against the high command from the president downward. Failure to learn that airpower could not play the same interdictive role against a shoe-leather peasant army in Asia as it had against the roadbound *Wehrmacht* in Europe was the error of the theater authorities, and failure to learn—really a failure to recall—that all-round defense defeats infiltration was the fault of units in the field.

Yet this study is really a salute to the First Marine Division which—though exposed to assault by twelve enemy divisions because of the high command's failure to anticipate the Chinese attack—retreated at its own pace, bringing with it all its own dead as well as wounded, and leaving 25,000 Chinese corpses in its wake. The First Marine Division was indeed an outstanding formation. I recall a British officer attached to it describing with admiration how he had watched leathernecks spit-and-polishing the bristle off their snowboots "to get a shoeshine" while they sat in frozen foxholes at the Chosin reservoir. Spit-and-polish is not one of the factors Dr. Cohen cites in his analysis of why the division fought so well; but it is, of course, as good as any other in this context, and might just as well figure in the matrix of failure—which here ought to be a "matrix of success"—as tactical adaptability or ammunition conservation. In short, a simple story seems here to have been made more complex than it ought to be.

PROFESSOR GOOCH, by contrast, oversimplifies a complex story in his examination of the French defeat in 1940. He rightly emphasizes the fossilization of French military thought between the wars and demonstrates how failure to anticipate, learn, and adapt produced catastrophe in a few days after May 10, 1940. As he then connects all levels with all failures, however, his matrix looks like a cat's cradle, and he does little more than tell us that France had a "Concept" which made Israel's in 1973 look like a passing thought. This is, of course, retrospective determinism: if French soldiers thought as they did, what other outcome could have been expected? It altogether overlooks the fact that French soldiers *acted* to enhance the chance of Germany's rapid victory. Nothing in the "Concept" required the French—trailing the small British Expeditionary Force behind them—to advance into Belgium at exactly the same moment that the Germans advanced into France. In doing so, they performed in essence that "kindly favor" which Schlieffen had warned the Kaiser's army must not count upon to expedite the success of his plan in 1914. Had the French army been truly fossilized, it would have done nothing at all in 1940, which would have left it with a *masse de manoevre* (whose nonexistence Gamelin had to confess to Churchill) handily placed to block the panzer advance through the Ardennes. It might not

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have succeeded, of course, but, as Professor Gooch concedes, even the feeble Gamelin perceived within the first week of the crisis *how* the German spearhead should be tackled—by convergent attacks, which he succeeded in launching, though not in coordinating, at Laon and Arras. Had he had the *masse de manoeuvre* at hand, and not allowed it to wander off into Belgium, the German breakthrough to the sea, Dunkirk, and the Pètain armistice might not have happened. That is not indulgence in "ifs," it is a deduction that follows directly from drawing a situation map.

The map, too, bears directly on Professor Gooch's analysis of the British failure at Gallipoli in 1915, though as a warning of how dangerous a map can be if it is all that a strategist uses in planning a campaign. Here Professor Gooch can fairly be lumped with the "if" school, those "terrible ifs" which Churchill, the begetter of the campaign, believed had robbed his grand design of success. He cleaves particularly to the "if only the commanders had been in touch" and "if only the troops had pressed on" interpretation. So did I—until this year, when I had the chance to go to the Gallipoli peninsula. Then the scales fell from my eyes.

It is unfair to use first-hand against second-hand knowledge—I am presuming that Professor Gooch, like Churchill and his fellow enthusiasts, approached Gallipoli via the atlas—but Gallipoli is one of those places where it is essential to visit in order to understand. What geography has done there is to create, at no expense to its Turkish owners, one of those vast barbicans or redans which dynastic monarchs laid out fortunes to construct on miniature scale at points of strategic access to their kingdoms. The Gallipoli peninsula, the Asiatic shore, and the Narrows which lie between are designed as if by an unseen hand to frustrate anything but an amphibious assault on the largest scale. Troops landing on the point of the peninsula are dominated by high ground. Troops landing further up cannot open the Narrows. Troops landing on the Asiatic shore are exposed to attack from the vast interior of Anatolia. Only by doing all three things simultaneously can an attacker hope to win—and the Allies in 1915 lacked both the numbers and specialized equipment to do all three. The Turks were well aware of the defensibility of the Gallipoli position, so much so, indeed, that a separate Gallipoli defense force, independent of the Ministry of War, had existed since the nineteenth century. It is not exaggerating to say that Churchill's Dardanelles expedition was doomed to failure before it left Egypt. Professor Gooch's analysis is therefore beside the point—an elegant intellectual exercise which does not stand up to five minutes' walking over the tortured ground of Helles, Anzac, or Suvla.

I WOULD therefore mark the Cohen/Gooch system two-and-a-half out of five. It works well when the problem under scrutiny is one-dimensional, as was that of defeating the U-boats off the Eastern Sea Frontier in 1942. It works quite well when the problem can be reduced to near one-dimensionability, possible in the case of the Yom Kippur War and the intervention of the People's Liberation Army in Korea. It does not work when the problem falls outside the framework of organization—the author's chosen field of inquiry—as it did at Gallipoli, nor does it work in a useful way when failure becomes multidimensional, as it did in France in 1940.

There is, nevertheless, a simple truth about the Fall of France. It is that the French, having paid a terrible price to defeat the Germans twenty-one years earlier, could not muster the resolution to repeat the sacrifice. This irresolution permeated the French political and military structure from top to bottom. It was evident in the half-heartedness of the government's call to arms (*"Il faut en finir"*), in the interminable lunches which dominated the day at cryptographic headquarters where Enigma was attacked, in the shoddy turn-out of the soldiers of the reserve divisions, ultimately in the refusal of all but

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7,000 of the 200,000 French soldiers who passed through Britain after Dunkirk to heed de Gaulle's summons to continue the fight. The authors are correct to point out that French command arrangements during the Battle of France were confused and ineffective, but that was a symptom, not a cause, of the French weakness.

Doubt about the general applicability of the authors' technique must therefore extend to the question, What Can Be Done? They point out, correctly, that the Soviets have a doctrine of war which is "richer, less rigid and more imaginative" than any in use in the West, "incorporating politics and technology as well as tactics." Since one view of the misfortune that has overtaken the Soviet Union is that it derives from attempting to run a whole society as a military machine, we perhaps ought tactfully to overlook that particular insight.

A more precise but equally disabling doubt attaches to the authors' more specific remedial proposals: that armed forces should study the past and that political leaders should examine military chiefs in their readiness to adapt to the unforeseen. As the authors themselves acknowledge—it is one of the sharpest perceptions in the book—the mere act of clothing scholars in uniform guarantees in no way at all that uniformed men of action will heed what they teach. There are indeed two cultures at work in the world, but the culture of learning and the culture of doing connect only in the most erratic way. As to the notion that politicians have the time, knowledge, or inclination to subject soldiers to organizational seminars, what is that aphorism of Kissinger's—that government is a perpetual conflict between the urgent and the important, in which the urgent always triumphs? Something like that; the form is unimportant, the essence vital. Soldiers and politicians alike are bound to the wheel of urgency, a relentless master which allows the barest time for thought. We should be grateful that, very occasionally, supreme command falls to quick thinkers with a sense of proportion. One of them waiting in the wings may find the time to read this highly-intelligent and well-intentioned book.

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The Footnote Man

Midge Decter

*Present Of Things Past** is the evocative—if misleading—title of a volume of occasional pieces by Theodore Draper. All the essays included in the book were published in the 1980s, mainly in the *New York Review of Books*, and cover such ostensibly disparate subjects as Eisenhower's role in World War II, the American Communist party in the 1930s, Reagan's policy in Central America, and the mystery of the identity of one Dr. Max Eitingon, an early disciple and supporter of Freud accused in the *New York Times Book Review* of having been an agent of Stalin. As is almost always the case with collections of serious writings published within a particular period of time, however, Mr. Draper's book is held very closely together by a common thread of attitude and preoccupation.

Or perhaps one should say, a common thread of irritability: it would be hard to think of a book of recent years more peevish than this one in both tone and method. The period spoken to and about by these essays, otherwise known as the Reagan years, was clearly a most displeasing time for their author. Even where he comes to praise, i.e., in a lengthy four-part defense of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in World War II, his method of doing so involves the implicit burial of those who have criticized Eisenhower's decisions with respect to the Soviet army in the final months of the war.

But for the most part, Mr. Draper is quite explicit about the real object of his displeasure—call it the engine of the considerable literary energy displayed in these pages—and that is the community of intellectuals now generally identified as the neoconservatives (and to which I myself emphatically belong). Indeed, the Reagan administration and its policies, of which he might be considered among the most stringent of critics, take a distinctly secondary place in the gallery of sinners against Mr. Draper's light to such figures as Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhoretz, Charles Krauthammer, and others named and unnamed whom he identifies as members of their cabal.

To be sure, these are not the only people subjected to Mr. Draper's stern notice. For example, he takes a properly dim view of the kind of journalism practiced by the widely-esteemed Strobe Talbott of *Time* magazine and other "insiders" like him who, in exchange for the promise of nonattribution, are granted privileged information by high officials and thus produce stories in which it is impossible to tell the user from the used. Even more stern, and of course even more properly so, is his refutation of the revisionist

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historians of American communism, who seem to spring up in American universities like some ineradicable, decennially blooming weed. Still, their treatment at his hands is gentle by comparison with that meted out to the neoconservatives.

Characteristically—very much including his astonishing and mystifyingly painstaking reconstruction of the Eitingon family tree with which the book concludes—in all of these pieces he displays that lust for the use of documents and details that has given him a marked pride of place among American journalists. In fact, he himself would claim not to be a journalist at all but rather, as he says in his preface, "a historian of a special kind." Yet it happens to be a muse significantly different from Cleo who is actually served by Mr. Draper's scholarly temperament.

THE NAME OF the art he truly practices, and has practiced for years to great kudos, is polemic. Now, polemic in its own right carries a most honorable and valuable pedigree among literary forms—provided, however, that it is permitted to travel under its own identity. Had it been so in the case of this book, Mr. Draper's title would far more rightfully have been *A Past of Things Present*.

No doubt the writing of history, too, grows to some extent out of things present, but there are limits on the capacity of historic material to bend to the purposes of the genuine historian. Whereas to a pamphleteer, particularly an unadmitted one, archives and the documents in them can become very eccentric things. Thus, precisely because so few of Mr. Draper's fellow journalists put themselves to the trouble of examining records already consigned to cold print, the quotations and references with which he so liberally laces his "historical" pieces tend to be treated as if they have been parachuted fully armed and unassailable onto some uncharted virgin territory.

Consider the essay titled "American Hubris." Written in response to the Reagan administration's intervention in the Persian Gulf in 1987, the piece, as its title implies, is not merely an expression of disapproval for that intervention but an overarching attack on the course of American policy from the Truman Doctrine on, both for immodesty of intention and incompetence of execution. To buttress what is after all a rather gross contention for an historian to offer in so few pages, Mr. Draper provides fifty-one citations, which make up a veritable jumble of quotes, half-quotes, quarter-quotes, and two-word quotes, taken from primary sources, secondary sources, tertiary sources, reminiscences from statesmen, from onlookers, from historians, from fellow polemicists, and from newspaper accounts written by people whom one would hardly have thought Mr. Draper found authoritative. What is to the point here is that all these sources are given convenient weight, without regard to context or likely accuracy or possible *parti pris*. One cannot therefore overcome the impression that most of the citations are there primarily not to support the truth, but, as T.S. Eliot might say, to swell a scene or two.

In any case, in this piece Truman and James F. Byrnes and Henry L. Stimson are first taken to task for imagining that the atom bomb would give the United States irresistible power and then for discovering that in matters diplomatic it did not. (For someone who has himself undergone a number of changes of mind about the nature of political reality, Mr. Draper's dismissiveness about this process might seem a bit odd.) The Truman administration is attacked for taking what should have been a response only to a small local difficulty in Greece and making a doctrine out of it—the doctrine responsible in Mr. Draper's view not only for the United States having sneaked itself into the Iran-Iraq War under the guise of protecting the supply of oil shipped through the gulf, but for an entire history of deceit and self-deceit that in his telling lay at the bottom of every single American intervention in the preceding forty years, from Greece and Turkey to Korea to Vietnam to Lebanon to the gulf.

The hubris to which he refers is finally

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an inclination among American politicians to declare large policies without providing the means for them. Now, such an indictment of American policy-makers is not in and of itself without a good deal of merit. It is in fact the gravamen of—dare we say it?—the neoconservatives' own criticism of Mr. Reagan's foreign policy. But the indiscriminateness, the uninflectedness, of Mr. Draper's indictment, along with the dyspeptic manner in which he lays about him from sentence to sentence, suggest not so much an effort to analyze what has gone wrong in postwar American policy—to the true historian, after all, a record of men acting in circumstances whose outcome they do not yet know and from what is always at best a less than godly wisdom—as a cranky plaint against the very idea of the United States as a major world power or the idea that there can ever be such an entity.[1]

Problematic as his discussion of American hubris is, though, it is in an essay called "Neoconservative History" that the author comes cleanest about the real source of his irritability. Not questionable journalistic practices, not even the academic revival of lies and nonsense about the nature of the American Communist party in the 1930s—the best reading in this book, and for Theodore Draper something like a champion marksman shooting ducks in a barrel—and not even all those swaggerers with their nuclear weapons can drive him to the polemical lengths to which he is carried by the likes of people who publish regularly in *Commentary* and in these pages. The piece, then, bears a somewhat detailed examination.

The history Mr. Draper refers to is that of Roosevelt's role and policy vis-à-vis Stalin at Yalta. He wishes to dispel the "myth" that Roosevelt, in his naivete and arrogance, gave away Poland, and with it Eastern Europe, to Stalin and undermined from the very start the structure of the United Nations. The instances of the perpetuation of this alleged myth he uses for his text are passages from contributions to a symposium in the November 1985 issue of *Commentary*, one by Lionel Abel, one by Jeane Kirkpatrick, and one by Robert Nisbet (who, be it noted, is not now and has never been a neoconservative).

The question posed by the symposium was how the United States had met its challenges in the forty years since the end of World War II. In the course of a rather long and complicated response, Lionel Abel remarked that Roosevelt had been responsible for "terrible foreign-policy decisions" that gave the Soviet Union control of Eastern Europe. This remark, contained in a single sentence, parenthetically cited a piece published in *Commentary* two months earlier by John Colville, Churchill's wartime secretary, who claimed that the British at Yalta had been uneasy about Stalin's promise of free elections in Poland, but since the Soviets and Americans were in agreement, they felt they had to go along. Jeane Kirkpatrick is quoted as saying "Founding the UN also required falsifying the relations between the Soviet Union and those two 'autonomous Soviet Socialist republics,' the Ukraine and Byelorussia." She further speculated how this could have happened: "Presumably, the reason was that [the Americans] could not bear to face the fact that even after this most recent, most terrible war, there remained a powerful, repressive, expansionist dictator to cope with." Churchill, she said, knew that nothing in the Soviet past justified optimism concerning its future behavior, and Roosevelt should have known the same. This last, that Churchill knew better about Stalin while Roosevelt was credulous, was also Robert Nisbet's view.

In citing these four instances of what might for convenience be called the Yalta

[1]This is, anyway, a curious set of implications to be drawn from a declaration of American interest in the Persian Gulf which is, among other things, a life-and-death source of energy for our Western European allies. One might almost suspect the presence somewhere of a thumbprint belonging to the eternally gloomy and latterly quite dyspeptic George Kennan, though he rates only a single footnote.

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syndrome, Mr. Draper is distressed by John Colville, contemptuous of Lionel Abel, shocked by Robert Nisbet, and—the only word for it—schoolmarmish with Jeane Kirkpatrick. ("The decision on the Ukraine and Byelorussia was made before there was a UN and before it had a charter. . . . The war was not yet over. . . . ") "The mystery," he later comments, "is how a former UN ambassador could get the whole story topsy-turvy"—as if by offering a pedantic correction about when the negotiation involved had physically taken place, he was providing a substantive answer to the real point of her analysis.

He then goes on to set the record "straight." His argument is essentially twofold. First, it was not Roosevelt who gave the Soviet Union control of Eastern Europe, it was the Red Army. By the time of Yalta, that army had already occupied most of Poland and Eastern Europe. A diplomatic effort was in fact made to stave off total control by Stalin, "But diplomacy can rarely save what is lost by force of arms." Second, as between them, if culpability there was, it belonged more to Churchill than to Roosevelt. In any case, the point about Yalta, Mr. Draper would remind us, is not that Yalta was a bad promise, but that it was a good promise broken by Stalin.

Maybe yes, maybe no. Half a century may be just enough for the beginning of historical perspective about decisions taken in the heat of dangerous events—a perspective he would have us apply to Roosevelt and Eisenhower but at the same time, as we have seen, himself withholds from those who have been required to make policy ever since.

How does he account for the fact that Jeane Kirkpatrick and the others have engaged in this "abuse of the past"? The main source of their bad faith, he would have us understand, is "the influence of the so-called neoconservative ideology." And what, pray tell, is that? It is an ideology, he avers, in which "liberal internationalism" has become the main enemy. That is why, for instance, its adherents find it necessary to "belittle" Roosevelt and "besmirch" his reputation. Following this breathtaking assessment, there is a positively dizzying account of an essay by Irving Kristol which appeared in the first issue of this magazine.[2] At that time, Mr. Kristol was in the process of adumbrating a position—since somewhat revised in response to the astonishing train of events, intended or unintended, set in motion by Mikhail Gorbachev—that he called "global unilateralism." Essentially, in this view the United States was being hamstrung by its alliances in the pursuit of its interests and policies and should henceforth free itself to act unilaterally. Furthermore, he argued, there was no reason why these unwieldy blanket treaties should not be replaced with a series of bilateral understandings. Whatever one thinks of this idea, the level of the assault launched by Mr. Draper in disagreement with it, and by extension with the ideas of others identified by him as Mr. Kristol's "cohorts [sic]," reveals him to be a man who has imposed upon himself a rather shockingly indulgent standard of argument.

FIRST OF ALL, one would never know from this essay that global unilateralism was an idea that had occasioned, to say the very least, a lively debate among "Kristol and his cohorts." The fact that in 1985 Irving Kristol's views on foreign affairs were hardly universally accepted among his neoconservative fellows does get a single mention, for use in the following way: ". . . Kristol is engaged in [an] operation. . . so extreme that even his friend Jeane Kirkpatrick cannot go along with it." Furthermore, speaking of "extreme," in this case a telltale extreme of, shall we say, historical carelessness along with sheer personal nastiness, Mr. Draper does not scruple to compose the following sentence: "[The neoconservatives'] version of ideological conflict shades into a real, ordinary, bloodletting war—anything up to nuclear devastation, which is the only concession Kristol makes to

[2] "Foreign Policy in an Age of Ideology," *The National Interest*, no. 1 (Fall 1985).

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stopping short of mutual catastrophe." Mr. Draper's vast researches seem to have failed to turn up the fact that Irving Kristol was an outspoken advocate of "no first use."

For another, and more serious, thing, Mr. Draper seems to have been in some confusion about just who in the 1980s were the real heirs and assignees of internationalism, liberal or otherwise, and just who had become the enemies of same. Whether or not an injustice has been done to Roosevelt—and there are few neoconservatives of my acquaintance who would not be happy to think so—it could hardly be in the great FDR tradition to agree, as Mr. Draper does, for instance, that lying to Congress for the sake of a desired foreign-policy initiative should be an indictable offense. Nor can just about every recent candidate for nomination to the presidency by Franklin D. Roosevelt's party be called in any decent use of the term internationalist.

The essay, then, is not about Roosevelt or Yalta at all. It would have been perfectly possible to attempt a corrective to those he considered in error on the Roosevelt record without distorting their words or defaming their intentions. So the question remains: Why has Theodore Draper become so bad-tempered? Why, to adapt his formulation, this abuse of the present?

The answer lies all over the pages of this book. For reasons known to himself, Mr. Draper is engaged in an effort to be regarded not as an engaged intellectual but as an Olympian. In a completely politicized age, where not a blade of grass that stirs in the intellectual, academic, artistic, or even popular-culture communities is free of political weight, he wishes to pretend that he is floating somewhere above the fray, in that blue heaven where one takes no sides and ultimately bears no responsibility. Others of his fellow intellectuals take him at his word; so do the journalists he patronizes; and even the leftist historians he scolds so effectively would be unlikely to respond in kind. But the neoconservatives, who harbor in their midst many disagreements, some of them serious, have reached consensus on this one thing: there is no such thing for an honest man in a politicized age as not taking sides. This, in the final analysis, is what he will not forgive them for.

Moreover, the truth is that pretending one is beyond politics is every bit as political an act as, say, producing a manifesto. The thunderbolts Mr. Draper hurls at the neoconservatives come not from Olympus but only from the next barricade. It would sweeten his temper, not to mention improve the truthfulness of his discourse, if he were to come out from behind it.

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No Controlling Vision

Mark Elvin

JONATHAN SPENCE'S new narrative history of China since 1600 is a Yellow River of a book, slow-moving, opaque, and silt-laden with a prodigious quantity of information.* The reader will end by knowing a great deal more about the country, but with his or her understanding little deepened, if at all, and maybe even confused. This must seem a harsh judgement, and I make it with the utmost reluctance. Professor Spence is a scholar of wide learning, and he writes better than most of us. What, then, is the justification?

At the most general level there is the book's insensitivity to the importance of the specific qualities of Chinese culture in the broad anthropological sense. By this I mean the patterns of meaning perceived in the world and human life, the patterns of action embodied in institutions, and the particular flavor of "being Chinese" within the range of circumstances afforded by the last four hundred years. The reason this matters is that at the center of modern Chinese history is the collapse of a culture—a collapse much more severe than that of other comparably great pre-modern civilizations—and the still unsuccessful efforts to put something in its place.

As a shorthand illustration, contrast the absolute disappearance of scriptural Confucianism with the continuing vitality, at least in comparative terms, of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The reader needs to know, with some degree of specificity, *what* it was that collapsed, and *why* it collapsed. Otherwise, China merely appears, as it tends to do in Spence's pages, as an impressive but rather conservative power that received some pummelling and humiliating from the West (without ever getting conquered, like India and the rest), plus a brutal invasion from the Japanese, and then took to communism to remedy social injustice within and national weakness with respect to the world outside. This is an unfair caricature, but it is not *very* unfair, because the passages that touch on the specificity of China are for the most part tangential. Yet almost everything in China *is* specific, and never more deceptively so than when it appears under an apparently familiar label. To take another shorthand example (not mentioned by Spence), "democracy" when it first appeared was valued much less as the realization of popular sovereignty than as a means of strengthening the "intercommunication between superiors and inferiors." These differences do not necessarily persist forever in the modern world, but they have long lives.

This problem of cultural "blur" appears in a number of ways, great and small. For

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*Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990). 876 pp., $29.95.

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example, Spence refers to the Ministry of "Justice" in late-imperial China, but "justice" is a Western concept. (You cannot sensibly translate *Fiat justitia, ruat Coelum* into classical Chinese.) The reader without specialist knowledge is shielded from the crucial awareness that traditional China did not have, in the true sense, a system of law but of social discipline (in some respects like a Western army or very old-fashioned school). This may seem no more than a tiny linguistic straw in the wind, but it is symptomatic of the author's approach. The correct translation for "Ministry of Justice" is "Board of Punishments."

In another seemingly minor but revealing passage, Spence says that around 1600, "China's cultural life" was one that "few, if any, other countries could match." One might, if one was playing cultural Olympics, demur slightly for the age of Shakespeare, Palestrina, Rubens, Caravaggio, Vieta (modern algebra), Galileo (modern physics), Gilbert, Harvey, Monteverdi, and the approximate date of birth of Velasquez and Rembrandt. But the serious point relates to elucidating why China was, in this period, refined but without major originality (prose fiction excepted), and caught in a largely closed world of conception and perception—closed in part *because* of its very sophistication. On this there is silence. Yet the closure was to be lethal.

At the next level of generality is the bluntness of the conceptual tools that Spence employs. The book is called *The Search for Modern China*, but there is no working definition of "modernity." This is not an impossible task, and undertaking it can lead to important insights and questions. For example, in most so-called "modern" countries, large parts of the system of values and institutions are *not* modern (the Catholic church in the United States would be one instance), and it may well be that modernization is easier if a substantial part of the traditional inheritance is preserved. This is, of course, too complex a question to be settled in a few sentences here. My point is that formulating definitions of key concepts leads to interesting questions, and in this particular case could lead to a new perspective on the Chinese Communists' attempt to create a cultural *tabula rasa*.

THE CONCEPT of "class" in the Chinese context also requires close semantic attention. Though not unaware of some of the problems, Spence does not tackle head-on the crucial question of whether it makes sense to use the notion of *distinct* social classes in the context of the dense Chinese social continuum, with its high social and geographical mobility. No one would dispute that the top and the bottom of this continuum were worlds apart—some might prefer to say Heaven and Hell apart—but the absence of natural breakpoints in the continuum (apart from a small number of caste-like minority groups) has a direct bearing on two important points.

The first is how one analyzes conflicts in Chinese society. Experience has persuaded me that, at least up to the end of the nineteenth century, vertical groupings are usually more important than horizontal groupings, though both exist. (If a simile is required for vertical groupings, think of football clubs with their financiers, managers, trainers, teams, apprentices, fans, followers, and hangers-on, each club containing a broad slice of the social continuum.) In the twentieth century, there may have been some shift of emphasis, epitomized for me by the red-and-black checkered flag of the peasant movement in Hailufeng in the early 1920s: it conjoined the Red Flags and the Black Flags, two previously bloody rival organizations of all but identical social composition. Nonetheless, and this brings us to the second point, communist "class analysis" in many ways forced an inappropriate model onto Chinese society, especially in the countryside. Spence's praise for the subtlety of Mao's system is misplaced, but what matters is that it arises out of a failure to grapple analytically with the nature of the concepts involved, both on the ground then and in the scholar's study now.

Spence does not have a well-developed

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sense of the problem. Why was there a revolution in 1911? Why was there a successful communist movement in China? And so on. Indeed, where there is a well-known clash of views, such as that between Chalmers Johnson and van Slyke on the role of "peasant nationalism" in underpinning the rise of communist power during World War II, Spence seems to slide away deliberately from any engagement with the argument. Time and again, there is no real attempt to tease out a pattern of causation, and I would like to examine a few examples of this in more detail.

THE FIRST IS the Boxer Uprising of 1899/1900. Spence treats this as a form of nationalism when it was nothing of the sort, except for the limited number of gentry and officials who sought—almost totally without success—to manipulate it and redirect it for nationalist purposes. The uprising was an anti-Christian pogrom, with millenarian overtones and not a little of the Children's Crusade (a characteristic it shared with the later Cultural Revolution), and the participants spent by far the greater part of their time killing and robbing other Chinese, mostly but not exclusively those whom they accused of being Christians. Spence gets it wrong primarily because he does not look at what was happening where and when. His map (p. 234) is unbelievably inaccurate—and is avoidably so, since he could have referred either to Blunden and Elvin's *Cultural Atlas of China* or to Elvin in the *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford* (November 1979) for reasonably precise maps. As these indicate, Boxerism did not correlate in any simple way with the presence either of foreigners or Christian converts, but was related to the particular social circumstances of western Shandong, especially around the Grand Canal, and a number of other specific factors.

My second example is the long and complex process that led to the 1911 revolution. Spence seems to be edging back to an emphasis on the role of Sun Yat-sen and his Revolutionary Alliance that one thought had been laid to rest since the conference organized by Mary Wright in 1965. Something like four major aspects of this process may be distinguished in addition of the drama of the actual dismantling of the imperial institution in 1911/12. The first was the long debate during the generation between the 1860s and the 1890s over what was wrong with China. Spence hardly touches on this at all, but it is in any case usually overlooked that both "conservatives" and "reformers" (the labels are poor approximations) agreed that something was seriously wrong with China. The disagreement was whether what was amiss was a lack of traditional virtues or of modern qualities of character and society. In a step-by-step way this debate crystallized a Chinese sense of self-disgust and devalued the meaning of imperial Chinese history. Eventually, critics like Wang Tao and Zheng Guanying (neither mentioned by Spence) inserted the time-bomb of democratic thought into the intellectual world of the elite. In the 1890s this trend forked, one path being theoretical and one practical. The first of these was the collapse of scriptural Confucianism, in the sense that thereafter it was incapable of perpetuating itself in subsequent generations.

This development can be found in Kang Youwei's attempt to recast Confucianism as a revelation imparted by Confucius Super-Sage, in the dissolution of the hierarchical elements of Confucianism in a pseudo-scientific mystical fusion of the Confucian virtue of *ren* (empathetic feeling for all other beings) and Buddhist *nirvana* by Tan Sitong (not mentioned by Spence), and the radical phase of Liang Qichao (an aspect also barely touched on). Spence overrates the role of the May Fourth period (i.e., the 1920s) in the downfall of this system of ideas; it was then that the consequences began to appear, the basic demolition work having been done earlier.

The second fork led to the development of new political institutions. The earliest were the so-called "study societies," which featured the first attempt at a partly modern political party in the Society for the Study of Strengthening (not mentioned by Spence)

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and a sort of provincial parliament in the Southern Studies Society (not mentioned either).

After the interruption of the ultra-conservative coup and the Boxer years, this trend was resumed by the creation of local self-government bodies based on a severely limited franchise. The first was in the Chinese part of Shanghai (again not mentioned by Spence), and then the provincial assemblies and the other parts of the imperially-sponsored program of constitutional development. One of the three central components of the 1911 revolution—the newly politically consolidated gentry working through democratic institutions—barely appears in Spence's pages. The second, the modern officer class, receives equally summary treatment. Only the directly revolutionary organizations receive even moderately adequate coverage. As a result, 1911 becomes all but unintelligible.

The fourth component leading to the 1911 revolution was more diffuse, though nonetheless important. Nineteen-eleven was the first essentially *urban* political movement in Chinese history, based on an urban public opinion created by newspapers, telegraphic communication, and a partially modern urban culture. Again, the importance of this is hardly brought out at all, though a fair number of the bits of the puzzle are scattered through the text.

IN GENERAL, the problem of what may be called "roots" is not dealt with satisfactorily. Thus the recent surge of democracy in Taiwan seems in Spence's account to have come from nothing more than a decision of the late President Chiang Ching-kuo. Though it is quite fair to say that Taiwanese democracy owes a handsome debt to the late president, it had a long pre-history in genuinely contested local elections for a wide range of posts, and the toleration (by and large) of a so-called "nonparty" opposition. This last has been a reservoir of experience of immense value for what is still a venture fraught with peril.

The last major criticism that I would make is that in some sense the book is lacking in imaginative range. This appears in various ways. For example, China's greatest twentieth-century philosopher, Zhang Dongsun, does not rate a mention. Perhaps understandably, this well-informed but sharply critical socialist—this translator of Plato and developer of Kantian epistemology who insisted on the primacy of culturally determined categories in determining concepts and values—was unwelcome both to the communists and the nationalists, though for different reasons. He was also in some ways ahead of his time. Nonetheless, to leave him out skews the reader's vision of what China, at her most formidable, was capable of. It is broadly fair to say that the writers whom Spence picks as important belong to a long-established left-wing canonical tradition. While some of them are both good and important (like Lu Xun), the impression that the reader gets of what was actually being read by most Chinese is unrepresentative. There are so-called "social novels" from the 1920s by now-forgotten authors that are much richer, subtler, and often funnier than, say, the canonized *Midnight* by "Mao Dun," who later became minister of culture. An example is *The Human Tide* by "Wangzhu-sheng."

But the greatest challenge to the historian's imagination is to find some way of encompassing the phenomenon of Chinese communism to find a coherent vision that pulls the welter of details into some sort of understandable pattern. Such a vision has to find a place for the interplay of social conditions with the internal emotional life of party members, and of both with a new political technology, partly imported and partly created. It has to render intelligible both an outpouring of idealism, energy, and self-sacrifice on the one hand and the coldest cynicism and mass sacrifice of the minds and bodies of fellow-citizens on the other. In my view, which is not particularly original, only the conceptualization of Chinese communism as a religion—a "secular" religion if you like—can begin to do justice to these requirements; but I would welcome some other way of

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looking at the phenomenon, provided it worked.

Although I am not really persuaded by Emmanuel Todd's analysis of the differential acceptance of communism as being primarily based on its role as a substitute for certain particular types of family structure that have crumbled in the modern world, it is an example of the kind of approach that might provide the foundations for an alternative answer. But Spence does not even try. There is nothing much on the tortured inner life of the cadre that John Wilson Lewis made familiar to us long ago. There is no account of the centrality of the dossier system in the lives of individuals. The People's Liberation Army seems to be described without mention of the three-man group control system analyzed by Alexander George and others. The labor camps are not described, though there is a photograph of a scene of one. The subordination of the individual to his or her work unit is clearly done, though, as are other aspects of the control system.

The problem is balance in the absence of a controlling vision. Take Spence on the psychological roots of the response of the young to Mao's call for a Cultural Revolution as an example of the subtlety of the problem:

> This outpouring of violence. . . suggest[s] the real depths of frustration that now lay at the heart of Chinese society. The youth needed little urging from Mao to rise up against their parents, teachers, party cadres, and the elderly, and to perform countless acts of calculated sadism. For years the young had been called on to lead lives of revolutionary sacrifice, sexual restraint, and absolute obedience to the state, all under conditions of perpetual supervision. . . . They eagerly seized on the order to throw off all restraint. . . .

From what I know by reading and talking to some former participants and reading the books they have written, this wholly underestimates the real idealism of the young. Whatever they may have ended by doing, the young began by *believing* in the revolution. Their frustration was not just at being restrained, though that was real enough, but above all at being fed a constant flow of inspiring examples of revolutionary action and being themselves constrained into a passive state in which they could not emulate these exemplars in which they believed. The plainest statement of this emotional double-bind is Hua Linshan's *Les années rouges*. But the point is this: because Spence does not have an overall vision of Chinese communism, he turns the Red Guard movement into nothing but juvenile gangsterism seeking relief from social and psychological repression. There was this element, but also much more—as the religious analogy would have tended to make him aware.

Let me conclude on a quite different note. This book notwithstanding, I still think Jonathan Spence is an historian with major gifts, and I believe that he could have written an incomparably better book if the ruinous pressure for publication had eased and he had taken the time to think through the subtleties and difficulties of the many aspects of his immense subject.

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Latin America's Reformation

Henry Higuera

DURING THE LAST twenty-five years or so, the spread of evangelical Protestantism in Latin America has become a major phenomenon. Significant percentages of people in several Latin American countries are now Protestant, and most of these are evangelicals or Pentecostals. This development may, in the long run, help bring about profound and pervasive changes in Latin American nations—perhaps toward American and Western European patterns. Indeed, perhaps in the long run it will even prove the crucial turn toward such an end.

It is still much too early to tell. Even now, however, Protestant denominations have become important in the politics of several countries, and their political proclivities, current and future, deserve heightened attention.

Meanwhile, the Catholic church is undergoing major changes. While it is deeply woven into the social, economic, and political fabric of Latin America, these connections are beginning to break down, and the process is accelerating. Partly in response to this is a great ferment of reform within the church. The radical school of thought known as "liberation theology" is itself an attempt to reestablish these connections (along different lines, of course). Yet neither liberation theology nor Catholic reform in general has been able to reverse the trends. And so conservative Protestantism seems destined to grow further, in numbers and influence, at the expense of the Catholic church, both exploiting and intensifying the latter's gradual social disestablishment.

These conclusions are supported by two admirable (though very different) books, each of which complements the other in important ways. David Martin's *Tongues of Fire* takes a longer view, is more scholarly, and builds its case more methodically. David Stoll's *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?* is almost journalistic by comparison, and for the most part is decidedly short-term in its focus.* The possibilities dealt with in Martin's book will take at least a generation to mature, if they ever come to pass. Stoll, on the other hand, shows that Protestants already figure into various political equations and that they will continue to do so.

Despite its title, Stoll's book is only secondarily about the long-term question of whether Latin America is "turning Protestant." Rather, it inspects current Protestant political roles and asks just what the politics of Latin American Protestants are and to

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*David Martin, *Tongues of Fire—The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 352 pp., $29.95; David Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 424 pp., $24.95.

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what extent they have been influenced by U.S. institutions, including the government. This brings us to an unfortunate aspect of Stoll's book: it is extremely partisan. This is how Stoll describes one of the two main motivations for his book:

> For evangelicals, I wish to dramatize the danger of allowing their missions to be harnessed to U.S. militarism by the religious right. . . . I want to emphasize the clear and present danger that [evangelical Protestantism] is being manipulated by the U.S. Government.

Throughout the book, he assumes that U.S. policy in Central America amounts to "covert and immoral 'dirty wars' " and that the real villain in the region is Reaganite militarism. Readers who do not unquestioningly share these views will find the frequent sermonizing extremely annoying.

This polemicism is doubly unfortunate since Stoll actually concludes that Protestant expansion as a whole, including the conservative evangelical wing of it, cannot be explained as a CIA plot. Rather, as he shows, the effects of U.S. manipulations of American missionaries have been small-scale and transient. The author's jeremiads often obscure this basic point.

Worse, and consistent with the fashionable liberalism of his politics, Stoll has little openness to religious experience. Although he tries to correct for that attitude, it occasionally unduly narrows his causal analyses. Furthermore, he is extremely unsympathetic toward conservative American evangelicals. Thus, whole sections devoted to American Protestant movements have picturesque details in them but shed next to no light on whether and why Protestantism is transforming Latin America. There is not much point in repeating, as Stoll does, the seemingly bizarre pronouncements of some American evangelicals. Moreover, the repetition obscures the author's own point that Latin American Protestantism is becoming independent of foreign missionary activity altogether.

Stoll's chapters on this theme are interesting and illuminating. He focuses on the uneasy relation between Latin American Protestants and U.S. missionary organizations and makes a good case (sermonizing aside) that neither the growth up to now nor the potential for future growth can be explained primarily in terms of direct action by foreign missionaries. At the same time, as he notes, the U.S. offers necessary financial resources and has a powerful cultural influence. Thus Latin American evangelicals are trying to work out a balance between independence and dependence on two levels.

STOLL, OF COURSE, wants a maximum of independence on both, especially much more social work and political activism. American evangelical missionary organizations are generally cold toward such activities; for many reasons, most Latin American Protestant churches profess to be apolitical and do not encourage political participation by their members. Stoll argues, however, that Latin American Protestant churches will be "forced to deal with" economic and social conditions by the increasing impoverishment of their congregations. This claim seems based on the assumption that spiritual comforts are ultimately "escapes" from one's real (i.e., economic and political) discomforts. Whatever the supposed etiology, however, Stoll gathers evidence that some Protestant organizations are becoming more active and are developing theological justifications for their deeds. Although the evidence does not yet establish that a trend toward Protestant politicization has emerged, that possibility cannot be ruled out for the future.

The most valuable part of the book is a set of three case studies of Latin American Protestant involvements in politics: the born-again presidency of José Effraín Ríos Montt in Guatemala, the Protestants under the Sandinistas, and an American-based but increasingly nativized mission in Ecuador. These accounts contain a wealth of detail and much to ponder. They are a useful supplement to Martin's shorter and more distant accounts of

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Estimate of Evangelical Growth in Selected Latin American Countries from 1960 to 1985

	Evangelical Percentage of Total Population		*Growth Factor from 1960 to 1985*
Country	*1960*	*1980*	*(in number of times)*
Argentina	1.63	4.69	2.9
Bolivia	1.27	6.51	5.1
Brazil	4.40	15.95	3.6
Columbia	0.39	2.43	6.2
Costa Rica	1.30	6.46	5.0
El Salvador	2.45	12.78	5.2
Guatemala	2.81	18.92	6.7
Honduras	1.51	8.75	5.8
Mexico	2.21	3.06	1.4
Nicaragua	2.26	6.32	2.8
Panama	4.40	9.72	2.2
Peru	0.63	2.98	4.7
Puerto Rico	5.87	20.85	3.6
Venezuela	0.82	1.95	2.4

Note: "Evangelical" refers to theologically conservative Protestants, not all Protestants. Adapted from David Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?*, p.337.

the same episodes. Again, polemics aside, Stoll's conclusions seem sensible and in line with Martin's.

Perhaps the most important point that emerges is that given the right circumstances it seems quite possible, indeed surprisingly easy, to draw Protestant churches into the politics of their countries. Stoll convincingly describes how very difficult it is for an institution to be truly apolitical given the demands for loyalty that political institutions impose. In tense situations Protestants have sometimes acquired surprising new flexibilities in their attitudes toward involvement in politics. It seems possible from Stoll's accounts that Protestants may gradually adopt a familiar-looking attitude toward public reform—making sporadic demands, on narrow rather than systemic issues, aimed not at changing the spirit of the government but pressuring it from the outside.

IN MARKED contrast to the "yesterday's headlines" atmosphere of Stoll's book, Martin's work revolves around a grand historical theme, "the four hundred year clash between the Hispanic imperium and the Anglo-Saxon imperium." Of all the differences between these two worlds, Martin focuses on a scholarly, sociological one: what he calls "differentiation" v. "integration," or "free space" v. the lack thereof. By an "integrated" society he means one in which all the authoritative social ties are permanently set for the individual at birth and in addition are recognized and legitimized at every step by one overarching institution. "Free space," by contrast, is the freedom and legitimacy for voluntary organizations to perform all sorts of functions and even to wield various kinds of authority.

The notion that real power could be wielded by voluntary formations, Martin claims, is very foreign to Latin cultures. In Latin countries the general pattern is that structures compete for exclusive control of the process of integration. The Catholic church is only one of these, for "the monopolistic nature of Catholicism has. . . tended to give rise to rival secular monopolies under the aegis of the state, some of these promoted by radical liberals, some by communists. . . . "

It may turn out, of course, that in the

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competition between would-be monopolies none of them manages to integrate the society. This, however, need not lead to "free space." Violent oscillations could take place without the emergence of any nonhegemonistic cluster of groups which could be perceived as a viable and legitimate alternative. This kind of oscillation is, roughly, Martin's capsule characterization of much of the political violence in Latin America's history. Furthermore, as these oscillations drag on we see increasing economic and political woes and a deepening general crisis of legitimacy.

In principle, this type of trouble might go on forever. (Re-integrations are logically possible too, although they seem increasingly unlikely today.) Here, however, is where the clash of imperial cultures becomes relevant. The United States (predominantly) already possesses vast stretches of "free space" and in addition is energetically involved in Protestant missionary activity in Latin America. Martin's thesis is that Protestant sects, coming in the first instance from the U.S., may serve as "carriers" of American-style "free space" and may in the long term help bring about the differentiation of Latin American societies.

Martin argues that Protestant churches may have the independent power to cause change in an integrated society. Here he invokes several long-term historical parallels. The most interesting and important hinges on this: the recent spread of Protestantism in Latin America is primarily *Pentecostal.* Everywhere that Protestantism is growing, Pentecostals are growing much more rapidly than the older denominations. What we are seeing today is a massive *revivalist* movement in Latin America. Martin starts from this fact and argues, first, that "the early stages of Methodism in. . . America clearly resemble the present condition of Pentecostalism" in Latin America and, second, that "the sector of voluntary religiosity" was decisively strengthened by Methodism or "the Evangelical Revival in general" and in turn "provided the social and religious matrices out of which the United States emerged."

This is not the place to pass judgment on the historical question of how much credit to give revivalism for the emergence of American democracy. It is also difficult to weigh just how strong the parallels are. However, Martin has an additional layer of argument in which the "apolitical" character of Pentecostalist Protestantism plays an important role. The Pentecostalist churches, argues Martin, provide "shells" or "cocoons" for their members. In order to disentangle those members from the web of preexisting obligations and rights, the churches must not only provide substitutes (obviously) but also isolate them somewhat from their societies. The denominations become worlds unto themselves, with their own networks of support and loyalty. This means that the pastor plays a central role in mediating between his church and the larger society, with both its claims and its services. The "apolitical" character of the flock is correlative with the "authoritarian" position of the pastor.

This combination, argues Martin, is characteristic of the way in which Protestants have historically created "free space" in the past. The congregations are so passive politically that nobody perceives them as a threat; the pastors become tied into the prevailing system as brokers; and in the meantime the people are receiving an education in sobriety, initiative, problem-solving, mutual trust and support, communication, and leadership, all based on voluntarism, or free choice. Furthermore, Protestantism generally encourages a "peaceable psyche," as against both traditional *machismo* and revolutionary ideologies. The end result is a group of people gradually becoming ready to step into the political arena in a new way. Martin calls this "political latency."

One strength of Martin's book is that he is very aware of how tentative the connection is between "free space" and all the other things that would have to happen before Latin American societies could resemble the United States. He refuses to make forced connections between free space and capitalist development, counteracting political corrup-

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tion, or any other such thing. Martin does discuss all these matters, indeed in quite lengthy chapters; and the wealth of information and bibliographic references does suggest that these various connections do obtain, though more in some countries than in others.

MARTIN'S CAUTION—and, for that matter, the extreme complexity and obscurity of the situation—is frustrating if one cares only about Protestantism's effect on the political and economic situation in Latin America. Martin, however, believes that this movement will much improve the lives of many Latin Americans quite apart from its effects on their overall political and economic fortunes.

In fact, some of the most intriguing and boldest portions of *Tongues of Fire* come when the author describes spiritual effects of Protestantism. He includes long quotes from first-person conversion accounts and gives some sympathetic descriptions of the atmosphere, even the music of typical, all-night Pentecostal meetings in Latin America. It is certainly strange to think of Latin America as a home for all-night revivalist meetings, possessions by the Spirit, speaking in tongues, healings and prophesying, but Martin's descriptions drive home the fact that this is indeed what is happening. He also has considerable respect for these phenomena: "By exactly what linkages of mind and body we do not know, but there is sufficient evidence from the New Testament to the present time of a double release or discharge acting simultaneously on spirit and physical substance to restore harmonies long distorted and disturbed. . . . "

In short, Martin argues that Protestantism has both transformative and staying power partly because it is in touch with something true about the human spirit. His book may leave some wishing for attempts *à la* Max Weber to establish connections between the fundamental experiences of this religion and wider cultural tendencies. That Martin provides so little of this is partly a sign that he wants the inner experience of Pentecostalism to be valued in itself.

Significantly, both authors consider that liberation theology is losing out to evangelical Pentecostal movements. In Brazil the liberationist "base communities" are still a major rival to Pentecostalism; in Nicaragua a quasi-established liberation theology seemed for a time to draw enthusiastic mass support. Elsewhere, however, it has not shown the same staying power. Many observers have always thought that liberationism is so much the product of intellectuals that its popular appeal is limited: and now both Martin and Stoll agree. Stoll's pessimistic assessment of liberation theology is especially telling, since he is very sympathetic to its ends.

Furthermore, he has the following additional complaint about liberation theology: in Nicaragua, radical Christians revealed themselves as not sincerely interested in freedom of belief or conscience. Now anyone could have predicted this who had actually read works of liberation theologians. Martin, in fact, has an immediate explanation for how unliberal liberation theology is: it is, ultimately, just one more hegemonistic Latin structure. This is probably partly right, and rather satisfying too.

It is not the whole story, however, for it fails to address just how radical liberation theology really is. Ultimately neither Stoll nor Martin sufficiently appreciate the importance of doctrine to Catholics. Even if a formal split is averted between liberationists and the Vatican, the demoralizing doctrinal disarray within Latin American Catholicism is certainly one last factor that has to be included in the accounts of why Protestantism is doing so well.

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

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

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President Arafat?

Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle

BOXED IN BY the *intifada* and the immobility of the peace process, increasing numbers of Israelis (and some Americans, too) are proposing a radically new approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most Likud party leaders want "Jordan is Palestine" to become the official premise of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. As Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's spokesman put it: "If the Palestinians speak of a Palestinian State, it should be established east of the river, where they already constitute a majority." A Palestinian state is fine, in other words, as long as it is in what they insist is the "other part" of Palestine, nowadays called Jordan.

Two developments in recent months have made this viewpoint newly important. First, an unprecedentedly right-wing government was formed in Israel on June 12, 1990. Freed from its six-year union with the Labor party, Likud can now pursue Jordan-is-Palestine with fresh energy. Most of Likud's partners in the ruling coalition are even more hardline. While Likud disavows any intent to expel large numbers of Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza, three of its allies (Tehiya, Tsomet, Moledet) to one degree or another explicitly favor mass expulsions (a process they euphemistically call "transfer"). Further, survey polls show this option to be increasingly popular.

Second, the arrival in Israel of tens of thousands of Soviet Jews, and the prospect of many more to come over the next few years, has created new possibilities for an overwhelmingly Jewish "Western Palestine," along with new pressures on the Arabs to leave. Shamir focused worldwide attention on this possibility when he asserted in January that the arrival of Soviet Jewry required a "big Israel." And Ariel Sharon, the most prominent advocate of Jordan-is-Palestine, has become housing minister in the new government, which means that he gets to formulate policy on where newly-arrived Israelis live.

Jordan-is-Palestine holds obvious attractions for Israelis. Redefining the Arab-Israeli conflict so that it is no longer about two peoples fighting for one land ends the seeming intractability of the problem. Instead, Jews and Palestinian Arabs each get part of a whole—Jews get "Western Palestine," now called Israel; Palestinian Arabs get "Eastern Palestine," now called Jordan. The arrangement is fair and, according to Likud ideologues, requires both sides to make concessions. Palestinian Arabs give up their long-standing claims to the West Bank, and Zionists (of the Likud variety) give up their long-standing claims to parts of the East Bank.

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Jordan-is-Palestine proponents believe that replacing Hussein and the Hashemite monarchy with Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization would satisfy most Palestinians and relieve international pressure on Israel. And to the extent it does not, it would at least conventionalize the conflict militarily to Israel's advantage. Most importantly, it resolves the issue of the formerly Jordanian territories occupied in 1967. For many Israelis, such benefits justify sacrificing the Hashemite monarchy.

How convenient if all of this were true. But it isn't. Jordan-is-Palestine is based on a six-part argument that Jordan is part of Palestine, each element of which is faulty.

1. *Geographically*, Palestine and Jordan are indistinguishable.

Not so; in reality, the two sides are quite distinct. Until the mid-twentieth century, the Jordan River was a daunting obstacle to communication and commerce between the two banks and had none of the integrative functions usual to a river. It was not navigable, its banks were too erosive for bridges or buildings, its valley was malarial and plagued by bandits. In modern times, the Zionist undertaking caused the West Bank to develop its economy and culture in wholly new ways, leading to further differences between the two sides.

2. *Ethnically*, their respective Arab populations are identical.

Again an error: The East Bank developed its own identity over the centuries when it was isolated from the more cosmopolitan West Bank. The fact that Palestinians see themselves, and are seen by East Bankers, as a people apart confirms these differences.

3. *Demographically*, Jordan is already predominantly Palestinian.

This is a most ironic claim for Israelis to make—in part because it contradicts the second point, in part because it was the Arab-Israeli wars which made Palestinians so much of today's Jordan. More important though, to argue that just because Palestinians predominate demographically in Jordan means the country is already Palestinian in character ignores the many long-lasting and powerful minoritarian regimes in the Middle East. It also underestimates the vitality of the Jordanian military and the East Bank tribes; the Hashemite Kingdom is not so weak as all that, nor does its East Bank character depend entirely on the king.

4. *Historically*, Palestine included today's Jordan.

But the historical record is ambiguous on this point. A succession of imperial powers sometimes administered the West and East Banks together, sometimes not. Jewish history is also ambiguous on this matter. While Jews in ancient times lived east of the river Jordan, the biblical land of the covenant (defined in Numbers 34) clearly excluded it. Had it not, Moses' death on Mount Nevo, east of Jordan, would not have been a punishment.

5. *Legally*, the British Mandate for Palestine included all of what is today Israel and Jordan.

True enough—but for a mere eight months—July 1920 to March 1921. Further, British rule during that time was nominal; London made no effort to control the East Bank. And even if one credits the stodgy reasoning that Transjordan was technically part of the Palestine Mandate until 1948, it does not follow that decisions taken by British imperial masters over seventy years ago should bind Israelis and Arabs today. For seven decades, the East and West Banks have been separate polities; no amount of legal pedantry can change this reality.

6. *Rhetorically*, Palestinian and Jordanian Arabs alike have often proclaimed their indivisibility.

True, but when Jordanians or Palestinians proclaim "Jordan is Palestine," they mean something entirely different from what Likud politicians mean. In effect, they are saying to each other: "You belong under my rule." And this oratory has diminished; King Hussein has now explicitly proclaimed that "Jordan is not Palestine" and so the Palestinians often make similar statements.

Jordan-is-Palestine has two major political implications, both of which are detrimen-

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tal to Israeli and American (as well as Palestinian) interests.

First, it justifies the notion of "transfer," and anything that fosters large-scale expulsions (as opposed to voluntary movements of population) is disastrous. "Transfer" would disrupt normal life for as many as a million Arabs; entail unspeakable moral costs; destroy the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the bedrock of both Israeli and U.S. security policy in the area; and it would profoundly alienate diaspora Jewry and the U.S. government. Further, it would simultaneously accelerate Jewish emigration from Israel while probably ending the Soviet-Israeli rapprochement permitting large-scale immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.

Second, Jordan-is-Palestine is designed to destroy the Jordanian monarchy and replace it with the PLO. Here too the implications are ominous for both Israel and the United States. Israel's most devoted enemy would replace the government that for over three generations has most accommodated its security concerns. Then, and perhaps only then, would Israeli nightmares of a new, aggressive Arab eastern front come true. Even today, the fear of Jordan-is-Palestine (called with trepidation the "Jordanian Solution" in Amman) fuels King Hussein's new rhetorical excess and his ever-closer bonds with Saddam Hussein of Iraq, presently the most vociferous anti-Israel and anti-American demagogue in the Middle East.

Further, the assumption that an East Bank state will satisfy Palestinian national aspirations could not be more dangerously mistaken. It is obtuse to think that Palestinians will accept Jordan as a substitute for the real Palestine. In poetry and verse, Palestinians have built up an intense romantic attachment to the land west of the Jordan, rivaling the much older Jewish longing for *Eretz Yisrael*. Were the PLO to take over the East Bank, it would sooner or later use it as a base to launch war on the Jewish state, possibly in alliance with other Arab states.

And the PLO would have new assets in doing so. The normal life of more than one and a half million Palestinians in Jordan today would be destroyed as the country became mobilized for military action. A euphoric PLO, ruling from Amman, its recruits massively armed and flush with international support, would probably be unable to resist war even if it wanted to. Palestinian artillery barrages, ballistic missiles, and chemical warheads would make Israelis long for the days of PLO pin-prick terrorism. Israel would probably win this war, but the cost would be terrible.

The United States would also lose were the PLO to take power in Amman. An anti-American state would replace a pro-American one, with a variety of unpleasant consequences in addition to conflict with Israel: an increase in terrorism, new threats to such pro-American states as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and new turmoil in inter-Arab politics. These circumstances would probably imply a decline in U.S. support for Israel, as Washington would react with understandable umbrage to Israel's destruction of one of its Arab allies and the undermining of its regional interests.

H.L. Mencken famously remarked that "there is always an easy solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong." Jordan-is-Palestine fits this bill. Indeed, the only thing worse for Israeli and U.S. security interests than a fully independent Palestinian state on the West Bank is one on the East Bank.

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The President's Men at the NSC

Part II. The Struggle Under Carter

Michael Charlton

THIS IS THE second excerpt from a series of programs, prepared for the BBC by Michael Charlton, tracing the evolution of the National Security Council. The first excerpt, dealing with the Nixon-Kissinger period, appeared in our Summer 1990 issue. For reasons of length and relevance to American audiences, the script has been edited.

Michael Charlton: After Henry Kissinger, interest in a crucial Washington question—"Who's in charge?"—became more acute. In support of Tocqueville's well-known proposition that in the area of foreign policy democracy is "unable to persevere in a mature design," the ballast duly shifted away from Kissinger's vision of *realpolitik* towards a populist foreign policy with the advent of President Carter. Jimmy Carter brought with him to Washington a high moral tone, pledged "open government," and said Kissinger's pursuit of a traditional balance of power should give way to the search for a "just" world order.

The instrument of presidential will hammered out by Kissinger, formerly the post of the president's "special assistant" for national security affairs, had emerged from the Nixon presidency as the president's "adviser" for national security affairs. The designation was without precedent. Henceforth the national security adviser to the president was at least co-equal as a policy-maker with the leading member of the president's cabinet, the secretary of state. But, unlike the secretary, as a personal adviser he was not accountable to the Congress and its jealous oversights. The secretary of state was seen to be the victim of this sudden expansion of the adviser's role.

In the Carter presidency, the continuing need for the two to coexist modified their actions, but sharpened their differences. In Jimmy Carter's White House, harmony was shown to be of heaven—and beyond this relatively inexperienced president's capacity to contrive or command.

Carter had chosen Cyrus Vance, an experienced member of the Eastern establishment, as his secretary of state, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Polish-born American and prominent Soviet expert at Columbia University, as his national security adviser. Before his appointment, in an article called "America in a Hostile World," Zbigniew Brzezinski had been sharply critical of the Nixon/Kissinger White House as "covert, manipulative and deceptive in style" and had deplored Kissinger's "high-wire acrobatics."

Zbigniew Brzezinski: This goes back to the mid–1970s and the discussion about the nature of presidential leadership, the concern about the so-called "imperial presidency," and also the feeling that was quite widespread in the United States at the time, that secret diplomacy was really not in keeping with American tradition. I'm afraid that the legacy

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was the War Powers Act which, in my judgment, in fact, involves an excessive assertion of congressional authority over the presidency, and in my modest nonjuridical opinion it is probably unconstitutional. But Congress has never had the guts to test it. It resulted in the general accretion of authority to Congress at the cost of the presidency. I don't believe that these were beneficial accomplishments. I don't think they strengthened America's capacity to conduct foreign policy. There were things which were done by President Nixon and by Mr. Kissinger which I greatly admired and supported. I think the opening to China stands out. I think the initial negotiations with Egypt, "Sinai Two," were very important accomplishments. But they have to be balanced by a judicious analysis of some of the costs. And, I think, the covertness, the manipulativeness, produced a reaction which, in the long run, has proven very costly to effective management of foreign policy by the president.

Charlton: In your memoirs you said, "I was always conscious of the degree to which coordination of policy meant shaping policy," coordination of policy being the allotted task of the national security adviser; and "I was intent," you tell us, "from the start, on influencing our priorities and our policies." It sounds very much like Kissinger.

Brzezinski: Oh yes. Well, you know, I'm not drawing some sort of black and white dichotomy between him and me.

Charlton: Despite your attack on secrecy and the emphasis on an open policy which you articulated in that article, "America in a Hostile World," we've been told that, soon after the election, both President Carter and you were intrigued to learn in your briefing sessions with the Ford staff that you would be able to send messages to foreign leaders without the State Department finding out; the so-called "back-channel system" was dutifully explained to you. And therefore, so much for open diplomacy?

Brzezinski: No, that is actually factually wrong. I don't really know what you're talking about. The "back-channel" was not used by the president, or by me, to the disadvantage of the secretary of state. As far as I can recall, there was not a single back-channel message from the president to any head of a foreign state or government that the secretary of state was not aware of. The president *did* initiate, with my assistance, personal correspondence with a number of key heads of states or governments, in order to foster a personal relationship or dialogue with them, but always with the knowledge of the secretary of state.

Charlton: Zbigniew Brzezinski's recollections, not surprisingly, are not quite those of the secretary of state, Cyrus Vance. Brzezinski, like Kissinger, showed himself to be a power politician. But, Kissinger moved with such commanding assurance because he had the unequivocal support of the president. Unlike Nixon, Carter did not give such full or continuous backing either to the adviser or the secretary. In consequence Brzezinski and Vance embarked on something of a Hobbesian struggle for the soul of President Carter. Despite the attacks Brzezinski had made on Kissinger, the similarities between the two outweighed their differences—to the distress of Cyrus Vance.

Cyrus Vance: On one or two occasions during the Iran crisis, I found that he was going outside the channels to communicate with the ambassador of Iran. And when I found out about it I went to the president, after talking to Brzezinski about it, and that was stopped. It also took place on another occasion when I was in the Middle East. On the question relating to when we should announce the fact that we had reached agreement with the Chinese in respect to normalization, they bypassed the State Department—the National Security Council did, or the national security *adviser*, excuse me—and therefore my deputy, and my assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, did not know

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about it until after actions had already been determined in the White House. And I did not hear about it until after the plans were all set. I was many thousands of miles away, and I had to change my plans and come back immediately to be in Washington at the time. That was an occasion where they bypassed it, and I think it was deeply regrettable.

Charlton: I wonder if there may not be another reason lying at the heart of all this: that there was, from the period of Henry Kissinger and Nixon's detente onwards, a policy split in the foreign-policy establishment, one which became institutionalized in the roles of yourself as secretary of state and Brzezinski as national security adviser. Is that how we should understand, for example, the differences between the two of you when Brzezinski thought that extending the opening to China should take priority over completing the SALT Treaty with the Soviet Union, while you believed the opposite? Was there a fundamental split in the foreign-policy establishment about how to deal with the rival superpower?

Vance: I think that's a correct statement. I think that the basic fundamental split between Brzezinski and myself was on how to handle Soviet policy, and that cut across other policies from time to time, such as how to deal with China, and sometimes even such things as how to deal with some of the problems in Africa, and particularly in South Africa. So the root of the differences was this split between Brzezinski and myself on U.S.-Soviet relations. There were one or two things, as we went along with negotiations with the Soviets, where I did feel I was undercut.

Charlton: And that was another part of the institutionalized disagreement—disagreement over the question of linkage.

Vance: We were deeply split on the question of linkage, yes.

Charlton: And so I return to the point that these disagreements, were there only *one* policy-making body in foreign policy, would be resolved presumably within that body. Because there are two, it cannot be resolved?

Vance: Your point is well taken.

Charlton: Unless the president resolves it?

Vance: Correct.

Charlton: Why didn't the president resolve it?

Vance: (Sigh) I don't know, I can't answer that question. I thought it was resolved.

Charlton: Mr. Vance's thoughtful, and no doubt loyal, pause leaves a gap for which there are several explanations.

In reacting to the widely held perceptions that Kissinger's star had risen too high, President Carter, having no experience in foreign affairs, had campaigned as an outsider against the Washington "establishment" and was determined that neither Vance nor Brzezinski would be seen as the architect of foreign policy. With the president, at times, like the beast in the fable, unable to choose between two equally tempting bales of straw, American foreign policy became starved of strong direction from the top.

In addition to which Jimmy Carter attempted to master in person a degree of detail which proved overwhelming. It was the dilemma from which Kissinger had sought to rescue the presidential system by transforming the role of the national security adviser. And, he had given his own answer on the vital issue: How is the president best informed in order to perform his duties?

Henry Kissinger: It depends very much on the president. In my experience, for example, President Nixon was already very well informed. So with him it was better to talk either philosophically about the nature of the world, or very practically. With President

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Ford we had an arrangement where I met with him for at least forty-five minutes every day. And, we would take some area of the world and analyze what the problems were, without going into any decisions. Later President Carter bogged himself down in endless minutiae, and Reagan, in my view, wasn't really interested in foreign policy.

Charlton: Yes, we know Carter was overwhelmed. Why was Nixon not overwhelmed, given the fierce creative energy that you unleashed in the White House?

Kissinger: I once met with President Carter about the Middle East. And he knew the location of many, or most, of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank. It's a total waste of time. Nixon would never have been interested in that. Nixon had the ability to focus on those problems that only he could settle. He wouldn't deal with problems that other people could settle.

Charlton: Where Henry Kissinger, as national security adviser, had been in control of the vast surf of paper which breaks over the modern presidency, and narrowed the choices in the way he and Nixon wanted, President Carter was swamped by his own diligence. Dean Acheson once said that the president "is a head gardener in foreign policy, trying to shape forces he can't totally control." Acheson, a Capability Brown among American foreign secretaries, continued, "If the President tries to do it all himself, and be his own secretary of state, he will soon become exhausted, and too immersed in manure and weed-killer to direct anything properly." Jimmy Carter, it might be said, was a president who tried to do everything except cut the White House lawn.

Brzezinski: I think the president did become overloaded. I think initially I have to assume some responsibility, because not knowing that he would read everything, I tended to give him a lot—occasionally, in memos saying "Please read the first five pages and the concluding seven." And then the whole thing would come back to me with notes, by hand, on the intervening 178 pages, or something of that kind. But, once I stopped doing that, and reduced his load, I at least limited the amount of time he had to spend reading. I tried to confine it to no more than thirty to forty pages a day. Even then he would get quite absorbed in actual specific decisions, and would resent it if I were to report to him on some issues on which I had taken decisions on his behalf, in the confidence he would approve retroactively. He would sometimes object to that rather strongly. . . .

Charlton: Given the myriad responsibilities of world power, Brzezinski's problem with Carter was a real one. Jimmy Carter's tremendous application exhausted him and left insufficient time for the questions "only he could settle." Among them was this contest between the White House team directly serving the president and the secretary of state. When Carter took office, this is what Cyrus Vance understood the president wanted from these two institutions, the NSC and Department of State.

Vance: He looked to the State Department to develop and bring to him recommendations with respect to how the foreign policy of the United States should be conducted in a wide range of issues, from regional issues to functional issues, and to then discuss those with the president and with others who had a role to play, such as the secretary of defense, the national security adviser, the head of the CIA, and others, to bring about the best possible policies and initiatives.

Charlton: But was he constant about that?

Vance: No.

Charlton: He oscillated?

Vance: He oscillated, yes.

Charlton: So it was never really settled who had paramountcy?

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Vance: Oh yes, I think it was settled at the outset, but as time went on it varied.

Charlton: So paramountcy was conceded to you at the beginning, as secretary of state?

Vance: And I think it was all the way through. On the other hand, I think there is something to the fact that where you have a national security adviser who sits a few doors down the hall from the president, and is running in and out all day long, that there is a tendency, under those circumstances, for the national security adviser to assume a role that goes beyond his proper role.

Charlton: With no clear-cut decision from President Carter, the competition between Vance and Brzezinski became like the old game of "Grandmother's Footsteps." Every time there was a move, and the secretary of state turned around, Brzezinski would be virtuously standing still. Their relationship was complicated by Carter's insistence that Brzezinski should, in the manner of Kissinger, take a high profile, and be a spokesman for foreign policy.

Brzezinski: Because Kissinger was viewed as a successful usurper of the secretary of state's prerogatives, I was viewed from day one as a potential usurper—carefully monitored as to when I would commit that crime in the eyes of the local Washington media and Georgetown Society. It was not my idea actually; it was the president's. But when I did so, I was immediately attacked by the mass media as seeking to aggrandize myself at the secretary of state's expense. If you look at the president's memoirs, he says that quite explicitly. He was the one who decided that I should take the high profile because he felt that the secretary of state was not inclined to do so.

Charlton: Yes, in his memoirs *Keeping Faith*, one's not quite sure how disappointed Carter was. He mentions that Cyrus Vance, the secretary of state, "was not," as he put it, "particularly inclined to assume the task of educating the American public about the country's foreign policy on a sustained basis."

Brzezinski: Mmmm, exactly, exactly.

Charlton: But this was never clarified between you, or at least between Carter and Vance, it seems, because Vance says further: "I supported the collegial approach." It was, according to Vance, appropriate for the national security adviser to offer independent foreign policy advice to Carter, but "with one critical reservation." Only the president and his secretary of state were to have the responsibility for defining administration foreign policy and, "as time went on," says Vance, "there developed, increasingly, a serious breach of this understanding. Despite [Brzezinski's] stated acceptance of the principle," he "attempted increasingly to take over the role of foreign policy spokesman."

Brzezinski: Well, all I can say in response to that is to refer you to the citation which you have already partially read from the president himself. The president says that he was not satisfied with the way Vance performed that role and wanted me to perform it. And I think he says in his memoirs, in fact, that I was occasionally even reluctant, because I knew that I would then pay the political cost for it, because I would be attacked for allegedly usurping Vance's role. But the president explicitly says he had me play it, and since he wanted me to play it I played it. And if Vance had been better at it, and more active at it, there would have been no problem.

Charlton: Personalities alone might give rise to friction, but if the roles of the national security adviser and the secretary of state come to institutionalize a difference, conflict would seem guaranteed. This took on a major strategic dimension when Vance and Brzezinski could not agree over the issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union—Vance putting the SALT Treaty first, Brzezinski arguing for linking progress in this field to progress in others. Having watched the various incarna-

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tions of the NSC, Cyrus Vance had begun to form a very strong opinion.

Vance: Well, I believe that foreign policy should be institutionalized, in that it should be recognized that the most effective way of conducting and of developing foreign policy is to lodge the responsibility and authority in the State Department to be and its secretary to be, the principle adviser in the field of foreign affairs to the president of the United States. That provides, I think, the best kinds of advice that the president can get because one can draw on the institutional memory. And institutional memory is terribly important when dealing with diplomatic affairs and matters of state. And when one tries to short cut, and ignores that, the result is that very often mistakes are made that could have been avoided otherwise. . . . Managing the foreign affairs of a great republic is not a question of making a few decisions, or taking a few actions. It's a continuous process of creatively managing, sustaining, and building over time a broad range of relationships with other nations, and to manage such a relationship requires the president to serve as the chief executive of a large team of individuals. His job, in my judgment, is to lead its members, to inspire them, to be involved with them, and to give them all a clear sense of purpose and direction.

Charlton: But, there was no agreement on such fundamentals. Cyrus Vance says that "The NSC and its staff was not, and is not, intended to make policy or conduct operations." Brzezinski felt "the best place in the American government for serious strategic planning *was* the NSC staff."

Did that not mean, therefore, that the NSC, in his hands, was a shadow State Department inside the White House?

Brzezinski: No, because the State Department was not designed to make foreign policy; the State Department is designed to execute foreign policy.

Charlton: Did this also reflect a feeling on the Carter presidency's part, on your part particularly perhaps, that the State Department was incapable of the kind of innovation you believed was necessary in policy? Or, indeed, if it did undertake the task, it would be likely to produce a policy which was not the president's policy?

Brzezinski: That's a fair way of putting it.

Charlton: And how did you see this dilemma being resolved?

Brzezinski: By making policy in the White House.

Charlton: Your status having thus been elevated, how was your public role to differ from that of Kissinger, your predecessor?

Brzezinski: Well, only to the extent that the president and I and others placed more emphasis on openness, on human rights, on American commitment to principle, and not on operational terms. Operationally, I had no objections to Kissinger's role.

Charlton: Henry Kissinger's White House staff had been enlarged to shadow and supervise the key desks in the State Department and organized into seven specialized committees controlling policy, and they were all chaired by Kissinger himself.

Although President Carter gave Vance a strong foreign-policy mandate, Brzezinski chaired the key Coordinating Committee responsible for interagency operations. Kissinger's domain was thus split between them.

Vance: We divided it up among ourselves. Some were chaired by the secretary of state, really basically all of those dealing with foreign policy matters. Others were chaired, or one other, was chaired by the secretary of defense. That dealt primarily with defense matters. On crisis management, Harold Brown and I agreed that we had no problem with that being lodged in the national secur-

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ity adviser because he was near the situation room, and all of that kind of thing.

Charlton: But there is a very important change. For one thing, Kissinger had chaired all these committees himself. Now, the chairing of these committees had gone back to the heads of the various agencies?

Vance: That's correct, yes.

Charlton: The numbers of committees had also been reduced. There were two under President Carter, a Policy Committee, chaired by you, and a Special Coordinating Committee, which was chaired by Brzezinski. Wasn't this a battle lost, the creation of this committee and the selection of its members by the adviser? Didn't it cut across the one reservation you had from the outset, that the adviser should not be allowed to summarize the views of everybody and make a direct recommendation to the president?

Vance: Now, that's a different question. My own view has been, and remains, that in terms of decisions or conclusions reached—rather than decisions taken—at such committee meetings, that they should be shown to the heads of the other departments or agencies so that it was clear that what was being said to the president was an accurate representation of the conclusions reached and not simply the views of the national security adviser.

Charlton: Yes. In other words, the national security adviser should not have the power to sum up or interpret.

Vance: That's correct.

Charlton: But that's exactly what he did isn't it?

Vance: Yes, and I think it's wrong. And I have said to those who have followed me since I left that office that I would hope that they would make clear, in the arrangements of the processes that were set up, that they would not let themselves end up with a situation like that.

Charlton: The heavy tread of the national security adviser, in the game of "Grandmother's Footsteps" with the secretary of state, included an advance to cabinet rank during the Carter presidency. Yet, Brzezinski felt that cabinet meetings in Washington were exercises in futility. In which case we are free to wonder why was this move to cabinet rank made at all?

Brzezinski: It meant absolutely nothing of importance. I frankly did not attach any importance to it. It meant two things, quite literally: it meant that when there is a state dinner, or reception, one is a member of the cabinet lined up ahead of the other guests in the first dozen or so couples, that had the privilege of shaking the president's hand and the state visitor's hand somewhat earlier than the other visitors at the function. The second, somewhat more important benefit, was that in the course of the weekly, two-hour long cabinet sessions, I sat at the cabinet table rather than against the wall. And this permitted me to surreptitiously place on my knees the weekly magazines which would come out that Monday morning—and the meeting was on Mondays. So during this two-hour long otherwise utterly futile session, I could at least read those magazines.

Charlton: If it was meant to have no significance inside the White House, would you agree that was not how it was seen from the outside? It was seen again as a return to the Kissinger arrangement, and that you were highjacking the role of the secretary of state?

Brzezinski: Well, if it was so seen I certainly did not object to it. But I don't really think it was so perceived.

Charlton: There was also a specific innovation: you were to plan American policy goals some four years ahead—there was to be

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"long-term planning." How can the national security adviser, with his relatively small staff, do that when the real resources for that kind of activity presumably lie in the State Department?

Brzezinski: Well, you know that's an interesting perspective because you state it so affirmatively and not in a hypothetical fashion even. I'm not quite sure that strategic plans are better when they are the product of a huge machinery of multiple layers of bureaucracy, for consensus is the product of the lowest common denominator. Most strategic plans, if they have any strategic content to them, tend to be the products of a few people working closely together, looking at the broad picture and not becoming absorbed in minutiae. In fact, I think there is no better place in the U.S. government than the NSC staff for serious strategic planning. Not only for the reason that I have mentioned—which is that large bureaucracies do not produce strategies, they produce shopping lists—but beyond that, because every bureaucracy is the prisoner of its own institutional perspective, I'll be curious to know how you would envisage a national strategy in the security area being planned by the Department of State. It would be very interesting to see what he would have to say about the subject of defense, or weaponry, or intelligence. Similarly, I wouldn't want a national security strategy planned in the Department of Defense because I would be curious to see what it would have to say about diplomacy, or foreign aid, or negotiations, or arms control. The point I'm making is all bureaucracies are the prisoners of their institutional perspective, and if you want a comprehensive national security plan, *that* has to be done by some organ which reflects the national perspective, or at least the presidential perspective. And in the U.S. government the only place in which this can be done is in the White House. What is lacking in my view today is some actual organ for doing so. I did it with my staff; I wish I had had a larger body which I could have dedicated to that task.

Charlton: President Carter's national security adviser was, therefore, wholly disinclined to scrape a second fiddle to the secretary of state. At this level, American government is not a cabinet so much as a court. In the jostlings of the court, democracy is colored by the appetite for power. There were echoes in Vance's predicament of what was said of Austen Chamberlain, that "he always played the game and always lost it."

Vance: I really should have gone to the mat and said, "We've got to get it down in clear black and white, because I don't trust my colleague." I believed in collegiality, I believed it was possible to have a collegial staff serving the president, and therefore I didn't think it was necessary to dot every i and cross every t.

Charlton: But my submission to you is, that in that context, it was the national security adviser chairing this crucial coordinating committee, it was his recommendations that were going to the president, rather than the conflicting advice. In other words, he was making a compound of what he thought was the thrust of advice.

Vance: Well, as the scribe of the committee meetings, he did the same thing with respect to the policy committee meetings. His function was to be the secretary and actually reflect what took place in each of the committees which we've been talking about.

Charlton: Vance clearly believed that the national security adviser attempted increasingly to take over the role of foreign-policy spokesman.

Brzezinski: Well, all I can say about this is that no one else has complained, and he didn't complain at the time. Also, if he didn't see these memoranda, I don't see how he could claim they were not accurate. So there is a slight logical problem there. But if he had gone to the mat on the subject, he would have lost; and the reason he didn't go to the mat is

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that I suspect he knew he would have lost, because that is the way the president wanted it. The president wanted to have confidential memoranda addressed to him, so that he would be in a position then to make his own judgment. He did not want memoranda coming to him to be vetted through the system and to represent the entire—if you will—interagency consensus.

Charlton: But Vance's complaint was a much more direct one, as I understood it, that you thought. . .

Vance: In hindsight. . .

Charlton: . . . that what was being compounded was not what you recollected taking place.

Vance: Yes, that is correct, but this occurred as the months went by. That was certainly not the case at the outset, but as time went by we did have instances. It didn't happen all the time, but it did happen from time to time, and it should never happen.

Charlton: To what extent was this due to the president's fear of leaks in the bureaucratic process?

Vance: That was the stated reason of the president for the procedure. I went to the president at one point after this problem arose, and I said that I would like to see it changed, and he said, "We can't change it because I'm afraid of leaks. . . . "

Charlton: Here, then, has been another spur to the rise of the president's men. Leaks are part of the struggle for influence. They had become a widespread practice in the executive branch in order to discredit this or that course of action. In addition, they were all the time a constraint on frankness. The danger of leaks, real enough, was advanced as one more reason for not reaching more deeply into the institutional memory for the more broadly based analysis which Cyrus Vance believed should underpin strategic policy. Has the reality become, therefore, that a muscular intellect and resourceful adviser in the White House, like Brzezinski, was able to move with an independence which the senior cabinet officer, the secretary of state, cannot match?

Brzezinski: Well, I think that has to be put in a larger context. It's been my view throughout that everything quite depends on what role the president sees for himself in foreign policy and what role he actually plays. If the president wants to be in fact the maker of foreign policy, then the national security adviser—no matter how ambitious or un-ambitious he may be—is the residual bureaucratic beneficiary of the president's interest and becomes a principle player. If the president is *not* interested in foreign policy, then there is no way that a national security adviser—even very ambitious and assertive—can demonstrate any authority or dominance. On the contrary, power then, and initiative then, tends to gravitate towards the secretary of state. So under, let us say, Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Ford, and—to some extent—Reagan, who was very ambiguous, foreign policy was really made by the secretaries of state. Under Kennedy, Nixon, Carter, and, I suspect, Bush, foreign policy has tended to be made by the president.

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Herbert Stein on 'the Third Way'

SEYMOUR Martin Lipset's article, "The Death of the Third Way—Everywhere But Here, That Is" (*The National Interest*, Summer 1990), presents an informative survey of recent talk and action about economic policy around the world. But I believe that on the whole, the impression he leaves is incorrect.

Lipset's argument seems to be the following:

There have been, or have been believed to be, three ways of organizing an economy. The first is capitalism, the second is communism, and the third is something intermediate. The third way has no single name but is described by such terms as "socialist," "left-wing," "centralizing," and "redistributionist." At the same time as the second way, communism, is fading, the third way is also dead, or at least dying, in most countries of the world. The exception to this trend is in the American Democratic party, which is still trying to move the country more completely into the third way.

This argument is hard to grapple with, for three reasons. First, there is no clear definition of the three ways, especially of the first and third, and no specification of the dividing line between them, so that one cannot tell which countries or which programs are in the first way or in the third, or even in which direction they are moving.

Second, hardly any distinction is made between talk and policy or between policy and action. Usually, the talk is more clear-cut and ideological than the policy, and the policy more clear-cut than the action.

Third, the argument seems to assume that if the U.S. and the rest of the world are going in different directions, they are getting further apart rather than converging.

I suppose that the distinguishing feature of the three ways is the degree of government intervention in the economy, although Lipset occasionally refers to other ingredients, like attitudes towards defense and social permissiveness on moral matters (on which scores the USSR of Stalin would have rated rather high). But the government's intervention in the economy involves several different variables, and it is not possible to measure the degree of government intervention in any one of them, let alone create a composite index of "governmentness" in an economy.

One would want to consider at least the following variables:

- What productive facilities does the government own, how are they controlled, what incentives does the management have, are they competitive?
- What does the government regulate—what industries, what terms (prices, wages, safety conditions, environmental conditions, etc.), by rules or by discretionary authority?
- What proportion of the labor force does the government employ—by central government or by decentralized units, by what standards are they hired?
- What share of the national output does the government spend, for what—for transfer payments, for uniquely governmental services, for services also provided by the public sector?
- What share of the national income does the government collect in taxes, and of what kinds?
- What responsibility does the government assume for the stability of the economy in the aggregate, and by what instruments and

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strategies does it seek to discharge these responsibilities?

I have never seen an index of the degree of intervention of the government in the economy in any of these dimensions, for the U.S. or for any other country. I do not know how such an index would be constructed, because each of these variables consists of several ingredients, and if each ingredient were measured there would still be the problem of weighing the ingredients to obtain a total for the variable. And if we had an index for each variable, how would we combine them to create a composite index for the economy as a whole?

But suppose that we have surmounted this difficulty and created a measure of the degree of government intervention. On a scale from one to ten, where would the dividing line be between the first way and the third, between capitalism and socialism? I leave aside the question of the dividing line between the third way and the second, since the second, communism, is *hors de combat* by all accounts.

THE KEY QUESTION is what is capitalism. Lipset's main conclusion is that "In country after country during the last decade, socialist and other left-wing parties have taken the road back to capitalism." Interestingly, he says "to" not "toward."

Joseph Schumpeter, certainly a qualified student of the history of capitalism, dates the end of the period of "Intact Capitalism" as 1898. For people of my generation, 1929 looks like the last year of high capitalism. In either case, intact capitalism or high capitalism no longer exists anywhere. Moreover, I do not think that any of the left-wing parties that Lipset sees as having "taken the road back to capitalism" have taken the road back to 1898 or to 1929. In fact, none of the real-world, operational right-wing parties wants to take the road back to 1898 or 1929.

All modern advanced societies have and will almost certainly continue to have these features:

1. A commitment to economic stabilization, to be implemented by some combination of fiscal and monetary policies.
2. Tax systems that are in some degree progressive.
3. Substantial programs of transfer payments or government provision for old age, health care, unemployment, and poverty, so that the net of taxes and transfer payments is significantly redistributional.
4. Government expenditures that are not less than 25 or 30 percent of GNP.
5. Government ownership of roads, bridges, most schools, many hospitals, and some research laboratories.
6. Government regulation of some industries, like banking, and regulation of all industries from the standpoint of safety and the environment.

What to call a system like that is a matter of perspective. William Gladstone and Andrew Mellon would almost certainly have called it socialism. Most people living today would probably call it capitalism, or at least not socialism. But the fact is that what we call it doesn't matter.

In 1945, Schumpeter foresaw that continuation of existing trends would "transform, even without extensive nationalization of industries, regulated or fettered capitalism into a guided capitalism that might, with almost equal justice, be called socialism. Thus, prediction of whether or not the capitalist order will survive is, in part, a matter of terminology." And it is true today that whether capitalism has survived, or will survive, or has not survived and is being restored—are all matters of terminology.

Whatever you call the present state of affairs in modern, advanced economies—whether guided capitalism or socialism—it is surely part of the third way. And whereas Lipset proclaims the death of the third way, one could more justly say that only the third way survives. The first way ended with Hoover and the second way ended with Gorbachev.

The third way—which some call the mixed economy and which I have called the adaptive society—accommodates a wide range of actual and eligible policies. You can have a maximum marginal tax rate of 60

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percent or of 28 percent, government expenditures equal to 45 percent of GNP or 25 percent, capital gains taxation or not, national health service or health insurance for the aged, ownership of a national airline or not, national wage policy or not. These, and others like them, are important choices. But they do not, singly or even collectively, make the difference between capitalism and socialism, or between the first way and the third way. And wise decisions about these choices cannot be made by identifying any of them as pro-capitalism or pro-socialism.

Words that Jacob Viner wrote thirty years ago, when we were all still worried about The Road to Serfdom, are relevant today when we are thinking about The Road to Capitalism:

> Route 1, a great national highway which connects Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, begins at Fort Kent in Maine and ends in a sand dune at the southern tip of Florida. Except on the arbitrary assumption that travel on this road, in either direction, is totally without benefit of brakes, the terminal points of our metaphorical road are often assigned an extravagant degree of practical significance in discourse in this field. Until quite recent years, actual and vital discussion in the public forum has turned mainly on the comparative merits of resting places along our highway of points not greatly distant from each other, or perhaps more accurately, as between no movement at all and a limited amount of movement, sometimes in both directions simultaneously, from the existing resting place. ("The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire," the *Journal of Law and Economics*, October, 1960)

Certainly it is true, as Lipset shows, that in the past decade in much of the world, parties of the "Left" have come to sound much less socialist than they used to. "Market" has become an acceptable word. And it has been discovered, as should have been obvious earlier, that a government that controls taxes, subsidies, and regulations has no need to own enterprises in order to achieve its objectives, whatever they may be. In addition to the change of language there has been some change of actuality towards less government interference in some aspects of the relations with the economy. There has been some privatization, although it moves very slowly. Marginal tax rates have been reduced in many countries, but that is a difficult thing to interpret.

It is significant that when Lipset refers to the U.S. Revenue Act of 1986, which reduced marginal tax rates, he considers that a move towards a more progressive, and by his lights, more "liberal" tax system. The problem is that the reductions of tax rates that we have seen around the world were not intended to be reductions of revenue. The reductions of rates therefore were accompanied by changes in the definition of taxable income, in order to enlarge the tax base. Usually these tax revisions have been improvements, in my opinion, from the standpoint of the market, because they reduced discriminations among sources of income and forms of business organization, but their net effect is difficult to evaluate. I remember that before the Revenue Act of 1986 was passed there was a hot debate, supported by leading economists on each side, about whether it would increase or decrease capital investment. We still do not know the answer to that.

There has been a reduction in many kinds of government regulation, but the net of that is also hard to evaluate, when consideration is given to moves in the other direction with respect to the environment and, in some countries, foreign trade.

In those aspects of government involvement in the economy that we can most objectively measure, the involvement has increased a little since 1980. That is true of both government outlays as a percent of GNP and government receipts as a percent of GNP, as is shown in the table below.

Government Outlays as Percentage of GNP	*1970*	*1980*	*1988*
United States	31.6	33.7	36.3
OECD Europe	36.6	45.7	48.7
Japan	19.4	32.6	32.9
Government Receipts as Percentage of GNP			
United States	28.9	30.8	31.5
OECD Europe	36.6	41.9	44.2
Japan	20.6	27.6	34.3

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None of this is to deny that there has been a change of attitudes and to some extent of policy in the 1980s, in the direction of more freedom for private markets and less government involvement. But it does not qualify as a systemic change, from the third way to the first, or from socialism to capitalism. In Viner's metaphor, it has been a movement from Baltimore to Washington, which is not meaningfully described as a movement to or even towards Key West.

A main point of Lipset's argument is to belabor the American "Left" for its exceptionalism. Whereas the Left in the rest of the world has seen the light and moved towards support of free and private markets, he finds that the American Left persists in its statist, interventionist ways.

In his discussion of other countries, from Australia to Sweden, Lipset names many names, quotes many statements, refers to many programs. But there is almost none of this in the section of the United States. No spokesman for the American Left is named or quoted, except by the statement that "with the exception of Jimmy Carter during his first campaign, Democratic nominees from George McGovern in 1972 to Michael Dukakis in 1988 have been linked in the public mind with the advocacy of a strong state in the domestic economic and welfare areas; a soft foreign and defense policy; and social permissiveness with respect to drugs, crime, family values, and sexual behavior." But that is saying something about the public mind.

Lipset is greatly impressed with the significance of American Marxist intellectuals, although he does not name or quote any of them. I can understand why American conservative intellectuals need to consider the Marxist intellectuals important. But for a person who lives in Washington, and not in Berkeley or Amherst, this story of the leftward movement of the American Left seems unreal. Perhaps that is because when I think of a Democratic party intellectual I think of Charles Schultze or Lawrence Summers, rather than of the unnamed Marxists Lipset has in mind.

Lipset says that, "the Democrats shifted to the Left in the 1960s and 1970s and have not reversed course in the 1980s." But where is George McGovern's Demogrant from the 1972 campaign? Where are all the national planning proposals of the 1970s? Where is "incomes policy," the panacea of Democratic economists for two decades? Where is comprehensive "industrial policy"? All gone with the wind.

And what is it that these left-leaning Democrats want now? They want to mandate unpaid leave for pregnant women. Having seen the top marginal rate of personal income tax come down from 70 percent to 33 percent, some would like to extend that 33 percent to the highest-income taxpayers, who now only pay a marginal rate of 28 percent. Some would like to spend a little more than Mr. Bush proposes on drug treatment centers or on cleaning the environment. Some would like to cut defense spending a little more than Mr. Bush proposes. Such ideas may be foolish. But, singly or taken all together, they do not make the difference between a first way system and a third way system. For some of them it is difficult to say even whether they constitute a step towards the third way or towards the first.

But suppose we knew that American Left leaders want more government activism, while Left leaders elsewhere want less—what would that signify? Would it mean that the Americans are going in a different, exceptional, and presumably wrong, direction? To use Viner's metaphor again, if some people are going south from Baltimore to Washington and some are going north from Richmond to Washington, are they going in different directions and is one party wrong? If a fat man is trying to lose weight and a thin one is trying to gain, are they in agreement or in disagreement? In many respects, the United States has less government intervention in the economy than other countries. Suppose that in our hypothetical, and impossible-to-construct, measure of governmentness, the U.S. has a score of four and other countries have a score of six. Would it be a sign of our

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"exceptionalism," and error, if we moved towards five while the others also moved towards five?

I do not ask these questions to support or reject any particular policies. The point is rather that these questions and the answers to them are irrelevant to the real policy issues before us. There are serious problems in this country and serious questions about policies to deal with them. We need to think as carefully as we can about the likely effectiveness of the available policies and about the priority of competing national objectives. The classification of policies as Left or Right, liberal or conservative, capitalist or socialist, first way or third way, does not contribute to that process but obstructs it.

Lipset Responds:

IN HIS CRITIQUE of my article, Herbert Stein presents two main arguments. The first addresses the decline of the third way, and the second the issue of American "reverse exceptionalism."

Concerning the former, Stein argues that as all contemporary economies are "third way" ones, characterized by a relatively high degree of "governmentness," they are neither capitalist nor communist. As Stein puts it: "The first way ended with Hoover and the second way ended with Gorbachev." It is false, therefore to argue the third way is dead. On the contrary: "Only the third way survives."

Concerning the latter, Stein rejects my conclusion that "one major exception to this global movement to the Right is provided by our own left-of-center party, the Democrats," and challenges my contention that "the Democrats shifted to the Left in the 1960s and 1970s and have not reversed course in the 1980s." Beyond disagreeing with this thesis, Stein argues further that even if one were to suppose "that American Left leaders want more government activism, while Left leaders elsewhere want less," this would not necessarily mean that the American Left is going in a different direction from the others, as "in many respects, the United States has less government intervention in the economy than other countries," and, thus, the two Lefts, like a fat man trying to lose weight and a thin one trying to gain weight, could be seen as converging rather than diverging.

My answer to the first argument is that I never made the point Stein rejects. What I wrote is: "Although hardly revolutionary, these changes have great *ideological* significance, for they represent a decisive withdrawal from centralizing and redistributionist *doctrines* on the part of the democratic Left. In country after country during the last decade, socialist and other left-wing parties have taken the *road* back to capitalism" (emphasis added). In other words, I did not say that economic policies implemented by various socialist parties in the past decade resulted in less "governmentness" than during what Stein describes as the era of "intact" or "high" capitalism, i.e., before the Great Depression. Rather, I contended that in the last ten years there have been important changes in the ideologies and doctrines of the democratic Left toward accepting entrepreneurship, profits, and the market as the main engines driving the economy which have led to economic policies that increase the importance of the market relative to the government as a means of resource allocation. Thus, I never used the term the "the death of the third way" to mean the end of what is sometimes called "mixed economies."

The third way, as used in recent writings about Eastern Europe, refers to a social democratic path *à la* Sweden between communism and capitalism. Many political analysts,

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including Western social democrats and activists in Eastern Europe, have concluded that the choice does not exist, that the option is between primarily market-oriented and state-controlled economies. For example, Pierre Mauroy, prime minister of the first majority Socialist government in French history (formed in 1981 by Francois Mitterrand), noted in the spring of 1990: "We thought we could find a third way, but it turned out there isn't one." Kjell Olaf Feldt, a leading Swedish Socialist theoretician and, until recently, finance minister, argued: "The market economy's facility for change and development and therefore economic growth has done more to eliminate poverty and 'the exploitation of the working class' than any political intervention in the market system of distribution." Such statements constitute a political obituary for the third way.

STEIN DOES NOT like ideological labels, especially Left and Right. He defines them out of existence by noting that all Western and, in the future, Eastern economies involve varying degrees of state participation. He states that since such systems are not by any classical definition typically capitalist or socialist, they are "surely part of the third way." But, as he also notes, these issues "are all matters of terminology." Even American state and national governments were directly involved in the economy in the early and late nineteenth centuries. As Louis Hartz and Oscar Handlin documented, many American states fostered government ownership of industries, particularly transportation and banks. Ostragorski described the McKinley tariff as legitimating socialism. Mercantilism never ended in Europe.

In the post-World War II political world, the economic choices have been (a) between varying forms of market economies, which include some statism, and communism; and (b) within Western societies, over the degree of government involvement in the economy and the extent of social welfare. The term "third way" used to refer to efforts to build social democratic systems which placed increasing emphasis on statist economic and welfare policies. The "first way" resisted or sought to reverse the trend. The "second way" pressed for communism.

In my article, I sought to document that almost all social democratic parties now recognize in principle that statism, as they have practiced it, has been dysfunctional, the role of government must be reduced, tax progressivity has gone too far, and market mechanisms should be given greater priority. But these are not all-or-nothing propositions. They are matters of more-or-less, and the emphasis now is on *less*—in Stein's words, "more freedom for private markets and less government involvement." The fact that the social democrats now see the world in this way means to me that, in political terms, there is no third way.

Stein seems to agree with part of the above interpretation. He writes: "Certainly it is true, as Lipset shows, that in the past decade in much of the world, parties of the 'Left' have come to sound much less socialist than they used to do. 'Market' has become an acceptable word." However, he defends the Democratic party from the accusation of "reverse exceptionalism" by arguing that various major "antimarket" items espoused earlier by the party have been dropped.

It is difficult to agree with Stein on this. Let us look, for example, at the 1988 Democratic Platform, "Revival of Hope." According to Stein, "Market has become an acceptable word" among the non-American parties of the democratic Left. But the word "market" is absent from the economic section of the 1988 Democratic Platform, while the terms "government" and "administration" are repeatedly included. Though Australian Labor party prime minister Robert Hawke and other social democrats have argued "the move in the share of national income away from wages toward profits. . . has enabled us to grow. . . ", the 1988 Democratic Platform contends that "the time has come for America to take charge once again of its economic future, to reverse. . . 'trickle down' policies. . . . " Can a party whose economic plat-

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form uses the term "trickle down" policies be considered as understanding the role of profits in driving the economy? "Where are all the national planning proposals of the 1970s?" asks Stein. But what is the "targeted economic development" advocated in the 1988 Democratic Platform, if not "national planning" in different words?

Another good indicator of the "reverse exceptionalism" of the Democratic Party vis-á-vis major issues of economic policy emerges in the context of the conflict between the Bush administration and the Democratic-dominated Congress concerning capital gains taxation. As Sven Steinmo has documented, the United States "taxes capital gains more heavily than *any* of its democratic counterparts." Yet Congress rejects Bush's proposal to lower capital gains taxes. This Democratic rejection is justified in terms of opposition to a tax "give away" to the rich, a view which again does not show much appreciation for the role of profits in driving the economy, and ignores the fact that capital gains income is not uniquely the province of the rich. For example, the IRS data for 1987 show that, while 49 percent of all capital gains income accrues to the 8 percent of the capital gains taxpayers with incomes in the $100,000 plus bracket, "70 percent of the 10.3 million tax returns reporting capital gains income were filed by taxpayers with gross incomes below $50,000."

Stein also disagrees with my emphasis on the impact of a left-leaning intellectual world on the body politic, citing the conservatism of economic policy advisers. I would agree with him that economists are much more conservative, more market-oriented, than other social scientists, humanists, journalists, and those in the creative arts world. But the latter, disproportionately on the Left as much survey data demonstrate, have considerable influence on the national agenda, on setting priorities and programs in the social and welfare policy arenas, and on the opinions of Democratic party activists and through them party nominations. The weakness or absence of effective party structures in the U.S. makes these intellectuals more important politically than in parliamentary countries, which have much stronger parties.

It is difficult to agree with Stein's "fat man getting thinner—thin man getting fatter" argument. Although government ownership is less prevalent in America than in most other Western countries, redistributive progressive tax policies are not. The United States, as Sven Steinmo documents, "relies substantially more heavily on 'redistributive' individual and corporate income taxes and property inheritance and wealth taxes than either Britain or Sweden." Almost all developed countries draw a much larger proportion of their government revenues from sales and value added taxes than does America.

To sum up, the choice is between greater or lesser emphases on statism, the market, and redistributive policies. The social democrats and much of the communist world now favor less statism, more market control, and less emphasis on redistribution. American Democrats press in the opposite direction. But to grant Stein's truism, none is or will be purely capitalist or socialist.

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Meetings Without End

Robert W. Tucker

THE END OF the Cold War has given rise to a wave of speculation and debate over the future of American foreign policy. Predictably, this takes the form of a reconsideration of the American purpose. Other nations may have foreign policies defined and dominated by interests, but this nation's foreign policy must be understood above all in terms of purpose. That, at any rate, is the nation's self-understanding—one that not only sees foreign policy largely in moral terms, but also as something that is quite consciously and deliberately contrived. Now, as in the past, the prevailing dialogue on foreign policy proceeds from the assumption that we must first decide what our purpose is in the world and then determine how we may achieve this purpose. It is the latter activity that we normally think of as foreign policy. Needless to say, this distinctive outlook reflects an equally distinctive experience, one in which statecraft has been equated far more with freedom than with necessity and in which security has only seldom been a matter of first order importance.

In all the discussions of what the future holds for this nation's foreign policy, few have asked what the future holds for those whose professional commitment has been to activities for which there may be a declining need in coming years. A legion of defense specialists has presumably been dealt a body blow by recent events. So too, the arms controllers find themselves in what may be a doomed specialty. And while the effects of the developments on foreign policy experts as such would appear to be less marked, they too have felt the ground shaking under them.

These groups make up what is generally considered as the foreign-policy community. It is a community distinctive to the nation's capital. There are, of course, individuals to be found beyond Washington—in universities, in institutes, in media, etc.—who also think, talk, and write about issues of foreign and defense policy. Still, Washington is a case apart. It is here where the action is, where policy is made, just as it is here where the great majority of foreign-policy professionals live and work. And of course it is in Washington that meetings on foreign and defense policy proliferate without apparent limit. Washington probably has more such meetings in a week than most cities have in a year. To attend a substantial number of these meetings is mandatory for the professionals, for it is perhaps the principal way of making their presence, and hopefully even their thoughts, known. The professionals read, just as they write, but they talk far more than either, and mostly in meetings.

In its addiction to meetings, as in other respects, the foreign-policy community resembles those who have official responsibility

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for conducting foreign and defense policy. The resemblance is not accidental. The ways of the community are largely the ways of the government bureaucracy, if only because the community serves as a training ground of sorts for the bureaucracy. Then, too, a large percentage of those who have held government positions, on leaving office become (whether once again or for the first time) members of the community. To be sure, not all professionals aspire to hold, at some point in their career, a significant government post. But most of them do, and understandably so. To pass one's professional life without having held any official position is to risk being seen as a mere voyeur, or, what amounts to the same, an academic. As such, it is asked, how can one ever really know what the great game is really about? The commonplace assumption is that after a certain point, mastery of the game can only be gained by playing it, not merely thinking about or imagining it. This is why even near callow youth, if only it has once been a deputy assistant secretary, can often lay claim to an authority that its knowledge and maturity of judgement would otherwise never entitle it.

The justification of the foreign-policy community's existence presumably must be found principally in the contribution it makes to improving the quality of the nation's foreign and defense policies. The size and significance of that community, one must further assume, bears a meaningful relation to the importance of these policies to the nation. This being so, a decline in their importance could be expected to result in a corresponding decline in the size and significance of a community that enjoyed substantial growth in the 1970s and 1980s. Perhaps this is one reason why there are so few real "declinists" in the foreign-policy community. It is one thing for academics to embrace the declinist view; they can always go on teaching and writing. For those dependent on the mutable forces of the Washington market in foreign policy, the matter is more serious.

However reasonable the assumption of a rough correspondence between the significance of foreign and defense policy and the size of the foreign-policy community, experience suggests a rather more complex relationship. Certainly, the assumed correspondence did not appear to hold for an earlier period. In the mid–1950s, when I came to Washington, the primacy of foreign over domestic policy was almost uncontested. The great postwar contest had been fully joined for half a decade, a substantial war had been fought in its name, and, as a result, the American alliance system had been extended throughout Asia as well as Europe. In a sense that has not been true for over a generation, Washington was the imperial capital of the noncommunist world. Its decisions and policies went virtually unchallenged by its still weak allies.

EVEN SO, the Washington foreign-policy community was at the time very modest compared with what was later to come. Of the many institutes and centers in existence today, there was scarcely one that existed then, save Brookings, and Brookings during those years was not much to speak of in foreign policy. In 1957, the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies began its activities. Founded largely as a result of the efforts of Paul Nitze, the center's first director was Arnold Wolfers. The center was for a time *sui generis*. Admitted in 1959 as a very junior member to its charmed circle, I can still vividly recall its weekly meetings and the sense of anticipation with which I looked forward to them (as did my contemporaries Robert Osgood and George Liska). No doubt, this anticipation was in part a reflection of age and experience—or rather inexperience. In part, however, it reflected the time. The late 1950s and early 1960s were years of what seemed at the time to be a world crisis without end. Although oppressive, it was also somehow exhilarating. For this was clearly still an age dominated by high politics with its ever-present threat of war between the major powers. The triumph of economics over politics, a development that has gone hand in

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hand with the decline in utility of military power, lay in the future.

The center's meetings also evoked a sense of keen anticipation by virtue of their high quality. This was due in the first place to the participants. Between Wolfers and Nitze, the best of two worlds, the academic and the policy-making, were brought together. The participants included such figures as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Dean Acheson, and Christian Herter. But the quality of the meetings was due as well to the care and seriousness Wolfers devoted to them. For the director of a center or institute to pay comparable attention today to a weekly meeting would be viewed as bordering on the eccentric. This, however, was a time before the age of inflation and hype, and people attending such meetings expected that their time would be reasonably well-spent. Today, that very expectation must also appear eccentric. There is a kind of Gresham's Law that applies to meetings, and it has been at work in Washington for some time. Thirty years ago, it had yet to take a firm hold.

As far as I could ever determine, the Washington Center did not have any direct or measurable effects on policy, certainly nothing comparable to the impact, say, of the Cambridge group with its theories of nuclear deterrence and arms control. The center's policy impact seemed almost inversely proportional to the quality of its discussions and occasional writings. If there was any real influence at work it was at best indirect. To the extent the center had an agenda, it was—apart from providing a meeting ground for academics and practitioners—to promote a realist perspective in foreign policy. With what success it did this must remain speculative. A realist perspective cannot be encapsulated the way a theory of deterrence can. Nor can the effects of accepting the former be meaningfully compared with the effects of accepting the latter.

The great expansion of the foreign-policy community began in the late 1960s and coincided with the breakdown of the vaunted postwar consensus occasioned by the intervention in Vietnam. It seems clear that there was a relationship between the two developments. The Cold War consensus had been presided over by what was known then and later as the "foreign-policy establishment." A relatively small group, the establishment consisted of persons otherwise identifiable by their social background, the schools they attended, and the independent means they frequently possessed. The establishment did not congregate for the most part in Washington; a large part lived elsewhere, particularly New York. Nor did its members normally consider foreign policy their profession, as do most members of the foreign-policy community today. Even so, they entertained a fairly constant interest in foreign affairs generally—they were almost invariably generalists, whatever their professional background—and, at one time or another, managed to serve in some official position.

IN THE YEARS before World War II, this establishment constituted to all intents and purposes the entire foreign-policy community. Given the American role in the world after the war, this equation did not and could not hold to the degree it once had. Still, to a remarkable extent, it persisted into the 1960s. A number of factors contributed to its decline thereafter. The very magnitude of the task of conducting the nation's foreign policy had already eroded a traditional role. Then, too, progressive specialization made the position of the generalist increasingly difficult. Moreover, even without Vietnam, the nation would have moved in a direction that was ever more at odds with what many had come to resent as an elitist preserve. This resentment could even be found in high places, as it was in the years of the Nixon administration.

Even so, it remains true that it was Vietnam that dealt the critical blow. The establishment had not only presided over a great failure, but in doing so had lost the self-assurance it once possessed. The breakdown of the old consensus and the discrediting of those who had been the traditional

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repositories of wisdom in foreign policy opened the way to outsiders long kept at arm's length from the *sanctum sanctorum* with its arcane knowledge. The great mystique that had previously attached to the enterprise was now gone. The essential precondition for the democratization as well as the expansion of the enterprise had occurred.

The shattering of the old consensus resulted in a vacuum that was no sooner created than it began to be filled. No longer presided over by a group that had claimed foreign policy as part of its patrimony, foreign policy became the object of struggle and contention in a way it had not been before. The old establishment had had no need to identify with either a political party or any particular pressure group. It could, and did, disdain the normal political process, and in this sense it was, as it claimed, above politics and partisanship. Now, however, the foreign-policy process began to resemble and to reflect the domestic political process, with its clash of parties and the proliferation of pressure groups, often institutionalized in the form of centers, institutes, and foundations. With institutionalization frequently came permanence or something close to it. Thus the persistence today of groups and institutions that arose by virtue of issues and ideologies that either no longer exist or are no longer relevant. But in a rapidly changing international environment there are always new causes to espouse.

The foreign-policy process not only became politicized as it had not been in the past, it also became professionalized. As already noted, the old establishment was made up of generalists who took pride in their nonprofessional status. Their right to manage foreign policy was based on prescription and their record (until Vietnam). But for many of the *nouveaux* who appeared in the wake of Vietnam, professionalization was in large part the basis of their claim to play the game. The emphasis on professionalization was not seen as incompatible with the politicization of the foreign-policy process. That a person was regarded as a professional did not preclude the active support of particular causes and policies, including those within the field of the person's expertise. On the contrary, having the standing of an expert was more often than not a means of participating more effectively in the struggle to shape a particular policy. To be considered an expert conferred a standing and a right to be heard that might otherwise prove difficult to obtain. The expert, being a professional, was expected to have a sense of responsibility, a commitment to the standards of a profession, that the layman might not have. These considerations notwithstanding, there is little in the record to support the view that the professionalization of the foreign-policy community has had the effect of moderating the political struggle over policy. The history of arms-control policy in the past two decades provides an instructive example in this respect.

IN THE 1970s, the consequences of the great transformation precipitated by Vietnam were quite destructive. The liberals used the new dispensation as a means of attacking the president and thus contributing to the cycle of hostility and isolation that ultimately resulted in Watergate and the president's resignation. At the close of the decade, conservatives made use of the same means to thoroughly discredit an administration. That in each instance the victim made a significant contribution to his demise was quite true. Nevertheless, were it not for the changes that had occurred in the foreign-policy community, it is doubtful that issues of foreign policy would and could have been employed with comparable effect. In the 1980s, they were not so employed, in part because of the personal popularity of the president and in even greater part because of the overall success of Reagan's foreign policy. This moderation of the struggle over foreign policy, which has continued thus far in the Bush administration, may well be reversed should the apparently benign international scene begin to worsen. For the elements that only yesterday made up that struggle remain firmly in place.

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These remarks ought not to be read as a lament for the old days, let alone as a plea for their return. There is no going back. A substantial change in American society has since taken place and many more groups now demand a hearing and desire to play a role in the shaping of foreign policy. The myriad organizations that today form a part of the foreign-policy process cannot be dismissed as little more than beltway bandits who represent only their own narrow interests. It would be much nearer the truth to see them as broadly representative of the diversity of American opinion in a way the old establishment was not and never could be.

To say this, however, is not to say that the new dispensation has also resulted in the improvement of the nation's foreign policy. Despite the vast expansion of the foreign-policy community, the more representative character of the groups that now comprise it, and the far greater expertise it now has, the policy results are at best ambiguous. The old establishment was like the little girl in the nursery rhyme; when she was good, she was very good, but when she was bad, she was horrid. The establishment was responsible for the grand design of postwar American foreign policy, but it was also responsible for Vietnam. The successors to the establishment may be expected to avoid future Vietnams, but they have yet to show that they can devise successful grand designs.

Will they in any event continue to proliferate? Defense specialists excepted, the likely prospect is that they will. Even the arms controllers appear to have a reasonably assured future, barring a complete disintegration of the Soviet Union. The task of building down promises to be as complicated and drawn out as that of building up. For the rest, the new international politics resulting from the ever increasing interdependence of states will surely thrust to the fore a whole new set of issues for the foreign-policy community to examine and debate in meetings without end.

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
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